THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

Wanted: A Universal Religion.

The War is a world war, and its problems are world problems. Consequently the solution of these problems has to be a world solution. Never before has mankind been faced with a crisis of this magnitude. The hearts of many are 'failing them for fear and for expectation of those things which are coming upon the earth,'[1] for they feel that mankind is unequal to the situation. Such an attitude, however, must not be, and cannot be, that of a Christian who is a supporter of the cause of the Allies and a believer in the principles laid down in the Atlantic Charter—which, we may add, is also the 'Pacific' Charter, since there can be no permanent world peace without acceptance of that Charter and persistent loyalty to its ideals. The spirit of those who are convinced of these things is also expressed in a phrase derived from Primitive Christian Apocalyptic literature:

> 'Look up and lift up your heads for your redemption draweth nigh.'[2]

Mr. F. A. Voigt, formerly Berlin correspondent to the *Manchester Guardian*, is of this tribe, as his recent address to the Church Union's Summer School of Sociology at Oxford (reported in the *Oxford Mail* of August 18) testifies. Dealing with the war, he said:

> 'In this task there lies before us an opportunity such as Providence has never conferred upon any nation in the history of mankind.'

In order to achieve a permanent solution, beneficial to mankind, it is needful to be rigorously clear-headed, not only in determining what are the values which it is needful to secure in this struggle,

[1] *Lk.* xxi, 26. [2] *Lk.* xxi, 28.

but also the sequence in which these values must be arranged. Mr. Voigt arranges these essential values thus: (1) Religious, (2) Moral, (3) Political, (4) Economic.

In putting religious and moral values at the top of his scale, Mr. Voigt thinks as a Christian. 'Seek first the Kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all things needful for this life shall be added unto you,' is a *dictum* of the Founder of the Christian Religion. The secularists, whether they are Communist, Socialist or Humanist, disagree violently with the valuation which Mr. Voigt assigns to Religion, but often times their opposition to it is a fight in the dark. They estimate Religion as worthless and detrimental — the 'opiate of the people'— because of the kind of religion with which they have been faced and the kind of morality to which this religion has been united. Such religion and morality are, they maintain, opposed to human progress and have constantly been on the side of oppression and stagnation, obscurantism and injustice. Alas! this charge is all too true, and, worst of all, this religion and morality have been called Christian.

As a consequence, our secularists reject the proposal that the Christian Religion is the most needful of all forces in securing the solution of our present-day world problems. Yet we cannot but believe that the Christian Religion is the most important of the factors which must be used if our world problems — religious, social, political, economic — are to be solved. Everything, however, depends upon the answer given to the crucial question, 'What is the Christian Religion and what is the morality integral to it?'

We might suppose that nothing would be easier for Christians than agreement here, but as a matter of fact nothing is more difficult. Whilst all are agreed upon a few religious and moral fundamentals, yet only a minority are agreed that those fundamentals on which all are agreed are sufficient for salvation. In other words, Christians are in disagreement as to the number of the Christian fundamentals. For one body of Christians one thing is fundamental: for other bodies of Christians there are several fundamentals: for the vast majority of Christians there are many fundamentals. This is disconcerting and complicates the present-day religious situation, but it is all explicable — though perhaps not justifiable — in the light of Christian History. Richard Baxter was right when he asserted that

> 'The plague of the Church for above a thousand years has been the enlarging of our Creed and making more fundamentals than God ever made.'

What we have in the Christian Religion of to-day is a series of Christian Religions superimposed on each other, and in most cases the latest Christian Religion subsumes the earlier forms. We have:

(1) the Religion *of* Jesus Christ himself;
(2) the Religion *about* Jesus Christ;
(3) the Religion of the Christian Church, its office, ministry and sacraments;
(4) the Religion of Conciliar Orthodoxy, beginning with Nicaea (325 A.D.);
(5) the Religion of the Papacy;
(6) the Religion of Mediaeval Scholasticism;
(7) the Religion of the Protestant Reformation (Calvanist, Lutheran, Anabaptist, Humanist).

Obviously we cannot expect the whole human race to-day to accept the Christian Religion in this highly developed form as the universal religion of mankind. Some may question whether we are justified in expecting the world to accept the Christian Religion at all in any form whatsoever. As Christians who believe in the Christian Religion as essentially *the* Religion of Humanity, we are compelled, when the issue of the need for a world religion is advanced, to maintain that the Christian Religion is the only religion which is able to meet this world-need. It is in no spirit of fanaticism or intolerance or pharisaical arrogance that we make this claim for the Christian Religion. We recognize with reverence the religious truth possessed in varying degrees by the other religions of mankind, but we are convinced that of the existing religions the only religion to-day which stands any chance of becoming universal is the Christian Religion, and that because in its purest form it is the highest product of religious evolution. We acknowledge that too often the Christian Religion has been presented to mankind in forms which are corrupt and by methods which have been unchristian. Nevertheless, *abusus non usum tollit* —'the misuse of a thing taketh not away its lawful use.' What is necessary is to secure the purest, most practical and most universal form of the Christian Religion and to offer that to mankind as the most precious factor in the securing and maintenance of world peace. Here let us add, to save misconception, that we do not hold that such a religion can by itself secure world peace. Other factors—scientific, political, economic—are also needed.

When we enquire where this purest and most universal form of the Christian Religion is to be obtained, the answer is that it must be obtained from the fountain-head. It must be the Religion of Jesus Christ Himself. Difficulties face us here: (1) the New Testament records of the teaching of Jesus are mixed with later elements; (2) there are elements in the Religion of Jesus Christ which were temporary and local and reflect the limitations of His age. But these need not trouble us to-day, since there survives enough of His Religion in its most essential, practical and universal form to supply mankind to-day and for ever with all the highest religious values that mankind needs. These are contained in:

(*a*) The Two Great Commandments:

'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and soul and mind and strength, and thy neighbour as thyself.'

(*b*) The seven[3] Beatitudes:

(i) Blessed are the holy and humble men of heart: for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven.
(ii) Blessed are they that mourn for sin: for they shall be comforted.
(iii) Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled.
(iv) Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy.
(v) Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.
(vi) Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called sons of God.
(vii) Blessed are they that are persecuted for righteousness' sake: for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven.

(*c*) The Lord's Prayer:

'Our Father in heaven: Hallowed be Thy name: Thy Kingdom come: Thy will be done, as in heaven, so on earth. Give us this day our daily bread: Forgive us our offences as we forgive them that offend against us: Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil: For Thine is the Kingdom and the Power and the Glory for ever and ever.

What is to prevent this constituting the basis of the world religion of which mankind stands in such grievous need to-day? Can we not begin here, even though, as many Christians would maintain, we ought not to be satisfied to end here? We believe that it is quite possible to-day for Jews, Mohammedans and Christians to unite together in praying the Lord's Prayer and in affirming the obligation of the Two Great Commandments and the blessedness of those who possess the spirit of the Beatitudes. The only thing that it seems to us they would object to would be that they should in consequence be regarded as disloyal to Judaism or to Islam. If this religion of mankind were not called the Christian Religion, but the Religion of the Divine Fatherhood and the Human Brotherhood and professed as such, without any suggestion that such an acceptance implied any kind of disloyalty to their traditional religious systems; and if the same point of view could be adopted by the many millions of Christians who are members of the divided Christian Churches; and if all these Jews, Mohammedans and Christians, and possibly also vast multitudes of Confucians, Buddhists and Sikhs, could unite for the purpose of practising and propagating this religion of the Divine Fatherhood and the Human Brotherhood, we should have made an enormous advance towards securing for mankind the world religion of whose spiritual and moral values mankind stands in such grievous need to-day.

May we look, and not look in vain, to the leaders of the Christian, Jewish, and Mohammedan Religions to undertake this venture of faith?

[3] We have omitted the third Beatitude, since it is a partial duplication of the first Beatitude combined with *Psalm* xxxvii, verse 11.

Sir Walter Moberly's Definitions of Religious Education.

Sir Walter Moberly, formerly Vice-Chancellor of Manchester University, in his recent pamphlet *The Churches and the Teachers*,[1] has made a valuable contribution towards the solution of our national religious educational problem. He holds that clear definition of what is meant by Religious Education is a prime necessity and that many of the misunderstandings between Church leaders and school teachers arise from this lack of clear definition. Sir Walter assigns five senses in which the term 'Religious Education' may be understood in the present crisis:

(1) The first sense is *Scriptural Knowledge*: the outline of the Bible story and study of selected portions of the Scriptures, explained from the point of view of those by and for whom the Scriptures were first written down.

(2) The second sense is *the inculcation of Christian Moral Values* for the purpose of framing individual character and developing a right communal life. Sir Walter points out:

> 'Our war-time experience shows that, when it comes to the pinch, young men of all classes are prepared to die for their country. But, so far, there is nothing to distinguish them from the Nazis. Yet the sense is widespread that this war is not only a struggle for existence, but that the ultimate issue is between two rival ways of life. It is widely felt that the way for which we are fighting, however unworthily, is not only "democratic" as against "totalitarian," but also "Christian" as against "pagan." But this sense needs to become more articulate. At present the contrast is marked between the clarity with which we realize what we are fighting against and the general vagueness about what we are fighting for.
>
> Events are now forcing us to face the question—"Must not the nation base its communal life, more consciously and decisively than hitherto, upon some positive ethical standpoint?" If we now claim to be defending the values of Christian civilization, must we not seek to embody those values in our national life? If so, must not this be recognized in our national system of education? In that case a broadly Christian ethic will be taught in the schools, not merely as a set of interesting ideas which certain people hold or once held, but as what is right and binding and what demands allegiance' (p. 8).

(3) The third sense of Religious Education is *the cultivation of that 'deep disturbing sense of the living God'* which was the motive power of such representative Englishmen as Oliver Cromwell and Doctor Johnson, Gladstone and General Gordon: in short, Religious Education which teaches those who receive it to believe in the 'divine governance and guidance and . . . the utter dependence of man's well-being on his relation to God.'

(4) The fourth sense of Religious Education is *instruction in the 'Christian faith and in the sense in which it is held in common*

[1] *The Churches and the Teachers*. Published for the National Society by the Press and Publications Board of the Church Assembly, 1942. Price 6*d*.

by all the major Christian bodies and receives theological formulation in the Apostles' Creed.'

(5) The fifth sense of Religious Education is '*training in Churchmanship*' with the purpose of making the pupils, whether English Churchmen or Free Churchmen or Roman Catholics 'all to be members of some worshipping community.' Sir Walter admits that denominationalism is an evil, but asks: 'Is it not a lesser evil than the absence of any Church attachment at all? . . . When all is said that can be said of the narrowness and "churchiness" of the existing churches, is it not plain that the great mass of those who drop out of the worshipping community fall away also from any living, personal faith or practice?'

Sir Walter holds that there will be no difficulty in securing Religious Education in our schools in senses (1) and (2). There might be difficulty about securing Religious Education in our schools in sense (3), but there is little doubt that in our present situation this also could be secured. He writes that our national custom of prayers at the opening of sessions of Parliament or Assizes and at the morning assemblies of most of our schools testifies to the national belief, often very vague, in the value of maintaining right relations with the Eternal, and, as Sir Walter remarks, 'probably only a small minority would wish these prayers to be discontinued.' If the prayers are to be retained, then the belief in God's governance and guidance which justifies such a practice ought also to be taught in our schools.

Sir Walter recognizes that (4) constitutes a very real barrier to agreement and co-operation between the Church leaders and the school teachers. He doubts whether the majority of the parents value this kind of religious instruction or would support a policy of Religious Education which officially included it. There is no doubt that the majority of the school teachers would decline to undertake such a task. They are opposed to dogmatic Christian Education; but are they to blame if they regard the Apostles' Creed as presenting many Christian dogmas in an out-of-date form? If only Christian dogma were taught in a modern way, and if this method were encouraged by the Churches, many teachers might be induced to undertake the task. The trouble is due to wrong dogmas being taught in the wrong way. We need the true and right Christian dogmas to be taught scientifically, historically and experimentally.

The situation is summed up by Sir Walter Moberly in an admirably sympathetic passage marked by deep insight and conscientious understanding:

> 'We must recognize that the number of teachers and of parents who will feel unable to take this last step with us is very substantial. We shall

be asked—and we ought to ask ourselves—whether we are not really a minority claiming the privilege of a majority. If we look for more than a nominal adherence must we not confess that, even in this country, Christianity is now the religion of a minority and perhaps of a small minority? If so, is it not more honest, and in the long run more wise, to face the facts and to draw the natural deductions from them? Should not the churches cease to expect the schools of the nation to do their work for them? Should they not devote themselves, through their pulpits and Sunday schools, through such other schools as they can provide from their own resources, and through the Christian homes which they can influence, to teaching the Faith to the few who are willing and able to receive it?

The crucial question is this. Does the Christianity of the churches possess, or can it win, sufficient public support to be recognized as the basis on which the British Nation will endeavour to build its corporate life and on which our national educational system is to rest? The answer cannot be given with confidence. The issue remains to be decided. Many of the signs are unfavourable; and not least among these is the present estrangement from the churches of so much of the best of the life of the nation.'

Divine Overruling and the War.

As the war with all its suffering and strain is prolonged, the difficulty of believing in the Divine governance and guidance of the creative process, and especially of human history, is increasing. The Prayer Book suffrage (1662), 'Give peace in our time, O Lord; because there is none other that fighteth for us but only Thou, O God,' seemed to many to lack convincing sequence. Accordingly it was altered in the Deposited Prayer Book (1927-28) to 'Give peace in our time, O Lord; because there is none other that ruleth the world, but only Thou, O God.' When the attention of a philosophical theologian was directed to this revision, he asked, 'Does God rule the world?' Many less well equipped to-day are asking the same question. Sir Walter Moberly has recently stressed the need for 'inducing in the youth of to-day faith in Divine guidance and governance.' How is this to be done? It is no easy task, and we venture here to emphasize only three points.

(1) If modern youth is to develop faith in the Divine guidance and governance of the creative process and human history, youth must be taught by its religious teachers to take the longest, broadest and deepest views possible. Short views, narrow views, superficial views of the creative process and of human history must make faith in Divine guidance and governance impossible for modern youth. 'Use large maps,' was Lord Curzon's advice to British politicians. 'Cultivate large views in your pupils' is sound advice for religious educationists.

When we strive to view the creative process as a whole, we become aware that we cannot view it as a whole: which means that we cannot secure a demonstrable proof of its true nature but only a proof which is 'probable'—to use Bishop Butler's phrase.

Aristotle's great *dictum*, 'the nature of a thing is that which it is when its becoming is completed,' drives home why proof of Divine governance derived from the creative process can only be probable and not demonstrable. When we study the trend of the creative process, particularly in biological evolution from proto-plasm to proto-plast (Sir Thomas Browne's term for the first man), there seems to be evidence of rationality — the operation of a Divine creative will. In human history also, beginning with primitive man and coming down to the most highly developed types of modern man and his achievements, there seems to be evidence of rational, moral and spiritual progress.

We have of course to admit that many great scientists do not recognize evidence of any rational creative will operating in their sphere. This is partly due to the tendency of the method of modern science towards departmentalism, which demands that the individual scientist shall ever strive to learn 'more and more about less and less.' Moreover, his researches are restricted for the most part to that aspect of Nature which can be perceived by the five senses; and yet how incomplete an aspect of Nature that is. Also, great historians — H. A. L. Fisher and Edward Gibbon — failed to recognize any Divine guidance and governance in human history. This may have been due partly to departmentalism although the sphere of their historic studies embraced wide reaches, but it was more probably due to the very exacting standard of evidence for historic truth which they demanded. Their concern was with certainty, not probability. The failure of many great scientists and many great historians to recognize Divine guidance and governance is a fact of very serious importance; yet it is not, we believe, of such overwhelming weight as to render the recognition of Divine guidance and governance irrational.

(2) Another reason for failure to recognize the Divine guidance and governance is due to looking for its evidence in the wrong way. Striving to find God's guidance and governance in miraculous interventions — the striving, as Dean Inge has said, to see God 'through the chinks in his universe.' For modern scientists and modern historians this method is doomed to failure. Scientific research and historical criticism have produced the collapse of 'the miraculous.' It is not affirmed by these investigators that miracles cannot happen. Their view is that of a philosophical theologian: 'Of laws of Nature which never can be broken, we know nothing; of laws of Nature which never are broken, we know a good deal.' It is necessary, therefore, to look for evidence of Divine guidance and governance in the course of Nature and the course of human history as a whole. Many will reply, 'If we cannot see it in the parts, how can we see it in the whole? If God does

not intervene in Nature and History, where does his guidance and governance come in? Do you regard the universe merely as a machine or mechanism which God has set going and left to carry on of itself?' Certainly not.

Francis Bacon, the father of modern Science, asserted in one of his apophthegms, 'We rule Nature by obeying her.' The triumphs of modern Science are due to practising this axiom. First, the scientist devotes himself to discovering Nature's laws with an entirely open mind, and then with equal humility and devotion he practises obedience to those laws. By this means he obtains his mastery over Nature and is enabled with enlarging freedom to achieve his purposes and accomplish his will.

Now if this be man's way, we believe it also to be God's way. God has infinite knowledge of the laws of Nature, and it is by absolute obedience to those laws that he achieves his guidance and governance of the creative process. What we need as Christians is to unite to the conception of God as the Heavenly Father the conception also that he is the Supreme Scientist—not, as a long religious tradition has regarded him, the Great Magician. When the youth of the nation are taught to think of God as the Supreme Scientist, they will then be able to see evidence of Divine guidance and governance which the traditionalist way of looking for Divine governance prevents them from seeing. They will see it, not in miracles or Divine irruptions, but in the trend of the creative process in which not only a conservation of values but an augmentation of values is evident.

(3) Faith in Divine guidance and governance is not primarily derived from scientific research and historical investigation, although it can be strengthened or weakened as the result of these investigations. It seems to come to most British people as the result of religious education based on the Bible and supplemented by personal religious experience. This religious experience is developed by the practice of prayer and the sense of Divine guidance, protection, consolation which ensues from it. In short, faith in Divine guidance and governance originates and develops in the interior life. We must first look within for Divine guidance and governance, and find it there and yield to it there, before we can hope to recognize it convincingly in the creative process as a whole.

It seems to us that it is along these lines that faith in Divine guidance and governance must be and can be developed in modern youth. We may add that faith in Divine guidance and governance is impressively strengthened by the study of great personalities who have been convinced of its reality in their own lives.

MARY, THE STAR OF THE SEA.

The *Church Times*, in its leading article for August 14, entitled 'Mary, Star of the Sea,' celebrates on the eve of her Assumption (August 15) the benefits conferred on seafarers by *Maria, Stella Maris*. Of course the festival of the Assumption of the B.V.M. is not yet included in our Prayer Book Calendar, but so many additional festivals in honour of the Virgin were introduced into the Calendar of the Deposited Book of 1928 that we may expect, unless the Italian tide is deflected from our shores, that the Assumption will be added at the next revision of the Prayer Book. The *Church Times* leader, after recounting the benefits conferred on mariners and others who place their reliance on St. Mary, Star of the Sea, concludes with these words:

> 'Holy Mary, Mother of God, pray for the Church of thy Son and for the people whom He has redeemed.'

Some forty years ago, after a stormy passage in the Gulf of Lyons, we climbed up to inspect the Church of Notre Dame à la Garde, overlooking Marseilles, famous for many votive tablets and offerings dedicated to the Virgin Mary by those who believed she had delivered them from the perils of the sea. Why were these votive tablets dedicated to the Virgin Mary and not to the Divine Father, or to Him of whom it is written in the Gospels, 'What manner of man is this that even the wind and the sea obey him?' Charles Reade, Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford, provides the answer in his great historical novel, *The Cloister and the Hearth*. He has put it into the mouth of his Renaissance monk, Fra Colonna:

> 'Among the ancient vulgar only the mariners were monotheists: they worshiped *Venus*: called her *Stella maris*, and *Regina caelorum*. Among our vulgar only the mariners are monotheists: they worship the Virgin Mary, and call her the "Star of the Sea" and the "Queen of Heaven." Call you theirs a new religion? An old doublet with a new button' (chapter lxxiv).

In fact, this cultus of the Virgin Mary by those who go down to the sea in ships and occupy their business in great waters is a survival from Mediterranean paganism, a recrudescence in Christianity of a religion much older than Christianity. It is four centuries since the cultus of the Virgin Mary was removed from the public worship of our National Church, but to-day many endeavours are being made to re-introduce this cultus. Cards inscribed

> 'Mary, Mother of God, Pray for England, Peace, and Victory'

may be seen hanging beside Lady-Shrines in our English churches. Of course this is only one of the many 'Catholic novelties and oddities' which are steadily alienating numbers of the more thoughtful English laity from their parish churches. The persistent

encouragement of this sub-Christian cultus by the *Church Times*, the most popular of English clerical weeklies, indicates the growing support which the Romeward movement is receiving from our English clergy.

The cultus of the Virgin Mary—something very different from reverence for our Lord's mother—is definitely sub-Christian and had no place in the Primitive Christian Church until that Church began to be paganised. Public episcopal condemnation of it, although it would not extirpate it, would at least indicate to the disgruntled laity and to the weaker brethren among the clergy that our bishops are definitely opposed to it. Of course it is only sound Christian education dealing with the origin, development and the errors of this cultus which can finally secure its extirpation in our Church.

Many Church leaders to-day are complaining of the growing scepticism of the nation, but is not this due to the increasing penetration of superstition into our public worship? No student of Church history can have failed to note how often this pincer movement of scepticism and superstition has brought about the defeat of the Christian Religion. None can doubt the attitude of Christ to such a cultus. His words, 'Who is my mother and who are my brethren? . . . Whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother and sister and mother,' is not only a prophetic prohibition of such a cultus, but also a condemnation of those who would make physical relationship a basis for spiritual authority.

THOMAS ARNOLD'S CONTRIBUTION TO CHRISTIAN PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY

By the Right Rev. J. W. Hunkin, D.D., M.C., O.B.E., Bishop of Truro.

I.

A HUNDRED years ago on 12th June, 1842, at the very height of his power, and on the day before his forty-seventh birthday, Dr. Thomas Arnold suddenly died of *angina pectoris*. It was a thoroughly Christian end, full of faith and fortitude. With characteristic dash he plunged into the narrow river and was soon across.

His life was of like mettle. Born into a cultured home, he passed full-sail through Winchester and Oxford to a Fellowship at Oriel. 'Cheerful Tommy,' as John Keble once called him, then had the excellent sense to marry Mary Penrose, a Cornish girl five years older than himself, who proved to be a most understanding

and never-failing support. The pair settled at Laleham on the Thames for eight years of unruffled happiness. Arnold occupied himself with reading (chiefly Roman History and Thucydides) and writing and taking pupils. In 1827 he was appointed Headmaster of Rugby at the age of thirty-three, and he went to his new work with 'enormous accumulated reserves of spiritual, mental and physical energy.' Europe had seen more than one example of a great State ruled by a philosopher, and now, perhaps for the first time, it saw a great school ruled by a prophet. Arnold was prophet first and schoolmaster second, but rule he certainly did. He governed his school 'as a man might govern a province on the edge of mutiny.' The first, second and third duty of a Headmaster, he used to say, is to get rid of unpromising material. Nor would he brook the least interference on the part of the Governing Body. But he greatly improved the status of the assistant ushers, and he made his Sixth Form his lieutenants. This meant, in some cases, that the boys were rather overweighted with a premature sense of responsibility; but the idea on the whole conclusively proved its soundness and spread rapidly to other schools. Arnold was himself a born teacher, and he knew how to rouse the imagination of his pupils and how to stimulate their intellectual faculties, as well as how to win their deep respect and loyalty and affection. The successes of Rugbeians soon became notable at the Universities, and when Arnold himself was appointed Professor of Modern History at Oxford and went to lecture there in December, 1841, his old pupils came with their friends in scores and hundreds to welcome and support him. This was at a time when attendance at lectures generally was extremely thin, and some Professors hardly lectured at all.

To the end of his life Arnold retained a certain most attractive bovishness. Liveliness he always regarded as a quality indispensable to schoolmasters; as also freshness of mind. The mind ought to be kept 'in the state of a running stream,' he used to say, 'if it would form or feed other minds: for it is ill drinking out of a pond.'

II.

The purpose of this brief essay is not to give a critical estimate of Arnold's work and influence, but rather to call attention to his contribution towards the solution of two great problems which are still with us. They are referred to in a letter to Mr. Justice Coleridge (18 November, 1835):

> 'The "*Idea*" of my life, to which I think every thought of my mind more or less tends, is the perfecting the "idea" of the Edward the Sixth Reformers,—the constructing a truly national and Christian Church, and a truly national and Christian system of education.'

But first it will be necessary to call to mind Arnold's conception of the essentials of Christianity. In a letter to his friend Julius Hare, written at Fox How, 26 January, 1835, he insists upon

> 'the great philosophical and Christian truth, which seems to me the very truth of truths, that Christian unity and the perfection of Christ's Church are independent of theological Articles of opinion; consisting in a certain moral state and moral and religious affections, which have existed in good Christians of all ages and all communions, along with an infinitely varying proportion of truth and error; that thus Christ's Church has stood on a rock and never failed; yet has always been marred with much of intellectual error, and also of practical resulting from intellectual; that to talk of Popery, as the great Apostasy, and to look for Christ's Church only amongst the remnant of the Vaudois, is as absurd as to look to what is called the Primitive Church or the Fathers for pure models of faith in the sense of opinion or of government; that Ignatius and Innocent III are to be held as men of the same stamp,—zealous and earnest Christians both of them, but both of them overbearing and fond of power; the one advancing the power of bishops, the other that of the Pope, with equal honesty,—it may be, for their respective times, with equal benefit,—but with as little claim the one as the other to be an authority for Christians, and with equally little impartial perception of universal truth.'

In order to be Headmaster of Rugby, Arnold had to be ordained priest, and on 21 October, 1827, in a letter from Laleham to Dr. Hawkins he wrote:

> 'I can accept no Situation which would require me to subscribe to the thirty-nine Articles—or much more to the three Articles in the thirty-sixth Canon. I do not mean to say that I differ from those Articles in any fundamental, or to my mind in any important Point;—if I did, I certainly would not do any church Duty. But I can only support the Church of England as I would the civil Constitution of the Country;—that is, I would serve it willingly, and because I think that it is good in the main.'

Happily the Bishop who ordained him was willing to accept his Subscription so qualified as not to imply 'positive agreement' with all the Articles 'important or unimportant.'[1]

In one of his letters to A. P. Stanley (28 October, 1836) there is a fine passage on faith:

> 'It is not scriptural, but fanatical, to oppose faith to reason. Faith is properly opposed to sense, and is the listening to the dictates of the higher part of our mind, to which alone God speaks, rather than to the lower part of us, to which the world speaks. There is no end to the mischiefs done by that one very common and perfectly unscriptural mistake of opposing faith and reason, or whatever you choose to call the highest part of man's nature. And this you will find that the Scripture never does; and observing this, cuts down at once all Pusey's nonsense about Rationalism; which, in order to be contrasted scripturally with faith, must mean the following some lower part of our nature, whether sensual or merely intellectual;—that is, some part which does not acknowledge God. But what he abuses as Rationalism is just what the Scripture commends as knowledge, judgment, understanding, and the like; that is, not the

[1] A. Whitridge, *Dr. Arnold of Rugby*, p. 53.

following a merely intellectual part of our nature, but the sovereign part; —that is, the moral reason acting under God, and using, so to speak, the telescope of faith, for objects too distant for its naked eye to discover.'

With regard to the Church, Arnold writes to Dr. Hawkins as follows (23 November, 1836):

'I hold the Church to be a most divine institution and eminently characteristic of Christianity, and my abhorrence of the Priescraft and Succession doctrines, (I do not mean that they are synonymous,) is grounded on my firm conviction that they are and ever have been in theory and in practice a most formidable device of the great Enemy to destroy the real living Church, and even to drive it out of men's minds, by the false and superstitious idea of a Church which never has and never can overthrow his kingdom.'

As to forms of Church government, Arnold had written to the same friend (18 April, 1834):

'All forms of government and ritual are in the Christian Church indifferent and to be decided by the Church itself, *pro temporum et locorum ratione*, "the Church" not being the clergy, but the congregation of Christians.'

'Let us have a real Church Government, and not a pretended one,' he wrote on another occasion (29 January, 1835), 'and this government vested in the Church, and not in the clergy, and we may have hopes yet. But I dread above all things the notion either of *the* convocation or of any convocation, in which the Laity had not at least an equal voice.'

III.

Actually Dr. Arnold was perpetually under-estimating the effect of religious differences.

'I have one great principle, which I never lose sight of,' he wrote (11 June, 1834), 'to insist strongly on the difference between Christian and nonchristian, and to sink into nothing the differences between Christian and Christian.'

In his famous pamphlet on the Principles of Church Reform (1833) he proposed to save the Established Church by 'comprehending the Dissenters within the pale of the Establishment, without compromise of principle on either side.'

'Either the Church must be more comprehensive,' he wrote (4 February, 1837), 'or, if this be impracticable, then an Establishment cannot be maintained.'

Two of his favourite watchwords were '*Christianity without Sectarianism*' and '*Comprehension without Compromise*.' Arnold believed that the essentials of Christianity were held in common by Anglicans and at least by the main communions of Nonconformists. But he could never persuade his fellow Christians to explore the extent of their agreement: and after a hundred years the extent of their agreement still remains to be explored.

But now that Christianity is the object of a fiercer attack than it has known since the days of Constantine, it is greatly to be hoped that Christians will be forced to close their ranks. Happily there are not wanting signs of encouragement. The Christian Education Movement has recently published a useful pamphlet with the significant title *Can the Churches Agree?* The Free Churches are evidently looking with expectation to the new Archbishop of Canterbury for initiative and leadership. And so on. A re-reading of Thomas Arnold helps us to see that a study of the problem of Christian Reunion must be undertaken alongside of the study of the problem of the relation between the State and the Anglican Church. It may well be that the true solution of the second will not be found apart from a solution of the first.

What caught Arnold's enthusiasm was the ideal of a truly Christian nation. In his own day he was very much alive to the pressing need of social reforms. 'No one,' he wrote to his sister Susannah in that critical year 1830 (November), 'seems to me to understand our dangers, or at least to speak them out manfully; . . . the interest is too intense, and makes me live ten lives in one every day.' What he himself would aim at was 'not the forwarding any political measure, but the so purifying, enlightening, sobering, and, in one word, *Christianising* men's notions and feelings on political matters, that from the improved tree may come hereafter a better fruit.'

IV.

There can be no doubt that Arnold was a great educationalist. He thought 'primarily of *character*, as the outcome of a high-spirited education.'[2] And the building up of character necessarily, in his view, involved the strenuous cultivation of the intellect. The prayer he read every morning in the Sixth Form contained the petition:

> 'O Lord, strengthen the faculties of our minds and dispose us to exert them.'

> 'I am quite sure,' he wrote to an old pupil (5 April 1937), 'that it is a most solemn duty to cultivate our understandings to the uttermost, for I have seen the evil moral consequences of fanaticism to a greater degree than I ever expected to see them realised; and I am satisfied that a neglected intellect is far oftener the cause of mischief to a man, than a perverted or over-valued one. Men retain their natural quickness and cleverness, while their reason and judgment are allowed to go to ruin, and thus they do work their minds and gain influence, and are pleased at gaining it; but it is the undisciplined mind which they are exercising, instead of one wisely disciplined.'

[2] Sir Michael Sadler.

He was most anxious to get his pupils to think for themselves.

> 'I seem to find it more and more hopeless,' he wrote in 1835 (29 January), 'to get men to think and inquire freely and fairly, after they have once taken their side in life. The only hope is with the young, if by any means they can be led to think for themselves without following a party, and to love what is good and true, let them find it where they will.'

Arnold was determined to resist centralized State control of the proceedings of the English public schools, but he desired more co-operation.

> 'It seems to me,' he wrote (28 January, 1835), 'that we have not enough of co-operation in our system of public education, including both the great schools and Universities. I do not like the centralising plan of compulsory uniformity under the government; but I do not see why we should all be acting without the least reference to one another.'

Similarly he would guard the Universities.

> 'No man ought to meddle with the Universities,' he wrote (8 March, 1837), 'who does not know them well and love them well; they are great and noble places,—and I am sure that no man in England has a deeper affection for Oxford than I have,—or more appreciates its inimitable advantages. And therefore I wish it improved and reformed—though this is a *therefore* which men are exceedingly slow to understand.'

Arnold's attitude to the young was over-moralistic, and would no doubt have been modified if he had had a knowledge of modern psychology.

> 'I am daily more and more struck,' he wrote (26 February, 1834), 'with the very low average of intellectual power, and with the difficulty of meeting those various temptations, both intellectual and moral, which stand in boys' way; a school shows as undisguisedly as any place the corruption of human nature, and the monstrous advantage with which evil starts, if I may so speak, in its contest with good.'

His letters frequently contain references to 'the wickedness of young boys,' 'the strength of evil in such young minds,' and so on. In a letter to George Cornish (24 August, 1830) he refers to his earnest addresses to the school 'as a cannon ball on a bolster.'

All the more deeply, therefore, was he convinced of the necessity of an education that was Christian through and through. He deplored a tendency which he regarded as a great and growing evil in English society—the tendency to keep the principles of the Christian Religion distinct from the national literature and education.

> 'The plan of National Education without Christianity,' he wrote to Mr. Justice Coleridge (18 November, 1835), '. . . I utterly abhor.'
>
> 'Surely the one thing needful for a Christian and an Englishman to study,' he wrote (9 May, 1836), 'is Christian and moral and political philosophy, and then we should see our way a little more clearly without falling into Judaism, or Toryism, or Jacobinism, or any other *ism* whatever.'

Arnold hoped that the newly founded University of London would be 'a Christian, and yet not sectarian University.' He accepted a Fellowship in the Senate in September, 1835, and managed in December, 1837, to carry a resolution: 'That, as a general rule, the candidates for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts shall pass an examination either in one of the four Gospels, or the *Acts of the Apostles*, in the original Greek, and also in Scripture History.' The resolution, however, aroused great opposition, and was afterwards modified, the result being only to establish a voluntary Scriptural examination. Arnold was greatly disappointed, but he continued his efforts to make the Scriptural examination as efficient as possible, and only finally withdrew from the Senate in November, 1838.

> 'To my mind,' he wrote (18 November, 1837), 'the whole good that the University can do towards the cause of general education depends on its holding manifestly a Christian character. . . . There is no difficulty with Dissenters of any denomination; what we have proposed has been so carefully considered, that it is impossible to pretend that it bears a sectarian character; it is objected to merely as being Christian, as excluding Jews, Turks, and misbelievers. . . . I am quite sure that no earnest Christian would wish the Gospels and *Acts*, and the Scripture History, to be excluded, because they were in some instances understood differently.'

Arnold had clear views as to the true use of Scripture:

> 'that it is a direct guide so far forth as we are circumstanced exactly like the persons to whom it was originally addressed; that where the differences are great, there it is a guide by analogy; *i.e.* if so and so was the duty of men so circumstanced, ergo, so and so is the duty of men circumstanced thus otherwise; and that thus we shall keep the spirit of God's revelation even whilst utterly disregarding the letter, when the circumstances are totally different. *E.g.* the second commandment is in the letter utterly done away with by the fact of the Incarnation. To refuse then the benefit which we might derive from the frequent use of the crucifix under pretence of the Second Commandment is a folly, because God has sanctioned one conceivable similitude of himself when He declared Himself in the person of Christ. The spirit of the commandment not to think unworthily of the Divine nature, nor to lower it after our own devices, is violated by all unscriptural notions of God's attributes and dealings with men such as we see and hear broached daily, and, though in a less important degree, by those representations of God the Father which one sees in Catholic pictures, and by what Whately calls *peristerolatry*, the foolish way in which people allow themselves to talk about God the Holy Ghost, as of a dove. The applications of this principle are very numerous, and embrace, I think, all the principal errors both of the High Church and of the Evangelical party.' (16 December, 1831.)

Arnold may be regarded as one of the forerunners of the modern study of the Bible.

> 'The criticism of the Old Testament,' he wrote to Chevalier Bunsen (10 February, 1835), 'the dates of the several books, their origin, &c., all seem to me undecided, and what Wolf and Niebuhr have done for Greece and Rome seems sadly wanted for Judaea.'

He himself did not agree with Schleiermacher in denying St. Paul to be the author of the Epistles to Timothy and Titus.

> 'But I have long thought,' he wrote on 25 January, 1840, 'that the greater part of the *Book of Daniel* is most certainly a very late work, of the time of the Maccabees; and the pretended prophecy about the kings of Grecia and Persia, and of the North and South, is mere history, like the poetical prophecies in Virgil and elsewhere. In fact, you can trace distinctly the date when it was written, because the events up to the date are given with historical minuteness, totally unlike the character of real Prophecy; and beyond that date all is imaginary.'

An acute observation for 1840!

Here again a re-reading of Thomas Arnold brings suggestions for to-day. It is imperative that we should effectively unite with the great mass of our fellow-Christians in securing a national system of Christian education. This involves including in the curriculum intelligent study of the Bible under the direction of sound learning. But it involves much more than this. It means that the whole life of the school should be permeated by the true Christian spirit. And it further requires scope for initiative and experiment, and freedom from undue control by any Department of State.

Once more we can be grateful for signs of encouragement. Here it must suffice to refer to a notable pamphlet by Sir Walter Moberly, *The Churches and the Teachers*, published by the National Society (the Central Council of the Church of England for Religious Education).

V.

In his own immediate field Dr. Arnold lived to see the fulfilment of many of his hopes. As early as 16 May, 1836, he could speak to his friend Archbishop Whately of

> 'the large body of very promising young men' at Oxford 'disposed to listen to me for old affections' sake.' And he could add, 'I have got a very effective position here, which I would only quit for one which seems even more effective; but I keep one great place of education sound and free, and unavoidably gain an influence with many young men, and endeavour to make them see that they ought to think on and understand a subject, before they take up a party view about it.'

After Arnold's death his influence went on increasing throughout the Public Schools of the country. Happily it is very much alive in the teaching profession to-day.

It is interesting to note what happened in his own immediate circle. His son Matthew carried forward the liberal and ethical thread of his father's teaching. For him the Church of England became 'a great national society for what is commonly called goodness,' but he was never able to transmit enthusiasm to younger men as his father could. Another son, Thomas, became a Roman

Catholic in 1856, left the Roman Church in 1865, but rejoined it in 1876, and was Professor of English Language and Literature in University College, St. Stephen's Green, from 1882 till he died in 1900.

Archibald Campbell Tait, Arnold's successor as Headmaster of Rugby, was a cautious Scot. Such Liberalism as he ever possessed became modified when he went to Canterbury as Archbishop (1869-1883), but no doubt the influence of the Arnold tradition helped him to retain what he did retain of it. He was succeeded as Archbishop by Edward White Benson, himself formerly an Assistant Master at Rugby (1852-1857). How far the Arnold tradition entered into him it is difficult to say. His head was full of other more ecclesiastical things. The next Archbishop of Canterbury was another Headmaster of Rugby, Frederic William Temple. In him the Arnold tradition flowed more decidedly; but he was not as strong as he looked, and London began to get out of hand, and with it other parts of England, notably those served by the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway. Temple was succeeded at Canterbury by Randall Thomas Davidson, son-in-law to Archbishop Tait, and for five years his resident chaplain. A real strain of the Arnold tradition may be detected in him, but it was too much watered down to be very effective.

And now, once more, a Rugbeian sits on the throne of Augustine, and it remains to be seen what of the Arnold tradition survives in him. There was a time when it was strong in him. What effect the 'Popery of Canterbury'—as Arnold called it (18 March, 1842), apparently quoting someone else—may have, we do not know.

For the clearest examples of Arnold's particular brand of vital liberal tradition in ecclesiastical circles we must look elsewhere: to Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, his devoted biographer, Dean of Westminster Abbey, 1864-1881; Fenton John Antony Hort, one of the greatest of Cambridge Professors (Rugby 1841-1846); John Percival, the best Headmaster of Rugby since Arnold, afterwards Bishop of Hereford; the Canons of his Cathedral, Hastings Rashdall, and Burnett Hillman Streeter; and at Westminster, Canon Vernon Storr.

One other token more: when I was Rector of Rugby (1927-1935), one of the boys, afterwards head of his house, prepared for Confirmation by his House-master, a layman (how Arnold would have approved of that!), said in a burst of confidence to his mother: 'I can't understand any boy leaving Rugby not a Christian.'

DR. TEMPLE'S PHILOSOPHY

By Dorothy M. Emmet, Lecturer in Philosophy of Religion in the University of Manchester.

THE Editor has asked me for a brief exposition of Archbishop Temple's philosophy. That is no easy task; to 'pot' the conclusions of a philosophical thinker is as a rule neither just to the thinker nor profitable to the reader, since in philosophical thought especially is it the case that a man's conclusions do not interest us apart from the process of thought and argument by which he has come to them, for philosophy is largely a method of bringing into consciousness and examining the grounds on which one holds whatever views one does hold. Therefore the philosophy of another can hardly be presented with greater brevity than has been done by the thinker himself; for one is apt to miss vital steps in the argument by selective interpretation. To attempt one's own critical appraisal of a man's thought is of course a different matter. But then the personal standpoint of the critic obtrudes itself; and it is not in that, but in the Archbishop's own philosophical position that readers of this journal will be interested. Perhaps the best I can do is to attempt a compromise; something of the nature of a 'revised review,' taking into account particularly the Archbishop's Gifford Lectures, *Nature, Man and God*. This volume, published in 1934, is the comprehensive presentation of views indicated in a less systematic way in preceding books, *Mens Creatrix*, *Christus Veritas*, and a number of occasional works. Returning to the Gifford Lectures after seven years, I find it a really impressive book; impressive not only in the sweep of the discussion, but in the scope of knowledge and sympathy shown with different sides of thought and experience. For a professional academic worker the range of reading would be remarkable; for a busy administrator it is a miracle. Not only the book itself, but its type of thought strikes one as the response to life of an exceptionally integrated mind and experience. I suspect that the Archbishop must be the possessor of a singularly well-ordered and well-behaved subconscious mind in which there is no waste of energy, and which throws up not, as with most of us, unco-ordinated intuitions which may well be will-o'-the-wisps as often as genuine hunches, but well-formulated ideas which when examined are found consonant with his conscious beliefs and purposes. It is as though he were thinking not just with the top part of his mind, but reacting with the whole of a balanced and sympathetic personality.

The key to this unified thinking is undoubtedly to be sought in the Archbishop's single-minded faith in God. He knows too much about metaphysics, a way of thinking whose standards are exacting and where proof is perhaps impossible, to represent this faith as the demonstrated conclusion of philosophical argument. We know the type of book of apologetics which claims to start from scratch, without any presuppositions, and by the last chapter has arrived at all the articles of the Christian Faith, and which leaves us with an uneasy feeling that there are jumps somewhere. The Archbishop (contrary to the superficial impression of some who have not taken the trouble to see what his method really is) is not giving us apologetic of this type. He recognizes that the real rub in the relation of faith and philosophy lies not so much in the compatibility or incompatibility of their conclusions as in the reconciliation of two very different attitudes of mind. For 'the primary assurances of religion are the ultimate questions of philosophy' (*Nature, Man and God*, p. 35). How can one debate with critical impartiality the existence of a Being to whom one is utterly surrendered? In the second chapter of *Nature, Man and God*, he states this problem with a discernment born surely of experience. So he is as unwilling to identify religious faith with certain highly disputable philosophical views as he is to press critical philosophy into the service of being a handmaid to religion. The present writer for one is glad gratefully to testify to his sympathetic appreciation of the need for a critical philosopher to follow the argument whithersoever it leads us, without trying, in order to be edifying, to build more upon an argument than it will in fact bear.

His own conclusions therefore do not claim to be based simply on argument, but to present a *theological* philosophy, *i.e.* one which, starting from the presupposition of faith in God as holy and righteous Will, claims that *if you have this faith*, the facts of experience can be made more intelligible in the light of it than in the light of any other world view. This is quite different from saying that the faith is reached inferentially from the facts of the world and of experience. *Credo ut intelligam.* But this *Credo* is not reached in the first instance by a blind irrational leap, but by the convergence, in a way which to the Archbishop is irresistible, of three different lines of approach: (i) a general philosophical argument, (ii) religious experience, and (iii) the testimony of Christian tradition.

Our primary concern in this paper is of course with the first of these. Bearing in mind the *caveat* I made at the beginning, I shall not attempt to summarize the argument in any detail, but

merely indicate its general character. The Archbishop, as a Balliol pupil of Edward Caird, formed his initial philosophical outlook under the influence of the Hegelianism of the Oxford of that day. The lasting contribution of that school will in the end, I believe, be found to lie in its logic rather than in its metaphysics. (This is not the general or popular view, but I am increasingly convinced of it.) In distinction from formal logic, which can only deal with things in so far as they are susceptible of mathematical relations, the Hegelian logic gave, not a finished instrument, but the clue in principle to a kind of logic which studies thought as it tries to become conscious of its actual methods in grappling with problems set by concrete processes of life and history. It shows mind as moving dialectically towards theories which will be coherent and comprehensive, and ideas which become intelligible not by formal definition, but as exhibited throughout the richness of detail of a whole interconnected system.[1]

But the metaphysical assumption that the Universe itself *is* the kind of system which is reflected in the growth of such an idea is by no means self-evident. And even if this were granted, would it necessarily be the Christian view of the world? In *Mens Creatrix* Dr. Temple avoids the pitfall of the less tough minded of the Oxford and Scottish Hegelians, namely, identifying such metaphysical absolutism with Theism, still less with Christian Theism. Such a metaphysics is spiritual and not materialistic, in that it sees the universe as the expression of thought, but this need not mean more than that it is a whole or order informed by principles which our minds can partially reflect when we think logically. This impersonal absolutism is characteristic of Bradley, and (I think) of Bosanquet when he is consistent. Such a view would enable us to interpret the universe as a Commonwealth of Value, finite minds finding their purpose in realizing according to their several capabilities the different facets of value made possible by the informing order of the Universe as a whole. 'From the standpoint of the Will to Know, we can demand no more. The intellect working only upon the principles of its own procedure will never lead to the transcendent God of Religion, for its claims can be satisfied with less, and the further step is a leap in the dark such as Science may not take' (*Mens Creatrix*, p. 86).

Nevertheless, though the bare claims of intellect need not, and Dr. Temple holds should not, demand more than that the Universe as a whole should be informed by a coherent order, we may go on to ask why such an order should exist at all. Dr.

[1] A most persuasive recent account of the Idealist Logic is that given in Bruce Blanshard, *The Nature of Thought*.

Temple recognizes that this may not be a proper question to raise. It may be necessary to accept the system of the whole simply as ultimate fact. To ask for a reason for the Universe involves us in the difficulties Kant saw in taking categories of explanation such as Cause drawn from relationships within the world and applying them to the world as a whole. But in this, as in some other regards, the Archbishop is not unduly (in the opinion of the present writer perhaps not sufficiently) disturbed by these Kantian difficulties, and holds that the question may be raised. And if it is raised, he holds that the only answer which will satisfy our minds must be found in terms of Purpose to achieve Good. Here his argument appeals not only to purely intellectual demands, but to the values discovered by other forms of the mind's activity, ethical and aesthetic. In *Nature, Man and God* the trend of thought is away from orthodox Hegelianism to a more empirical view of the emergence of mind in nature, a view which he calls 'dialectical realism.' Since, however, his contention is that the process which has given rise to mind and its values must itself originate in mind, the total outcome is not far different from the Hegelianism of a Caird or a Bosanquet. But stress is laid on Mind as a principle of explanation in its volitional rather than its cognitive function. The argument thus appeals to the analogy of our own experience when the only sufficient reason for any course of action which satisfies our minds is that it was a 'good' thing to do. Satisfactory explanation is bound in terms of purpose to achieve apprehended good. In our own experience 'Good' is here generally understood as relative to the achievement of some desire which may be for a relative end. An absolute purpose would have to be understood as directed to the achievement of absolute Good. The correlation of absolute good with an eternal purpose to realize it and with response to that purpose through its immanence in a society of finite spirits obviously offers a Trinitarian analogy. Trinitarian analogies to metaphysical theories appear several times in Dr. Temple's books, and obviously and naturally impress him as too apt to be accidental. A stricter theologian than I can claim to be might be able to detect a variety of Trinitarian doctrines implied in these analogies, but that is a consideration outside the scope of this paper, and in any case my lay impression may well be a mistaken one.

The contention, then, is that the explanation of the universe is to be sought in terms of a purpose of absolute Good, realized in finite centres of experience by the achievement of such value as they are severally capable of achieving in fellowship with each other and with the Whole. Such a claim must obviously come to

terms with the problem of evil. This the Archbishop does, not by representing evil in the Idealist fashion as an apparent discord in a whole which here and now when seen as a whole is harmonious, but by seeing in it a real discord or irrationality which is only justifiable when it has been overcome, and when greater resources of good have been called out to meet it. If this happens, the past is not strictly unalterable, since the value of an act in the past may be altered by what may be made out of it by the resources of good. Thus he says that in itself the Crucifixion was the worst possible event; in the light of its consequences in the divine purpose, it has become the best possible. Here we have the *O felix culpa* argument; but handled soberly, and with an appreciation of the problem of tragedy.

I cannot do more than touch on the Archbishop's discussion of moral evil and sin (notably in *Nature, Man and God*, and in ch. iv of *Christus Veritas*). He expands what has been described as a view of a 'Fall upwards,' namely, how man as the result of his emergence as a self-conscious individual, able to make some sort of discrimination between right and wrong, not inevitably, but with overwhelming probability, sees things from the point of view of his own self-centred mind, and as related to his own good. Since such self-centred thinking and acting characterizes the action of other people too, the outcome is a world which is a maze of conflicts and cross-purposes. The only solution is that man should be drawn from his self-centredness to devotion to good that is other than his own apparent good. This, Dr. Temple holds, can only be completely achieved, not by man's own efforts after disinterestedness, but by a revelation of Love sufficient to call out his whole response of devotion. That such a revelation has been given cannot, Dr. Temple holds, be established by Natural Theology; but Natural Theology can point to the need which it would meet, and Christian experience testifies that the need has been met.

The distinction between Natural and Revealed Theology bore a generally recognized meaning when Lord Gifford drew up the terms of his lecture. It was a distinction between arguments based on a general appeal to reason and arguments based on an appeal to authoritative formularies or to the writings of Scripture. Dr. Temple, in common with most other recent Gifford lecturers, sees that the distinction of two theologies can no longer rigidly be maintained. Nevertheless he holds that there may be, and in his belief is, a valid distinction between truths of revelation and truths derived from general reasoning about the nature of the world and of experience. But 'truths of revelation,' not 'revealed truths.' That is to say, revelation is not given in the form of propositions,

nor even (as some of the Schoolmen would have held) in the compromise form of propositions adapted to the mode of understanding of their recipients. Revelation is given, he holds, in the form of divinely guided events, and minds illuminated to apprehend them. The propositions, however definitive, in which those minds seek to interpret and express their belief in the significance of such events are never in themselves the matter of revelation. They are attempts to point to the underlying events in which those who formulated them were convinced that revelation had been given.

The question of particular revelation as distinct from general revelation is discussed by Dr. Temple with refreshing freedom from the conventional presuppositions often made by those who disbelieve as well as by those who believe in it. It was a matter central to his earliest theological interests. In the preface to *Christus Veritas*, writing of the dominant thought of his philosophical contemporaries at Oxford, he describes it as 'not materialistic or atheistical; it is both spiritual and theistic; but the idea of God which it reaches is such as to preclude His ever doing anything in particular in any other sense than that in which He does everything in general.' (This sentence is quoted by the Archbishop in a notable article in *Theology* for November 1939, in which he points out how inapplicable the first part of it would be to the present intellectual atmosphere. We shall have occasion to refer to this article again presently.)

Dr. Temple's own answer concerning the possibility of particular revelations, and the allied question concerning the possibility of miracles, follows from his taking really seriously the conception of the Mind and Purpose of God as personal. To act always by unalterable rules is not, he points out, characteristic of personal mind and personal wisdom; rather, it is characteristic of woodenness. The characteristic of personal mind and wisdom is to maintain constancy of purpose by adapting its mode of activity as may best meet the situation set by circumstances as they arise.[2]

I cannot myself see that, granted a strong belief of Dr. Temple's kind in the personal character of the Divine Purpose, there is much in principle with which anyone can quarrel in such a view of miracle. The difficulties over accepting particular alleged miracles (*e.g.* the Virgin Birth) follow not so much from theo-

[2]This compressed sentence is perhaps not the best way of expressing the Archbishop's view. It rather suggests an analogy with British military strategy, in which the initiative seems always to be with the other side and we modify our plans in a brilliant series of strategic withdrawals, interspersed with occasional counter-attacks. Of course the Archbishop means just the opposite. The initiative throughout lies with the divine Purpose, but it is manifested in a general or special mode of activity as its wisdom may decree.

logical or philosophical principle as from critical questions concerning the nature of the historical sources, and the psychological atmosphere of the societies in which such miracles are claimed to have happened. Having regard to the prevalence among mankind of what Bergson calls '*la fonction fabulatrice*,' instanced in the growth of legend, such difficulties are very real. But this kind of question has not, it seems to me, been a primary interest with Dr. Temple. He is concerned rather with general questions of principle. But the whole question of the meaning of the category of the 'miraculous' calls for a thorough philosophical examination, which must be undertaken in conjunction with a clear re-examination of what we mean by 'laws of nature.'

Taken in its entirity, then, the Archbishop's philosophical writing supplies us not with a demonstrated metaphysical system (if such a thing be in fact possible) but with an impressive exposition of a reasonable faith. The key throughout is found in his firm belief in Good as realized in terms of the relations of persons with the Absolute Person and with one another. His insight into what is implied in this is the source of his carefully balanced discussions of problems of ethics. To my mind these ethical discussions are among the clearest and most fruitful part of his work and are very relevant to present perplexities. I regret that it is impossible to give any adequate consideration to them here.

I may perhaps be allowed to close with a few questions. I am encouraged to do so by the article in *Theology* referred to above, where it is apparent that the Archbishop himself, far from having formulated his general philosophical position, and now devoting himself exclusively to practical tasks, is well aware of the difficulties of relating his position to the intellectual world in which many of his younger contemporaries live. Some of these difficulties have their roots in psychological and sociological causes rather than in intellectual reasons. But I shall here indicate only one or two questions of a philosophical character. We are much further away now, as the Archbishop recognizes in that article, from the hope of achieving anything like a metaphysical system, whether 'Christo-centric,' theo-centric, or indeed with any other centre, which might commend itself to a large consensus of civilized minds in the way in which the Hegelian metaphysics did when he was working out his position. Contemporary philosophy seems largely trying to go back behind Hegel, perhaps behind Kant, to a consideration of something like the Kantian problem of the proper method by which the mind can reach anything of the nature of metaphysical knowledge. It is less easy to assume a fundamental congruity between the nature of 'ultimate reality' and the pro-

cesses of thought. Though we may count ourselves far removed from the logical positivists, who like to glory somewhat aggressively in the 'nonsensical' character of metaphysical questions, we have still to determine the proper method of metaphysical thought and the sense in which there can be valid knowledge of something which transcends empirical verification. I have never felt quite happy about the Archbishop's epistemology when he speaks of 'direct apprehension' of reality. Some element of direct apprehension there must indeed be in anything properly to be called knowledge. But it has seemed to me that he under-estimates the part played by the *form-creating* activity of mind, which seeks continually to make the world intelligible to itself in terms of its own symbolic constructions. But this leaves us with the question of the validity of these forms to interpret 'ultimate reality' in any systematic way. I do not believe that these questions are in principle unanswerable, but we may well not find a satisfactory answer to them in this generation. On the long view this may be all to the good. We tend to use words like 'reality' a great deal too easily, and the modern analytic schools of philosophy may be doing a real service if they force us to a more radical examination of their meaning. But at present we need a new Kant more than we need a new Hegel; one who can give us a new critique of the significance of terms such as 'purpose' when used in a metaphysical sense. These are merely some of the technical difficulties of a philosopher in feeling full satisfaction with the Archbishop's position. They may, however, turn out not wholly irrelevant to the religious and sociological difficulties he himself notes in the *Theology* article. We are seeking, I believe, for a more radical discovery of the nature of philosophical thinking, together with a more radical discovery of the categories of New Testament expression — the Kingdom, Eschatology, the Messiah, the Son of Man. These must be won before people can turn hopefully again to the task which lies so near to the Archbishop's heart — the construction of a Christian metaphysical system Moreover, the *Theology* article indicates that he himself is now being led to emphasize the need to consider the world as a dynamic process rather than as a rational system. This was of course implicit in his view of the problem of evil to which I have already referred. It would mean that if we ask whether there is anything in the universe which makes sense, we should have to underline 'makes' rather than 'sense'; as it exists, or at any rate as we can know it, the universe is not a rational or intelligible whole. One can only have faith that it will become intelligible in the light of the end, when the divine purpose at work in it is accomplished. The *Logos*

should therefore be conceived as an active force of moral judgment rather than a principle of rational unity. In this conviction of the impact of a divine imperative, we have a guiding light in the darkness of a largely unintelligible universe. Here the Archbishop can lead us forward, though metaphysical systems and their methods may have to be re-thought. Nor should anything I have said be taken as implying that his own systematic work should be put on the shelf as a distinguished example of an older metaphysics. For the insights into Christian experience which it contains are a treasure won. And such steady insight and wise reflection on a wide range of experience are not the conspicuous characteristics of much of our contemporary thought.

THE DOCTRINAL REPORT

(II)*

By the Rev. T. J. Wood, M.A., Organizing Secretary of the Modern Churchmen's Union.

Part I. God and the World.

THE *Report* follows the familiar lines in asserting that God is 'the ultimate existence' and 'must be perfect Goodness, perfect Beauty, and perfect Truth.' 'Inasmuch as Personality is the highest kind of existence known to us, . . . God must be considered as Personal—at least in the sense that there is Personality in Him. . . .'

'Natural Science not only studies the works of God in the sense of studying things that He has made, but also in the sense that it studies the manner of His working.' The importance of this sentence is that it concedes the autonomy of science in its own sphere, and makes *its* subject-matter a revelation of God (in Nature). What trouble would have been avoided if the Church had realized this a century earlier!

History, science, and the experience and character both of nations and individuals are all parts of the Divine self-revelation, and nothing can be 'effectively revealed by God to man apart from an activity of human reason in apprehending it' (p. 44). This view appears to dispose effectively of certain misconceptions, *e.g.*:

1. That revelation is something 'given,' apart from the individual through whom it is received, as in plenary verbal inspiration;

* Article (I) was published in the May *Modern Churchman*, p. 43.

2. That there are two kinds of religious truths, one of natural religion, and the other of revelation.

The significance of this view is then explained by its application to certain questions which have often exercised men's minds.

(*a*) The Creation. The *Genesis* stories are dismissed as irrelevant to the question, 'since it is generally agreed among educated Christians that these are mythological in origin, and that their value for us is symbolic rather than historical' (p. 45). Christians are not specially committed to any particular view of creation, so long as they believe 'that the world depends upon God as His Creation.'

(*b*) Angels and Demons. To some of the members of the Commission 'it seems unreasonable to suppose that the only spiritual beings which exist in the universe, other than God Himself, must be human.' The belief in angels and demons has 'at the very least, a symbolical value'; but the Commission 'desires to record its conviction that it is legitimate for a Christian either to suspend judgment on the point, or alternatively to interpret the language, whether of Scripture or of the Church's Liturgy, with regard to angels and demons in a purely symbolical sense.' (This is important for its effect upon the doctrines of original sin and redemption.)

(*c*) Miracles. Here, of course, is one of the most crucial tests of the position of the *Report*, for here lies the debatable ground between religion and science where battle has raged for long.

A miracle is defined as an event which 'cannot be co-ordinated with the general scheme of the universe by means of the ordinary categories of science alone or even of those ordinarily required for the interpretation of human action, and which manifests to the believer the spiritual character and holiness of the power sustaining the universe. . . .' The *Report* recognizes that some people on religious grounds, and not exclusively on scientific, 'feel it to be more congruous with the wisdom and majesty of God that regularity, such as men of science observe, . . . should serve His purpose.'

The ease with which legends involving abnormal events tend to grow round religious leaders is recognized, and in consequence (an important point)

> '. . . it is impossible in the present state of knowledge to make the same evidential use of the narratives of miracles in the Gospels which appeared possible in the past' (p. 51).
>
> 'It must be recognized that as regards the abnormal events recorded in the Gospels, a belief as to the Person of our Lord, which must mainly be reached on other grounds, constitutes a part of the ground for belief in their miraculous character' (p. 52).

This leaves the question really unresolved, and the Chairman (Dr. Temple) feels this, for he deals with the question in his Intro-

duction, asserting his own belief in miracles and repudiating the contrary view 'with vehemence.' But why should the Archbishop refer to the scientific view as '*monotonous* uniformity'? Surely that is the last word to be applied to the modern scientific view of the universe!

It will be more convenient to pass at this point straight to the sections of the *Report* which deal with specific miracles in the New Testament.

The Virgin Birth (p. 81). The *Report* gives the theological grounds for accepting the belief in the Virgin Birth, but concedes the following points, *viz.*:

> (i) 'The subject is one on which the historical evidence by itself cannot be other than inconclusive.'
>
> (ii) Some of the members of the Doctrinal Commission 'hold that a full belief in the historical Incarnation is more consistent with the supposition that our Lord's birth took place under the normal conditions of human generation.'

Although the belief has in history been intimately associated with the faith in the Incarnation, yet 'the work of scholars upon the New Testament has created a new setting of which theologians are obliged to take account.' The *Report* therefore recognizes that belief in the Incarnation is consistent with either the acceptance or the non-acceptance of the Virgin Birth.

The Resurrection (p. 83). The Resurrection of Jesus is necessary to account for the existence of the Church, and

> 'if a general principle is to be laid down, we may say that the Christian faith is compatible with all such critical reconstructions of the events underlying the narratives as would not have the effect, if accepted, of invalidating the apostolic testimony to Jesus as the Lord who rose from the dead.' 'Belief that the Lord was risen . . . is compatible both with a realisation that we cannot expect to reach clear or full knowledge in detail, and also with a variety of critical views.'

The Resurrection was a real fact, and the 'symbol' of this fact is the story of the empty tomb, but the *Report* does not attempt to affirm the mode of the resurrection. Indeed it points out that in such a momentous event 'it is not surprising that opinions should differ as to how much in the record of it is derived from the sheer occurrence of the fact itself, and how much is due to the primitive interpretation of the fact in the minds' of those who recorded it. 'No visual experience is devoid of all element of subjective interpretation. And, even if the full and undisputed records of eye-witnesses could be studied, there would still be room for difference of judgment,' (*a*) as to how much was due to bodily and how much to spiritual vision; (*b*) how much was objective, and how much subjective; (*c*) how much of the subjective may be considered true.

This is all expressed somewhat vaguely, but necessarily so. The *Report* appears to envisage all the different kinds of views which are held of the Resurrection, and to be trying to find justification for them all, which is a very difficult task. But the conclusion certainly seems to be that the Commission is reluctant to assert a definite view as to the nature of the 'fact' of the Resurrection (*e.g.* whether the tomb was really empty), and accepts the view that a Christian may interpret the 'fact' in various ways so long as he admits that the experiences of the disciples were such as to justify their belief that Jesus was still alive, thereby proving His victory over evil and confirming the hope of eternal life for man through Christ.

The Ascension (p. 89). It is worth remarking that while the majority of the Commission believed that the 'fact' underlying the Resurrection was the traditional one of the empty tomb, they make no claim whatever about the 'fact' which underlies the belief in the Ascension. They state, quite bluntly,

> 'its physical features are to be interpreted symbolically.'

No attempt is made to define the experience which led to the belief. We have definitely entered the realm of symbol and metaphor, where no physical 'fact' underlies the spiritual truth expressed in such pictures as 'sitting at the right hand of God.'

The Person of Christ.

> 'Christianity has regarded Jesus Christ as not merely the supreme prophet of God, but essentially one with God' (p. 72).
>
> 'What is necessarily demanded of any doctrines claimed to be Christian is that such unity be affirmed between Jesus of Nazareth and the eternal God as finds expression in the declarations: "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father," and "Who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven"' (p. 75).
>
> 'The Church affirmed both (His divinity and His humanity), each in its completeness, and the reality of their union' (p. 74).

The Christological problem has always been what meaning is to be attached to the statement that Christ was both God and Man, and how the two 'Natures' could be combined in one 'Person.' What the *Report* says is important.

> 'The fulness of the Divine life revealed in Christ cannot be adequately expressed in human language, and theological statements share the limitations of all theoretical formulae. It must be recognised that changes in forms of thought and the progress of knowledge may necessitate changes in the intellectual formulation of the content of Revelation, though this does not mean that there is any change in that which has been revealed. The apprehension of Revelation by the human mind must needs find expression in the form of propositions, but no such formulations are to be regarded as being, in principle, irreformable. It may be that there are theological propositions accepted in the Church which will always be found neither to need nor to be capable of revision, and in

that sense may be "final"; if so, they are final not in the sense that they are exempt from examination, but in the sense that examination invariably leads to their re-affirmation' (p. 79-80).

'The classical formula of the doctrine of the Incarnation is that reached by the Council of Chalcedon in A.D. 451. . . . The main upshot of this formula is plainly the affirmation of real and absolute Deity, and of real and absolute Humanity, in the one Christ. . . . How the affirmation is to be explained, or how the divine and human elements are to be related, it does not declare. . . . We believe ourselves to be affirming in our *Report* that which was affirmed in the language of its own time by the Council at Chalcedon. But we wish to assert that the Church is in no way bound to the metaphysic or the psychology which lie behind the terms employed by the Council' (pp. 80-81).

In short, the *Report* recognizes that, provided neither the perfect divinity nor the perfect humanity are denied, no precise definition of the Incarnation is demanded by Christian orthodoxy.

The Atonement.

'In the history of the Church various theories (of the Atonement) have been held, and while affirming the fact of reconciliation to God through Christ, the Church as a whole has never formally accepted any particular explanation of that fact' (p. 90),

The *Report* silently repudiates the 'ransom' theory, that the death of Christ was the price paid to redeem man, whether from the power of the devil or the justice of God, but the language of the old view is there, if not its ideas. Thus:

'The Cross is a satisfaction for sin in so far as the moral order of the universe makes it impossible that human souls should be redeemed from sin except at a cost. Of this cost the death on the Cross is the expression' (p. 92).

And again:

'Thus the Cross is a "propitiation" and "expiation" for the sins of the whole world. Christ, by the submission of His sinless life to the consequence of sin, created the conditions in which God can, and does take the penitent sinner into the full fellowship of His Kingdom, and treat him as His child' (p. 93).

The Holy Spirit and the Trinity.

The *Report* sets out in outline the New Testament evidence for the belief in the Spirit and for his work, avoiding the question as to what actually happened on the Day of Pentecost by remarking:

'The outward symbols of wind and fire, as recorded in the narrative, have their value as symbolising the coming of the Spirit.'

'Binitarianism' (*i.e.* belief in two 'Persons' instead of three) is dismissed because

'in the New Testament the Holy Spirit inspires Jesus Himself, and . . . is sent by Jesus to continue His work for mankind' (p. 95).

The grounds of the belief in the Holy Spirit are Christian experience, which, the *Report* maintains, distinguishes

> 'between the revelation given in the Logos or Word Incarnate and the work of the Holy Spirit in the heart.'

Consequently

> 'the Church has been led to speak of the Person of the Holy Spirit and to confirm His Deity and, in consequence, the doctrine of the Trinity' (p. 96).
>
> 'When we come to precise theories of the Divine nature apart from human experience, we are entering on a field where the task of the Church is to condemn any theories which conflict with Christian experience, not to enjoin any one theory upon all Christian people.'

Attention must be drawn to this negative function of theology, the exclusion of heresy rather than the asserting of a rigid orthodoxy. This is important. The *Report*, consistent with its attitude, does not attempt to define the doctrine of the Trinity, but does not sufficiently emphasize the dangers in the use of such words as 'person,' 'essence,' 'substance.'

This section of the *Report* concludes with this defence of the doctrine of the Trinity:

> 'If God be the supreme good He cannot be less than personal; yet we cannot think of Him simply as a Person, a lonely Sovereign enthroned above the Universe: if He be One, yet His unity must be such as to comprehend and not exclude plurality; if He be Love, His love must be such as to give scope for self-bestowal within His own Being.'

The second half of the *Report* deals with the Church, the Sacraments, and the Future Life. It may be possible to deal with it at a subsequent date, but these subjects are more suitable for discussion among those who have already accepted the Christian faith. Only the first half has so far been dealt with because it appears imperative that at this time, when so many intelligent people find it difficult to understand what that faith is, some exposition should be given of the interpretation and the authority which are attached to the fundamentals in educated circles within the Church itself.

The *Report* represents, we believe, such a departure from what most people think is the traditional view that the widest possible publicity should be given to its contents. In particular, we would urge that when the Church of England comes to deal with the question of the religious education in the schools of the country it must frankly put forward the *Report* as the most recent and authoritative statement of the present state of doctrine within its borders.

AN IMPORTANT LIFE AND IMPORTANT ISSUES

By Professor L. de C. Richardson.

THE cause of liberal Christianity already owed a great debt to Bishop Hensley Henson. He has now added to it by the publication of this retrospect of his important life.* And it is pleasant to record that at a moment which was difficult for him the leaders of the Churchmen's Union (as it was then called) were far-sighted and courageous enough to declare what he would mean for the Church. On January 12th, 1918, when the controversy about Dr. Henson's elevation to the episcopate was at its height and his future diocese was being inundated, by extremists of both the Catholic and Protestant wings, with leaflets and pamphlets 'base beyond description'; while the E.C.U. was circulating a prayer-sheet with the collect for St. Matthias's day (which mentions the traitor Judas and prays that we 'may alway be preserved from false apostles'); the Bishop-elect received the following resolution from our Chairman, Canon Glazebrook:

> 'The Council of the Churchmen's Union welcome the appointment of Dr. Hensley Henson to the Bishopric of Hereford, for they believe it will advance the cause of true religion in England.'

This judgment is justified, directly or indirectly, by every event recorded in the first volume of the Bishop's autobiography.

Dr. Henson tells us in his Preface that he hesitated to write any autobiography or to publish his journal; the argument that swept away his hesitation was that he has 'enjoyed exceptional opportunities for getting to know the truth about the Church of England.' Thus the book is intended to be a source for the historian. For the stormiest period which it covers, 'I have,' he tells us, 'quoted without omission (save for a few irrelevant passages) what I wrote from day to day.' The record is contemporary as well as first-hand.

Often it is witty, and always penetrating and forceful; sometimes it reflects a conscience excessively self-depreciatory and admits us to intimate questionings and prayers which only the author's resolve on complete truthfulness can have induced him to make public. It reveals a man, and the circumstances of a time, of singular importance for the Church of England; and when the present mood of sceptical or credulous anti-intellectualism is past,

**Retrospect of an Unimportant Life*, by Herbert Hensley Henson, Vol. I, 1863—1920. (O.U.P. 16/-).

Bishop Henson's unflinching passion for truth and justice will be seen to have served greatly, by both teaching and example, the cause of true religion.

The issues at stake are shown with characteristic penetration and lucidity in a passage (pp. 208-10) concerning the opposition between our author and Bishop Gore, for these two, although personally attached to one another, were often involved in deep and sometimes bitter public strife.

> 'In Gore's view of Christianity, the form of Church polity, Episcopacy, had essential importance; in mine, no form of ecclesiastical polity could ever be more than a non-essential, varying from age to age, always the creature of time and place. He was ever appealing to "principle," I to history. . . . *"Not disestablishment but more establishment,"* I used to say, meaning that I would have the Established Church administered in a large and liberal spirit with the definite object of widening its fellowship to include the orthodox Nonconformists, and thus making it more truly in fact what it was in theory, the corporate expression of the nation's Christianity. . . .
>
> 'To organize the Church of England on "Catholic" lines *before* the crisis of disestablishment in order to make sure that *after* the crisis that organization, being actually in possession, would be maintained — such appeared to me to be Gore's programme, unconfessed and largely unsuspected, but implicit in the "Life and Liberty" agitation. . . .
>
> 'To my mind, then, two things were apparent — the success of the autonomous agitation would hasten, if not even precipitate, Disestablishment; and, if Disestablishment were to befall the Church after it had already been organized on "Catholic" lines, the historic character and influence of the Church of England as a Reformed Church would have been destroyed. Moreover, I was shocked by the hustling tactics of the agitators ("during the distractions of a great war").'

Any candid observer of ecclesiastical events to-day will recognize in this analysis of the situation of twenty-five years ago an exact counterpart of the struggle that is still being waged by the two schools of Church thought to-day. It is therefore surprising — unless this be one more proof of the change of tactics that we observe also in other directions—to find in the *Church Times*' review of this book, among other statements and judgments which may well appear questionably accurate, the following:

> 'We may well be thankful that the particular controversies in which Dr. Henson most conspicuously held the limelight may now be relegated to the sphere of far-off, as well as of unhappy, things.'

What has greater actuality to-day than the twin questions of Reunion between the Christian Churches of this country, and of the relations between Church and State, on both of which Bishop Henson so valiantly sought to lead the way — not for the sake of limelight, but of truth — twenty-five years ago? His opponents of those days are still represented; their aims are unchanged, indeed are more pointedly and potently pursued. Their method alone is altered; altered from open attack, with arguments and debate, to a

subtler discrediting of liberal leaders by personal disparagement in passing references and innuendoes which give the reader no chance of even guessing the reasons on the other side; and from open pillorying to suppression of publicity, especially of liberal books and activities, through the action of a well-drilled Anglo-Catholic phalanx directed by quarterly meetings. Their old method of open attack on liberal Churchmen was plainly not the most effective; in fact, the public conscience was revolted by it. Dr. Hensley Henson was consecrated Bishop, with the public at large 'overwhelmingly on his side if the higher authorities were in any sense to make a martyr of him'; and Dr. H. D. A. Major, arraigned for heresy before a Bishop's Court of competent theologians in 1922, received the inevitable acquittal. Publicity was clearly a policy best avoided. Note how after his consecration, when Bishop Henson repeated the visit to the Congregational Chapel of Carr's Lane, Birmingham, which caused so grievous a stir in 1909,

> 'the *Church Times* ignored my visit to Birmingham altogether; the *Guardian* and the *Challenge* limited themselves to the briefest and the chilliest record of the fact.'

The new method has more chance of success. And it keeps the whole body of fair and liberal-minded Englishmen from being stirred to support liberal Churchmen. Meanwhile, the attempt is made to establish precedents of change in the 'Catholic' direction, and to achieve by administrative action — while the country is engrossed in war — what the law disallows and Parliament would probably reject.

There is indeed hardly a Church problem facing us to-day that is not fully dealt with in Bishop Henson's 'Retrospect': Christian Reunion and the Establishment; Church Discipline and Romanism; the Creeds and Biblical Criticism; Religious Education; Pacifism; Social Action. And always he writes and acts with the same directness, learning, regard for all relevant facts, and courage. Always, when action is required, he shows justice and respect for other men's rights both of conscience and speech. He can be caustic, but is never consciously unfair; just as, in administering his various offices, he could be stern but never oppressive. His firmness in difficult situations made for peace, not for friction. As Dean of Durham, he found divisions between the Chapter and the Archdeacon.

> 'Accordingly, having made myself thoroughly acquainted with my constitutional position, I brought the Canons together, and set out plainly the procedure which, as Dean, I should adopt. I made a rule of preparing the capitular business very carefully, discussing privately beforehand with the Canons any matter which might be contentious, *and then insisting upon a decision being taken.*'

A friend told him later that he had never, through all the thirty-

three years of his residence in Durham, known such harmony to prevail in the cathedral body as had existed during his time of office.

He was also conciliatory with men of good faith. 'I will not yield one inch to a society with the principles and methods of the E.C.U.,' he had written to the Archbishop during the agitation against his appointment as Bishop. But in the same period, on receiving a long letter from a Hereford clergyman who found the future Bishop's writings 'extremely alarming,' etc., the Bishop's reply begins:

> 'Dear Mr. Groves,—I am obliged to you for your letter, and, though of course I could wish that you were not so much alarmed at what you conceive to be my defects, yet I have a natural love of candour, and have ever in my experience found that friendship and confidence can grow from that root.'

He then mentions having received from the diocese also letters of welcome, regrets that efforts are being made to create in the diocese an atmosphere of panic, and ends with the comforting reflection:

> 'But these situations are not unfamiliar in ecclesiastical history, and, sooner or later, they right themselves.'

After his consecration, a Prebendary of Hereford who was also a Rural Dean and had voted against him, felt honourably bound to inform him and to place in his hands his resignation of his Rural Deanery. In the course of his reply the Bishop wrote:

> 'It is entirely clear to me that in declining to vote for me as Bishop you were not only exercising your unquestionable right, but also doing what appeared to be your duty. Your action, therefore, left in my mind not the smallest trace of resentment, and I should be sorry indeed if you felt that it rendered your work in the diocese in any measure embarrassed. . . . These are difficult days for us all, most of all for men holding ecclesiastical office. We must stand together, and work together as far as we can.'

It is clear that wherever he met with intelligence and good faith co-operation with him was not difficult. He was fortunate in meeting with both, on the whole, in his personal relations both in Hereford and Durham. Even had he been less fortunate his own conduct would have been no less praiseworthy. The saving grace of humour was a help: it is implicit on both sides in the letter with which, soon after his arrival (1908), he refused the gift of episcopal vestments:

> 'You and your friends are most kind to take such thought for my clothing, but I should have no use for cope and mitre, and therefore any money expended on them would be thrown away. May I venture to suggest that in this stern time there are objects of benevolence which may better gain the assistance of religious citizens than the purchase of archaic vestments, the aspect and significance of which has generally perished from English minds. But your letter was conceived in a lighter vein, and I should apologise for taking it so gravely.'

How, then, came it that the promotion of so desirable a man was nearly made the occasion of the disruption of the Church of

England, Bishop Gore petitioning against him and threatening to resign — the favourite device which, as Bishop Henson remarks of an occasion unconnected with himself, 'though effective was none the less unfair.' (Did not Bishop Gore, in 1914, hinder the Lambeth Conference, by his personal intervention at the last moment and by a threat to resign his see, from agreeing to a recognition of Presbyterian Orders?—*cf.* p. 167). The whole machinery of party methods was in consequence set in motion, with the result that bishops who had first congratulated Henson on his appointment, and must surely have known the work and publications of his thirty years' ministry, withdrew their support, and the Archbishop decided that he himself would have to resign rather than proceed to consecrate in face of their opposition. The full discreditable story is told in this book. Although it belongs to the winter of 1917-18 its antecedents lie fifteen years further back, when some Ordination Candidates who felt unable to affirm the Virgin Birth of Jesus as a historic fact were refused Ordination. Dr. Henson had, from the beginning of his ministry,

> 'definitely accepted the "Modernist" treatment of the Bible as it was attractively expressed by the leading Oxford teachers.'

He

> 'conceived seriously of the pledge which the Clergy take publicly at their Ordination to be Biblical students as well as "faithful dispensers of the Word of God,"'

and was convinced that

> 'for both the student and the pastor liberty was the essential condition of efficiency'—'liberty from the fear of coercive restraint, whether by official authority or by popular clamour.'

In a letter to Dr. Sanday which appears to him a fair statement of his position to-day, he said :

> 'I felt it was a mean thing for me to hang back and keep silence when a wrong was being done to Ordination Candidates and a narrowing of legitimate belief effected in a panic.'

And elsewhere :

> 'I resolved at least that the issue should not be an affair between individual Bishops and Ordination Candidates, and I took my side, openly in Convocation, publicly in "Sincerity and Subscription" (a sermon preached to Modern Churchmen in May 1903 and later published), "with the cause of theological liberty."'

His own position was one, not of denial, but of acquiescence in 'an inevitable agnosticism'; but few are so ardent in the defence of principles whose immediate applications involve others rather than themselves, and it was generally concluded that Dr. Henson's arguments were those of personal self-defence. This was the *gravamen* of the accusation of heresy levelled later at the Bishop-elect : that he recited the Creeds without believing the clause that

asserts the Virgin Birth. Dr. Henson rightly refused to make any fresh doctrinal pronouncement, and referred all enquirers to his published works. He rightly saw that

> 'this could not possibly be a personal issue: it had widened into the larger question of whether New Testament criticism, with its inevitable bearing on the historical articles of the Creed, was legitimate for English clergymen.'

But when the Archbishop, preparing his reply to Gore's protest, appealed to Henson 'for the relief of his (the Archbishop's) own conscience in performing a very difficult act,' and — as is noted in Dr. Bell's *Randall Davidson* (p. 871) —)' after making it plain that the conversation was that of friend to friend and not an examination, . . . showed him a portion of the reply he was preparing,' what else could Dr. Henson do but satisfy the Archbishop's questions?

> 'He (Henson) talked at great length and I (the Archbishop) took down bits of what he said and then wove these into a memorandum expressive of his position and belief, and read it over to him more than once. He agreed that it correctly stated his position. This was a great relief to my mind.'

Dr. Henson noted at the time in his diary:

> 'I don't like this kind of informal subscription. . . . I did not sign the statement.'

And, no doubt in order to emphasize that the statement was not his but the Archbishop's, he does not quote it in his autobiography. He does, however, faithfully report all that it contained, and that was interpreted by some as a recantation of former disbelief. We could wish that Dr. Henson had quoted that part of the document which reaffirms the liberty of Christians, in which he states that he was

> 'bound to add that the belief in the Incarnation may be consistent now, as it was in Apostolic days, with other notions or explanations (*i.e.* than a Virgin Birth) of the mode of what happened therein.'

When the so-called 'Enabling Bill,' which he had strenuously opposed, was passed Dr. Henson changed his mind on Disestablishment, since he conceived that that measure had secularized the State and reduced the Church to the status of a sectarian body, and marked 'the formal adoption by an unwitting legislature of a wholly novel conception of the National Church.'

There is no room to touch here on Dr. Henson's championship of Intercommunion between Christian Denominations, large though this looms in his life; nor on his campaigns for social righteousness, his intellectual achievements, the quality of his friendships, the width and variety of his interests, and his delight in natural beauty. But brief mention must be made of his warm and moving tribute to the wife who still gives him strength and comfort:

> 'She moved with dignity and kindness in unfamiliar situations, and always drew to herself a full measure of affection and confidence. Placable and unselfish by nature, . . . she was an influence making for peace and goodwill. I made great demands upon her, and she never failed me. . . . She was hospitable, welcoming and generous, . . . and I enjoyed undeservedly a portion of the goodwill which she evoked.'

In spite of all the battles of his life, the many meannesses to which he was subject and the anxious matters treated in this autobiography, it will be true to our subject to close upon a note of happiness. Bishop Henson has told us that his youth was not happy. Nevertheless his early childhood was so:

> 'I enjoyed the incomparable advantage of being one of a large family, of growing up in beautiful and healthy surroundings, and enjoying for a while the blessings of a devoted mother.' 'My earliest memories are those of the pleasant house in Broadstairs, . . . surrounded by a garden rich in fruit and gay with flowers. . . . We kept fowls, bees and rabbits: and we had a brown spaniel, named Flush, whom we idolised.' The peacocks from the adjoining grounds of Piermont (once occupied by the Duchess of Kent and the little Princess who afterwards became Queen Victoria) 'displayed their splendours on the low wall which bounded our garden.'

From his stepmother's library the little omnivorous reader of some ten years of age devoured a number of historical books, among them translations of Thucydides and Plutarch. Still earlier reading had included religious books and Milton. Perhaps the Bible, poetry, the flowers and the Greek heroes account for no small part of the story of this book, and of the love for him of the author's multitude of friends.

JOHN FOXE AND HIS BOOK*

By the Rev. NORMAN POWER, M.A., Worcester College, Oxford.

IN one interesting parenthesis J. F. Mozley observes that a truly impartial historian would be in reality a chronologist and not a historian at all. But he would agree, I think, that the 'partiality' which is essential to history should be born out of examination of the facts. All too often it tints the spectacles through which the facts are observed.

This is not an 'impartial' book. It is history, not chronology. But its value is enhanced by the circumstance that the author was impartial when he approached his subject. In his preface, Mozley writes that he was introduced to Foxe by his work on Tyndale.

* *John Foxe and His Book.* By J. F. Mozley, M.A. (S.P.C.K., 1940; 12*s.* 6*d.*; 254 pp.).

Acts and Monuments, by John Foxe; edited by J. Pratt in 8 volumes; published by the Religious Tract Society, London.

He approached him with suspicion, thinking he had been 'exposed as untrustworthy.' To his surprise, Foxe proved 'a good authority' and 'his way of writing proclaimed the straightforward man.' His curiosity aroused, Mozley made further investigations. This book is their result. That he approached his subject in such a way gives value to his 'partiality,' which comes from the facts alone, and gives emphasis to his vindication of the martyrologist.

The book is beautifully planned. The author first discusses the sources of Foxe's life, and then his life and character are examined in a way which enables the reader to estimate the probable trustworthiness of Foxe's work. Next the book is examined, objections and criticisms are enumerated, and the conclusion reached by confronting both Foxe and his detractors with the evidence of further witnesses in the form of contemporary MSS. and records.

What trouble Mozley took in his quest for evidence will be apparent to all. There can be few records concerning Foxe and his Book that he has not unearthed. But since any life of Foxe must be based primarily on the 'Memoir' in the 1641 edition of *Acts and Monuments*, which is ascribed to a son of Foxe whose Christian name is not given, and since S. R. Maitland 'in the course of the grand campaign which he made against Foxe . . . attacked this Memoir, declaring it to be untrustworthy and spurious,' the reader is treated at the outset to a lively piece of source criticism. For Maitland declared the Memoir to be a forgery 'concocted by the unscrupulous printers,' and this has stigmatized Foxe's work for a hundred years. It is delightful to follow the removal of this stigma.

Mozley begins by pointing out that Maitland is asking his readers to believe that the Company of Stationers connived at deliberate forgery in collusion with Simeon Foxe, for seven years President of the Royal College of Physicians, and with Thomas Foxe, the martyrologist's nephew and executor! Turning to internal evidence, Mozley observes that the Memoir can hardly have been forged in 1641, as Maitland alleged, since it describes as *hodie vivens* eminent persons who died before that date — in the case of the Earl of Northampton, in 1614. Finally, evidence is produced that Dr. Simeon Foxe was for some time engaged on a Memoir of his father.

After establishing the genuineness of this, the chief among many sources for Foxe's life, Mozley proceeds to describe the career and character of Foxe. This alone would make his book a great one. For John Foxe emerges as a most loveable Christian gentleman. He was utterly unselfish and spent himself unsparingly in the service of all, whatever their race or creed, who were faced

by the cruelty of bigots. A Christ-like gentleness was his principal trait, and hatred of every form of cruelty was the inspiration of his life. This is evident again and again as the career of Foxe is traced. It was first visible in 1550 when the anabaptist, Joan Boucher, was threatened with the stake. John Foxe disliked her views as much as anyone, but his voice alone was raised on her behalf. If her life must be taken, Foxe pleaded with Rogers, 'at least let another kind of death be chosen, answering better to the mildness of the gospel.' And when Rogers belittled the pain of burning, Foxe, prophesying better than he knew, took his friend's hand and said, 'Maybe the day will come when you yourself will have your hands full of this same gentle burning.'

From exile, the same petition was often sent to England. 'If heretics they were, what avail these naked arguments of blood . . . where is the gentleness of Christ?' The plea was due to a genuine hatred of cruelty and not to Foxe's Protestant sympathies alone. 'In Edward VI's reign there were two religious factions in the land and both were tolerated. Why need one seek to crush the other?' This is proved, too, by Foxe's determination that Protestantism should avoid cruelty when the tables might have been turned. The projected reform of Canon Law bears notes in his own hand, 'and the chief of these is prompted by his hatred of cruelty.' He risked Elizabeth's displeasure by the same pleas for leniency that he had sent without avail to Mary. Writing in 1571 on behalf of Flemish heretics, he says: 'To burn up with fiery flame . . . the living bodies of wretched men . . . is a hard thing and belongs more to the example of Rome than to the spirit of the Gospel.' And later he appealed to Justice Monson: 'Since the Queen has left wholly to you the decision whether they are to be burnt or punished in another way, I beg you so to mingle mercy with your judgment that Christ may see it and reward you with his mercy when he comes to judge.' And it was Foxe, himself marked down by Rome, whose friends had suffered and burned under the Terror, who was loudest in his appeals on behalf of Campion when sympathy with Papists risked a charge of treason.

No matter was too small for Foxe to undertake if suffering might be averted, and he was a persistent peacemaker in private quarrels. No one in trouble was turned away without help, whether spiritual or financial, and no one was too humble for Foxe to relieve save his poverty-stricken self. He appears, incidentally, as a brilliant natural psychologist and his letter to Croke proclaims his methods. No wonder 'there repaired to him both citizens and strangers, noblemen and common people of all degrees, and almost all for the same cause, to seek some salve for a wounded conscience.' There is no doubt that Foxe's friendship meant much

to all who knew him. His old pupil, Norfolk, for example, facing death in the Tower for treason, asked for Foxe's presence as his last request. 'He longeth much for his old schoolmaster, Mr. Foxe, to whom he much desires to perform that faith which he first grounded him in.'

Foxe's scholarship, and his love of the English Bible which first brought him under suspicion ('They see me study the Bible—that is the root'), are equally substantiated; but it is his character which gives the lie to the glib accusation that the martyrologist perverted history and misused sources.

Turning to the *Book of Martyrs*, Mozely describes in detail the making of the book and the difficulties — exile, poverty, ill-health — which Foxe contended with and overcame. He reveals how the evidence reached Foxe in exile and the trouble Foxe and his friends took in sifting it. Replying to a request from Foxe for MSS. relating to the death of Cranmer, Grindal wrote from Strassburg in 1557: 'I am afraid that our materials here are not yet in a state for you to use; . . . it has been a slow and difficult business to get trustworthy documents.' Minor errors — such as muddled Christian names—in the first edition of *Acts and Monuments* were largely due to the exile's distance from his records. They are usually corrected in later editions.

But many of Foxe's sources, such as the narrative by John Rogers in Newgate which was smuggled out by his young son, are shown to be of great value. For the English edition of 1563 Foxe 'ransacked documents of all kinds, ancient and modern, printed and unprinted.' Some of these Mozley gives, and this is one of the great services of his book. He finds Foxe's work to embody many reliable sources. Among others, the 1570 edition makes use of the episcopal registers of Hereford, Lincoln, Rochester, St. Andrews, London and Canterbury; the Royal archives, Parliamentary records, and numerous eye-witness accounts covering even the obscurest martyrdoms.

Mozley also produces strong evidence that Foxe was no credulous user of his sources. He was tireless in his efforts to verify reports, especially those of unofficial eye-witnesses, and all complaints against inaccuracies were fully investigated. This often involved travelling and tedious correspondence. The results are visible in alterations made between the 1563 and 1570 editions of *Acts and Monuments*. Mozley gives some typical examples of this work, and also discusses Foxe's actual use of MSS., which was much in advance of contemporary standards. His *verbatim* quotations are impeccable, as even Gairdner admitted, and his 'editing' never alters the general sense of his authority. Mozley's illustrations of this not only vindicate Foxe's accuracy, but have great

intrinsic interest and often humour. It would take a long review to do them justice.

From the firm ground thus uncovered, Mozley turns to deal with Foxe's detractors, and in his hands the truth is a mighty cudgel. During his life Foxe suffered much from the 'stinging wasps and buzzing drones' who sought to discredit his work. These he could answer himself. But in Laud's time the anti-Foxian chorus began to have its effect, although from Cope and Harpsfield, Foxe's first assailants, to more recent attackers, the core of the work, the accounts of Marian martyrdoms, has never been touched except by reviling, and no evidence that might really discredit Foxe has been produced.

In 1603 the Jesuit, Parsons, made a systematic attack upon Foxe, but under Mozley's examination this comes to little more than disgusting sneers at the humble station of many of the martyrs. No evidence or witnesses are produced, and if Parsons does claim that 'the official records' would substantiate his attack, he is careful to use no quotations from them and is compelled to use Foxe himself for the few facts he does incorporate.

More serious was S. R. Maitland's campaign against Foxe, which began in 1837. By exaggerating the minor inaccuracies in *Acts and Monuments*, and Foxe's occasional use of legends which were generally accepted in his credulous age, Maitland does make out some sort of case against Foxe. In this he was helped by the clumsiness of Foxe's defenders. But Mozley shows for the first time how dangerous to his own case was Maitland's claim to base his attack on the evidence of primary authorities. Mozley shows that it has no better basis than the lies told in the last extremity of despair by four minor Protestants. Foxe's citadel — his value as an authority for the Marian persecution as a whole — is found to stand unscathed.

But Maitland, ably supported by Brewer and Gairdner, had managed to cast suspicion on Foxe. The anti-Foxian drum was almost empty, but it made a lot of noise, and, to the shame of English history, echoes of it have found their way into the D.N.B. and the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Such is the 'traditional unreliability' of Foxe! R. W. Dixon, H. A. L. Fisher and J. A. Muller, however, knew enough of Foxe and his work to remain unconvinced by the tradition. Mozley is well able to vindicate their scepticism.

Foxe's detractors, for example, claimed, in Fuller's words, that 'many who were burnt in Foxe in the reign of Queen Mary drank sack in the reign of Queen Elizabeth.' Mozley shows that the basis of this is the fact that Marbeck, described as a martyr in the first English edition of *Acts and Monuments*, managed to escape

the fire. Foxe's accusers, however, conveniently omit that Foxe corrected the mistake in the Errata of that same edition! Mozley has similar disproofs of other charges against Foxe; the 'criminal' character, for example, of some of the martyrs.

Mozley devotes a chapter to answering the charge that Foxe 'garbled' the accounts of the Lollard trials. One accusation by Maddison is that a document for these trials was entirely forged by Foxe. Mozley shows that the 'forgery' is substantiated by the church registers of Chesham and Longland and the register of Lincoln. The 'garbling' is shown, by many examples, to be simply Foxe's use of common sense. He did not believe that Lollards, often tried unheard, really professed beliefs imputed to them when the beliefs were such as no Lollard would profess.

Mozley's facts must be taken into account by any who would re-asses the value of Lollardy as a preparation for the Reformation in England. Their work has been seriously under-valued, for it was to discuss the growing influence of Lollardy that Henry VIII's first Convocation met in 1512, and Colet's famous sermon on that occasion was directed not so much against the Lollards as against the abuses which gave relevance to their views. Foxe is similarly vindicated in the case of the Guernsey martyrs.

Thus the *Book of Martyrs* is restored to its place as an invaluable authority for the Reformation in England, and a great wrong has been righted. This is the more interesting because Foxe clearly believed that the Protestantism he professed was no new thing and certainly not the product of the continental doctrinal revolution. On pp. 21 and 22 Mozley seems, rather surprisingly, to regard 'reformed' opinion in Oxford in 1544 as Lutheran. But there is ample evidence in his book that his subject traced his spiritual descent back through Tyndale to Wycliffe and Grosstete, and beyond them to the more primitive Christianity which preceded the abuses he hated.

Foxe's *Commentarii* is quoted to show he was no Puritan, and it is clear that Foxe believed that permission to use the English Bible was the restoration of a right the Lollard's justly claimed. 'Foxe was very sensitive to the charge that Protestantism was a mushroom plant starting with Luther,' and his description of martyrdoms before 1517 shows that he believed his opinion to be well founded. That the English Protestants in exile under Mary were not Lutherans is illustrated by their difficulties at Frankfort.

This book is clearly printed on pre-war paper. It is a work which no future study of Foxe or his period will be able to ignore.

PETER ABELARD

(1079—1142)

By the Rev. J. R. McCallum, Rector of St. Leonard's, Colchester.

IT would be of some interest to enquire what is the influence of localities upon the people who are born and bred in them. Certain countries and districts produce certain types of mind. Mediaeval writers testify to the 'mental acuteness and industry' of students who came of Breton stock. The famous French thinker Ernest Renan was born in Brittany. The same country, bordering on the river Loire in the vicinity of Nantes, was the native soil of Peter Abelard, who died eight centuries ago this year. He was an intrepid advocate of free and rational thinking about the Christian religion in an age when the tide was running strongly in the direction of ecclesiastical authority, and when formalism and tradition were being enthroned in the place of truth. In considering some of his achievements in the realm of Christian rationalism, ethics and theology we do well to begin by pointing out this natural Breton endowment which favoured him with a vein of candid, critical scrutiny. Lacking it, he might have been no more than a leading scholar of his period: possessed of it, he has become for all time one of those who see Christianity as part of the truth of life, and seek to present it free from the superstitious entanglements that can so insidiously warp its real purpose.

It is important to realize that Abelard began by making himself outstandingly successful in the secular learning of his day. When he became head of the Cathedral School of Notre Dame at Paris he was far from being in cloistered seclusion. Rashdall has computed that there were certainly five thousand students at Paris in the early scholastic age, and 'the centre of this huge and novel concourse was the master of the Cathedral School.' In other words, it was to Abelard that students came from all over Europe to get the most up-to-date training in intellectual pursuits. Only later, after the episode of his attachment to Heloise, did he turn his attention to theological subjects, when his retirement to the abbey of St. Denis seemed to indicate a change in his interests more towards sacred and less to secular matters. So he tells us in the opening pages of his *Introduction to Theology*:

> 'My students urged me to deal with certain controversies about the Christian religion. They said that I was well-versed in philosophy and logic and should not let my talent lie unemployed. They added that nothing could more fall in with my change of life and dress (*viz.* that he had become a monk) than that I should also change my studies, and prefer the

sacred to human writings since I now proposed to give myself to God and entirely abandon the world.'

It can readily be seen that from such a starting-point Abelard came to consider the Christian faith and its contents from a rational and educated position. He asked the question which the purely ecclesiastical person frequently prefers to evade, or does not see as a question needing to be answered, namely: How do the statements which are made in the Christian religion accord with the ordinary knowledge which we already have of the world in general? This is a question which the Christian Rationalist is bound to ask because he knows that unless the religion is presented in terms that are understood by the educated persons of his times it runs the risk of being treated as little more than a pious fable or a naïve system of belief out of harmony with the accepted facts of acquired knowledge. When Abelard put this question it was fully recognized to be of the highest importance. In fact, it later inspired a classic answer from St. Thomas Aquinas. Perhaps his answer was more of a compromise than a real solution; but it none the less met the problem and has been used by the Roman Church ever since. St. Thomas said, as is well known, that much in the Christian religion can be understood rationally, by intellectual sight; but that there are certain parts of the faith which are a matter of pure revelation alone. This standpoint has proved more acceptable to the Roman Church, and probably to many outside the Roman communion, than the line of treatment which Abelard followed. This line of argument is interesting to us to-day because, with due allowance for changed conditions, it can yet give us assistance in facing the modern form of the rationalist question: What harmony is there between the basis of modern knowledge and the assertions upon which the Christian religion rests?

Abelard's *Introduction to Theology* contains his plea for the rational interpretation of the Christian faith. 'Some claim,' he remarks, 'that the whole faith is to be taken on trust from authority as a thing needing no reason or discussion.' This point of view, he says, is contrary to the Greek Fathers. Their desire was to give a reason for their faith. He therefore sets out in a completely original way to find the connection between rational knowledge of the world and Christian belief. The *Introduction* is largely inspired by this rationalist purpose. It is not a text-book of formal and traditional instruction so much as a freshly devised and clear-headed explanation showing the agreement between what Christians believe and what has for long been the teaching of great thinkers and experimenters in human knowledge. The point Abelard insists upon is that philosophers, from Plato to Boetheus, with whose work his teaching had made him familiar, are not to be

regarded as outside divine or sacred truth. They were, in fact, feeling their way towards, and indeed asserting, those very truths which the Church teaches. He finds the doctrine of the Trinity and of the Holy Spirit present in the writings of these thinkers no less clearly than it is in the sacred writers. Here is what he says about the Trinity:

> 'Plato and his followers, in the opinion of the sacred Fathers, support the Christian Faith. After the prophets, they plainly describe the Trinity. You will find that they consider reason, which they call *noun,* to have been born of God and to be co-eternal with Him. In other words, they refer to the Son, whom we speak of as the Wisdom of God, and regard Him as eternally-begotten of the Father' (*Introduction to Theology,* i, 17).

About the Holy Spirit in Platonic teaching Abelard writes:

> 'The Greek philosophers also had a doctrine of the person of the Holy Spirit. For them the third person proceeding from God was the "soul of the world"' (*anima mundi*) (*ibid*).

These lines of argument are continued throughout the whole of this interesting treatise. The writer does not claim what we understand to-day, namely, that in Greek thought there were stages of development towards the Christian view of man and his destiny. For Abelard, the Platonic and other writings contain Christian doctrine just as much as the Old and New Testaments. The point we have to notice is that he was trying to equate the latest education of his day with Christian belief.

We must, of course, not overlook the fact that this great Christian thinker was in many respects confined within the limits of his age. We must beware of crediting him with an intellectual grasp that was beyond his mental horizon. All the same, we can see how alert and liberal his approach to the Christian religion is, and how far removed from the restrictive dogmatism that can do so much to cramp Christian vision. His use of Greek thought to assist understanding of the Christian position was partly a result of his contact with what is known as the twelfth century renaissance, a renewal of intellectual life in the Middle Ages which was a kind of early spring-time before the fifteenth century renaissance of learning. But apart from this, Abelard's main object was evidently to set Christianity and up-to-date knowledge side by side, and to show, according to the light that he possessed, that the conclusions reached by philosophy in a rational observation of the world were not contradictory to, and indeed could go hand-in-hand with, Christian belief.

When we look at what Abelard achieved in regard to ethics, we find that he did much to give clear direction in matters where the mediaeval ecclesiastic was beginning to introduce mystification and obscurity. Out of the dark ages had emerged Augustine's theory of the depravity of man. The mediaeval man was being

taught that he could only escape damnation through the Church and its means of grace. The custom of baptizing infants to save them as soon as possible from the consequences of their tainted humanity had come in. Mediaeval theologians were disputing about original sin, and asking about its extent and how it made itself felt in the human mind. In the preoccupation with tiny points of logic that was a feature of the period they enquired whether or not a lascivious thought passing momentarily through the mind could be called sin. With the development of the confessional, tables of many sorts of sins were drawn up and the penances that they required were set forth on a list that has been sardonically referred to as a 'tariff.' Here were the early stages of pardon-selling, that system of 'paying your money and taking your choice' which was so resolutely condemned by the Protestant Reformers. The notion of man's fall was at the back of these degrading ideas, and to Abelard's credit it must be stated that he came boldly forward with the question : Is man by nature depraved? Is he involved in a guilt that goes back to Adam? May it not be that, though his circumstances are evil, man himself only becomes evil by the kind of use that he makes of his powers as a free and moral being? In the language of his day Abelard spoke of man as sharing the penalties of earlier errors (*poena*) without being subject to a perpetual state of sin (*culpa*). Against the tendency to classify sins into various sorts — such as 'venial' and 'mortal' — he set the fact that what is done may have all the appearances of a sin and yet it may have sprung from the action of a person who had no intention of doing wrong. What looks like murder may be the result of an act of self-defence. Thus in his *Ethics* Abelard laid it down that a sinful deed is not the thing of dominant importance : what really counts as a moral test is the intention or attitude of will of a person doing a particular action. 'If thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light : if thine eye be evil, thy whole body shall be full of darkness.' In a way that was remarkable for his time Abelard defined the moral consciousness, and in place of a theory of man as a fallen creature dependent upon the Church for rescue, he propounded the evangelical truth of man as a moral and spiritual being, capable, despite handicaps, of living the good life.

It is little wonder that he drew down upon himself by such opinions the ecclesiastical wrath, the well-meaning bigotry of St. Bernard, and condemnation at the Councils of Soissons and Sens. This ethical position was, no doubt, very largely reached through Abelard's interest in the controversy between Realism and Nominalism. William of Champeaux, head of the school of Notre Dame before Abelard succeeded to it, maintained the realist doctrine,

He asserted that nothing is real but the universal. Individuals and things are instances of the universal, and the universal exists in every individual and in every thing. A man, for example, is no more than an instance of humanity, or the man-type. Clearly, therefore, if humanity is depraved and corrupt, every man, as an instance of humanity, partakes of this depravity and corruption. Roscellinus of Compiègne held the nominalist theory: 'Only particular things have real existence.' The individual or the thing is alone real. Sin is therefore only personal. Abelard took a middle course between these points of view, although he inclined rather to the Nominalists. It is not easy to say exactly what his 'Conceptualism' amounted to, but the term itself may be said to refer to the individual mind perceiving outward things and understanding them by reason of its own inner concepts. In fact, on this question, which is really that of the relation of thought to things, of the mind to the universe, he asserts the independence and rational nature of every individual. From this it is a mere step for Abelard to affirm, in the moral sphere, the rational and moral responsibility of every man. The sub-title to his *Ethics* implies as much. It is *Scite teipsum* (*Know thyself*). Looked at from another point of view this teaching is an advocacy of free-will in the moral life, just as realism is akin to determinism: but there is allowance also for the operation of divine grace. One result of these lines of ethical thought was that at a time when the confessional was being sedulously organized Abelard asked: 'Should not confession be made to God alone?' A chapter in his *Ethics* deals with this point.

The conclusions to which he came as an ethical thinker had an important influence upon Abelard's contribution to Christian theology. Behind the current mediaeval doctrine of sin lay the great fundamental belief that human sin was borne by Christ and its penalty cancelled by his death. Christ was the substitute who suffered in place of sinful man. The Church by means of mass and penance dispensed the pardon won by Christ to the faithful. Now if, as Abelard taught, humanity is not guilty, though it is handicapped by its own errors, there is scarcely any need for guilt to be done away with. The Atonement, therefore, can hardly be looked upon in the way the mediaeval theologians adopted. Man makes mistakes, but he does so from intention, from bias to evil that is a misapplication of his moral freedom. What, then, does man require that Christ can give him? He needs to be raised to a perception of his wrong-doing and to a sense of endeavour to live the good life. This can be afforded him when he sees that God in Christ was appealing to man to live a life of moral and spiritual goodness that had the divine approval. Rashdall has put the issue so clearly that a quotation from his *Idea of Atonement* may well summarize

the matter :

> ' In Abelard . . . we get rid altogether of the notion of a mysterious guilt which, by an abstract necessity of things, was required to be extinguished by death or suffering. The efficacy of Christ's death is now quite definitely and explicitly explained by its subjective influence upon the mind of the sinner. The voluntary death of the innocent Son of God on man's behalf moves the sinner to gratitude and answering love, and so to consciousness of sin, repentance, amendment. His position is succinctly expressed in one of the propositions condemned by the Council of Sens in 1141 and by Pope Innocent II. After stating with remorseless clearness the objections to the common ideas upon the subject, he proceeds : " I think, therefore, that the purpose and cause of the Incarnation was that He might illuminate the world by His wisdom, and excite it to the love of Himself " ' (p. 358).

Along with the earliest Greek Fathers, Abelard takes the emphasis from the death of Christ and stresses his whole life and death as a proof of God's love for mankind, as a piece of experience by which the human race was awakened to its highest moral and spiritual self-hood.

What he has to say about the Trinity has been indicated above, and his treatise on the subject elaborates his theory of God as Power, Wisdom and Love. On this controversial and complicated ground it was hardly likely that he would sustain a case that would commend itself to everyone. His conclusions are of considerable interest : but of greater moment was his readiness to face problems and to seek to discover a reasonable way of thinking where meaning can be too easily turned into mystery, and where the ecclesiastical tendency was to dictate rather than to define what had to be believed.

So much for our author's work in Christian Rationalism, Ethics and Theology. Here are a few points of further interest. There has been a custom to keep Abelard's relationship to Heloise, niece of Canon Fulbert, of Paris, to whom he was united in love though not in law, separate from his accomplishments in thought. Heloise took the veil, and became abbess of the oratory called ' the Paraclete ' founded by him at Nogent-sur-Seine. May not Abelard's experience in this romance have had some influence upon his ethical notion of the intention and not the deed being the main issue in moral conduct? Censured for this episode by many who overlook irregularities in the life of St. Augustine, staged as a romantic troubadour hero by those with a taste for a tale of sentiment, Abelard himself may have seen in the situation and in his later constancy to Heloise a convincing instance of how a man's inner intention may be faithful love albeit to the world his action has a less happy appearance.

In his writings there is a style and strength not readily recognized beneath the mediaeval Latin. It has a good deal of that

vigour and *verve* characteristic of the French literary genius. There is a good example of this at the opening of his treatise called *A Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian*. Notice how he strikes out sharply into his subject in what we should almost describe as 'snappy directness':

> 'In the midst of night and its visions there came three men and stood beside me. "Who are you," I asked, "and why do you come?" "We are men," they replied, "who follow different sects of religion. All three of us claim to serve the One God. Yet we do so by a different faith and form of life. One of us is a philosopher, content to live by the natural law. The other two of us hold by the Scriptures. One is called a Jew, the other a Christian. We have conferred and also been in conflict about our variety of faith; and now we have come to you to see whether you can help us in any way by discussing these things."'

This treatise is an early excursion into Comparative Religion. Abelard's interest in Jewish thought is noteworthy. He occasionally quotes Hebrew. There is a general opinion that learning was preserved in mediaeval times by the monasteries. Actually there was another avenue through which it continued to thrive, namely, the Jewish and Arabic culture of Spain. It seems that our author had some contacts with this, no doubt through students in Paris. This sidelight on his sources of knowledge is dealt with in the volume *The Legacy of Israel*.

After study in Paris, Abelard opened a school at Melun. Then he went to Corbeil, and taught with increasing success. He returned to Paris and had a school at St. Genevieve on the hill outside the old city, before becoming head of the Cathedral School. His love affair with Heloise caused him to retire to the abbey of St. Denis, on the north side of the city. He left here to resume teaching at Nogent-sur-Seine, just below Paris. Here former students flocked to him, and he started an oratory dedicated to the Paraclete, which later became an important religious house. Subsequently he became abbot of St. Gildas de Ruys in his native Brittany. In 1141 he was condemned by St. Bernard at the Council at Sens. He began a journey to Rome to appeal to the Pope, but had to give up owing to failing health, and died in the spring of 1142 at Chalons-sur-Saône, near Lyons. His bones were buried at the Paraclete with those of Heloise. When the religious houses were suppressed by the French government the bones of Abelard and Heloise were placed, perhaps after some changes of location, in the cemetery of Père la Chaise at Paris, where a memorial grave commemorates both of them. On it sentimental folk throw posies of violets as a symbol of true love, a rather pretty proof of how little some of those who visit the spot realize that they are standing beside the mortal remains of one of the greatest minds which the Middle Ages produced.

THE CRITERION OF TRUTH IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

By S. R. Woods, M.A., Headmaster of Cotham Secondary School for Boys, Bristol.

'YOUTH in particular requires a clear expression of those fundamental Christian principles, which alone can provide a true direction for the future.' This quotation from a pamphlet, entitled *Empire Youth Sunday*, which I received recently, provides a somewhat ironic comment on 150 years of unparalleled material progress. But the 'century of hope' has been succeeded by a period of disillusionment and we are, perhaps, more ready than we were to admit that a standard of values is as necessary a part of knowledge as technical skill. Contemporary events compel us to admit that it may be true that 'the life is more than meat and the body than raiment' and that, as R. H. Tawney says, 'Both the existing economic order and too many of the projects for reconstructing it break down through the neglect of the truism that, since even quite common men have souls, no increase in material wealth will compensate them for arrangements which insult their self-respect and impair their freedom. A reasonable estimate of economic organisation must allow for the fact that, unless industry is to be paralysed by recurrent revolts on the part of outraged human nature, it must satisfy criteria which are not purely economic' (quoted by Ethel Mannin, *Christianity or Chaos*, p. 232). And so arises again a demand for a religious basis in education.

With such a demand the schools on the whole are sympathetic. Religion is part of the tradition of English education. The aims and aspirations of the school's way of life defy measurement by material standards. With all its faults the English school is a society inspired by a spirit of self-sacrifice and service and is in many ways well-fitted to be a vehicle for religious training. It is one of the few elements in our social system which would not have to be completely revolutionized in a Christian society. Yet there are difficulties — and serious difficulties — in the realization of this aim.

The summary of the Archbishops' Proposals which I have in front of me as I write apparently regards the difficulty as mainly one of defects in the appropriate machinery. There is a lack of specialist teachers; the subject is not inspected and there are certain administrative problems. Thus the proposals are limited to a

few practical suggestions to remedy these defects in the machinery of education.

The pamphlet, *Why Christian Education Matters*, published by the Christian Education Movement, courageously acknowledges difficulties of another character. One difficulty is that 'there are genuine differences of conviction as well as much misunderstanding, as to what should and what should not, be included in "religious teaching,"' and I am sorry that in 'the lines of practical action' which the pamphlet goes on to suggest, this difficulty is ignored. The pamphlet speaks of the need of a 'thorough rethinking of the philosophy of education,' but not of a similar need in religion. The problem of what should and what should not be included in religious teaching remains unsolved. Yet, I contend, until there is agreement as to the content of the religious teaching, consideration of the reform of the necessary machinery is premature. There can be no courses until the content of such courses has been decided, no inspection until it has been determined what is to be inspected.

In part these 'genuine differences of conviction' are due to the different emphasis which different men inevitably attach to different elements in the Christian Faith. To one man the dominant element is the assurance it gives that the ultimate purpose of reality is the achievement of goodness; its capacity to harmonise the realm of causation, apparently indifferent to men's hopes and hostile to men's aims, with the realm of values. By comparison the historical origins of the Christian Faith or the ability of its ethic to solve the bread and butter problems of the present age are unimportant. To another it is the Christian ethic which is fundamental. The harmony which Christianity offers is social rather than intellectual. In a world distracted by want and war, it points the way to social justice and international peace. And to a third group the central fact of the Christian Faith is the Incarnation. If Christ be not God, they are of all men most miserable; the coherence of the Christian philosophy brings no consolation, the efficiency of the Christian ethic brings no comfort.

I would suggest, however, that such an analysis of the difficulty attending that clear expression of the fundamentals of the Christian Faith is but superficial. Differences of emphasis, though they cannot be ignored, can be respected. The greater difficulty seems to be that there is no general agreement about the nature of authority in religion, no universal acceptance of some criterion of religious truth. Yet the content of a subject is determined at least as much by its criterion of truth as by the boundaries within which that criterion is to operate. If I say that the subject of my study is, say, 'Villeinage in Mediaeval England,' the content of my

subject is fixed not only by the boundaries implicit in the words 'villeinage' and 'medieval England,' but also by the criteria of historical truth which enable me, within those boundaries, to recognize that for which I am looking. It may be that I adopt a false canon of evidence, in which case the whole structure of knowledge organized upon that canon is but a house built upon the sand, which collapses when the winds and waves of criticism sweep away the foundation upon which it was built. But to accept some way of knowing, some criterion of truth, is the essential preliminary of any study, including the study of religion. An 'agreed syllabus' must contain an agreed criterion of truth as well as an agreed list of topics.

This lack of precise agreement about the nature of authority in religion is, I suggest, at bottom due to an attempt to combine two ways of knowing which are ultimately incompatible. A layman should walk delicately when discussing theories of knowledge, for they are bewildering in their variety, but with the boldness that comes from ignorance he may say that in the secular and religious writing with which he is acquainted he finds, broadly speaking, two alternative theories.

The first theory, which may be called the 'secular' theory, is that man is dependent upon himself for his knowledge of the universe. In the struggle to exist and to develop in the face of an environment that threatens to destroy him unless he can use it and bend it to his will, man has no tool but his own intelligence, his own way of knowing, his own capacity for comprehending that with which he is surrounded. The members of a group or society may pool their knowledge, putting at the disposal of each the wisdom of all, but even this collective knowledge can claim neither finality nor certainty. It is based upon judgments that, being human, are defective, welded into a system that must ever remain incomplete. Absolute truth always eludes man's grasp, though by effort and criticism, by rejecting old systems that cannot contain new facts and by refusing to give to the new that exemption from change which he has denied to the old, man slowly and painfully approaches nearer the goal of truth, which will never be completely attained.

The other theory, the 'religious' theory, is that God, the Mind behind the universe, knowing the limitations of human intelligence and pitying man's ignorance, has at times and in various ways revealed to man truth which man by himself without external aid could never have obtained. Through a Person, a Book or a Society, through the religious experience of the individual, God speaks to man with an authority that cannot be denied. The truth so revealed carries with it its own conviction, its imperative claim

to obedience. Criticism is impossible and proof unnecessary. In this way of knowing, God is active, man is passive. Only by annihilating his personality and obliterating his will does the individual receive undistorted the knowledge from on high.

To discuss which theory of knowledge is correct is obviously beyond the scope of this article. The two theories tend to be responses to different sets of circumstances. What I have called the 'religious theory,' though it is not entirely limited to the religious sphere, is the expression of a 'crisis' mentality. 'Matters of national defence, of politics, of religion, are still too important for knowledge and must remain subjects for certitude' (W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*; quoted by Huxley, *Religion without Revelation*, p. 29). It appeals to a leader, be he Moses or Mussolini, who honestly feels that only implicit obedience to his will can enable him to lead his people to the promised land. But it is contrary to English political tradition. It is a way of knowing which the modern university, accepting with all its limitations the 'secular' theory, flatly rejects. Yet religion as a subject of study in schools to some extent tries to retain the two theories and to combine 'knowledge' with 'certitude.'

Take, for example, the *Report of the Archbishops' Commission on Doctrine in the Church of England*. It is an extraordinarily honest document, for though it is obviously written by that 'company of personal friends' of which the introduction speaks, yet not even the claims of friendship nor an earnest desire for agreement, prevents the expression of honest divergencies of opinion. These differences are particularly apparent in the Prolegomena, pp. 27-40, which deals with the Bible and the Church, the source and authority of Christian doctrine, from which the following quotations are taken :

1. The Bible.

(*a*) 'The Bible possesses authority for Christians on the ground that it is the classical literature of that progressive self-revelation of God, which culminated in Jesus Christ' (p. 31).

'The fact that the Church has accepted this particular body of literature as canonical Scripture invests it as a whole with an authoritative character for all its members' (p. 31).

(*b*) 'Belief that the Bible is the inspired record of God's self-revelation to man and of man's response to that revelation is not for us a dogma imposed as a result of some theory of the mode of the composition of the books, but a conclusion drawn from the character of their contents and the spiritual insight displayed in them' (p. 27).

(*c*) 'The authority ascribed to the Bible must not be interpreted as prejudging the conclusions of historical, critical and scientific investigation in any field, not excluding that of the Biblical documents themselves' (p. 32).

2. The Church.

(*a*) 'The authority of the Church in the realm of doctrine arises from its commission to preach the gospel to all the world and the promises, accompanying that commission, that the Lord would always be with his disciples, and that the Holy Spirit would guide them into all truth' (p. 35).

(*b*) 'Acceptance of the Church's authority by the individual must always rest on his own judgment' (p. 36).

(*c*) 'The Church should recognise as necessary to the fulness of its own life, the activity of those of its own members who carry forward the apprehension of truth by freely testing and criticising its traditional doctrines' (p. 36).

In each group quotations (*a*) are expressive of the theory that truth is God-given rather than man-obtained; the Bible, being God's instrument and the Church, being God's agent, therefore possess authority. But quotations (*b*) and (*c*) represent the other theory. The ultimate authority is the individual judgment. Finality in truth has not been achieved and the progressive apprehension of truth is the result of a process of criticism, which, presumably, may involve the rejection of that which was previously accepted.[1]

Admittedly sentences wrenched from their context are unlikely to give a true impression of the meaning of the original writer, but I think it is fair to say that the quotations given above show that the *Prolegomena* is not a coherent expression of either of the theories of knowledge previously described, but a less than successful attempt to combine the two. And the consequences are serious. The sympathetic reader is left with the impression that there is confusion amongst the leaders of the Church about the nature of authority in religion. The more critical reader feels that such a document, by permitting a distinction to be drawn between 'religion' and 'clear thinking,' to some extent justifies Mr. A. L. Rowse's recent letter to *The Times*:

'. . . Nor do we agree with the Archbishop that more religious instruction in schools is going to be our salvation. What we want is more intelligence, putting ability, clear thinking, foresight, aggressive energy first . . .'

And, more serious still, religion becomes separated from other subjects of study.

'The theologian who stubbornly insists that his truth is of a different sort, a self-validating sort and therefore incompatible with tests and analyses stands in ignorant isolation from his many colleagues in the search for understanding' (A. L. Swift, *New Frontiers of Religion*, p. 66).

Up to a point religion and the secular subjects employ the same mode of thought, but then somewhere they diverge; either religion

[1] 'To maintain that God in and for Himself is not self-sufficient, is, from the standpoint of traditional Christian theology, a gross heresy . . . In my opinion the doctrine of the self-sufficiency of God should be rejected' (W. R. Matthews, *The Purpose of God*, p. 173).

goes on, claiming a way of knowing not available to the secular subjects, or the process of criticism in religion has to stop short, lest there should be conflict between the truth that emerges through criticism and the truth once revealed.

> '"The Christian concept of the Deity is said to be fashioned from the data of religious experience very much as the intellectual construction of the order of nature is built up from the immediate data of sense. Yet not entirely so, for though our conception of God may be enlarged and modified by the centuries of reflection which have elapsed, and by the mass of new knowledge about the universe which the last two hundred years have brought, any idea of God which can be called Christian must be in harmony with that which is presented to us in the New Testament and particularly in the life and works of the Lord' (W. R. Matthews, *Tract. Theol.-pol.*, chap. 4). This would appear to introduce a radical modification into the alleged empirical procedure. Matthews suggests that the theologian follows the method of science in proceeding from the empirical data and reaching results by means of "observation, record and narration." But there is surely no parallel between the two methods. For the scientific man history has no authority, nor are any of its epochs privileged. Doubtless no scientific man could afford to ignore Kepler, but the data supplied in Kepler's work have no privileged position. There is no parallel in inductive thought to the theologian's ascription of privilege to one person's consciousness. It would seem that the theological method as represented by Matthews is a method of interpreting experience in the light of certain *a priori* conceptions' (F. E. England, *The Validity of Religious Experience*, p. 194).

The shifting standpoint of this article, at one moment apparently in favour of religious education, at another apparently hostile, will have suggested already the schoolmaster's difficulty. Religious education is something infinitely more than the insertion into the school time-table of one or two periods a week of religious instruction. Religious education means that the whole activity of the school has a religious basis and is unified to a religious end. Religion is not one amongst many subjects in the time-table, but the spirit in which each subject is taught. But this cannot be, unless religion accepts the same mode of thought and the same *criteria* of truth as the other subjects and the school is committed to what I have called the 'secular' theory of knowledge. This determines the intellectual climate of the school and no amount of good-will on the part of the schoolmaster can secure the healthy growth of religion, even merely as a school subject, if religion requires an intellectual climate of another character. Still less can it become the school's way of life, the spirit that gives life and organic unity to the otherwise unconnected aspects of the school's activity.

On the other hand many schoolmasters earnestly desire religious education. We feel that at present schools lack a clear-cut purpose, and that the absence of a unifying principle is a defect,

judged even by purely educational criteria. But this unifying principle to be efficient must fulfil certain conditions. It must accept the school's standards of value, which are not material; it must respect the liberal, non-authoritarian tradition in English education and must be not a single subject but a synthesis of subjects or, rather, a synoptic view of knowledge. It must be based upon a conception of human personality that is complete and not partial. Now the unity that in other countries has been forced upon the schools, the uniformity of some rigid political or economic system, does not fulfil these conditions. An enforced unity of this nature involves the complete destruction of our liberal theory of education. It is based upon a conception of personality which, by the school's present standards, is less than complete, for the schoolboy, we believe, is something more than an economic man or a political animal. Such systems are either a complete denial of the Christian ethic, which the school accepts, or are but a partial expression of that ethic, invalidated by that criticism of R. H. Tawney, quoted at the beginning of this article. The unity which is most consonant with the ethos and general structure of the English school is a religious unity. Nor, in my opinion, is such a unity impossible, for the difficulties with which this article has been concerned can be reduced to this — that there are certain doctrines based upon the historical element in the Christian Faith, which cannot be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the school's mode of thought and which require for unqualified acceptance belief in 'a different sort of truth, a self-validating sort, incompatible with tests and analyses.' For this truth of 'a different sort' is not necessary to justify the Christian ethic nor does the argument for the Christian philosophy depend upon it. And the content of religion compatible with the school's mode of thought is not mere intellectualism, for emotion has its place in school, but it is a controlled emotion-devotion to that which the intellect finds most worthy. Cannot the school be permitted to teach a religion which, by accepting the school's mode of thought, would integrate the curriculum, direct the whole of its activity to a religious end and recapture that unity of life and thought which was the glory of the Middle Ages?

'Behind our few stars,' said Auda, the Bedouin chief, to Lawrence, 'we see God, who is not behind your millions.' That epitomises the school's problem. We would see God, but we cannot deny the existence of the stars in their millions.

DOGMA MATTERS

By the Editor.

'DOGMA Matters' has become a slogan of modern ecclesiasticism. The undergraduate world has enshrined it in a doggerel verse:

> 'Dogma matters: this I know.
> Dorothy Sayers has told me so.'

Does dogma matter? The true answer to this question depends upon what we mean by 'dogma' and what we understand by 'matters.'

Dogma is a Greek word. *The Oxford Dictionary* defines it as 'that which seems to be.' This is in accordance with its derivation from the Greek verb 'to seem.' *Dogma* has three meanings in Greek literature:

(i) opinion,
(ii) a principle,
(iii) a decree.

(i) The first meaning needs no explanation since it is true to the etymology of the word. (ii) The second meaning represents the process of philosophic thought when that which seemed to some master-mind to be true was postulated as the underlying principle of a philosophic system. Thus 'happiness is the highest good' is declared to be the dogma of the Epicureans: 'All things flow' was the dogma of Heraclitus. (iii) The third meaning represents a stage when that which seems to authority to be necessary or desirable is formulated in a decree or regulation which ultimately is enforced by penalties.

In the New Testament, *Dogma* is used only in the third sense. St. Luke uses it of an Imperial decree:

> 'There went forth a decree (*dogma*) from Caesar Augustus that all the world should be enrolled' (*Lk.* ii, 1).

At Philippi, Paul and Silas are charged with seeking to subvert the Imperial authority by acting 'contrary to the decrees (*dogmata*) of Caesar, saying that there is another Emperor, one Jesus' (*Acts* xvii, 7). St. Paul in his Epistles uses *dogma* to describe the commandments and regulations of the Mosaic law (*Col.* ii, 14; *Eph.* ii, 15).

But most significant of all for the understanding of the future ecclesiastical use of *dogma* is that Luke uses it of the decisions reached by the Council of Jerusalem which were delivered to the churches of Galatia (*Acts* xvi, 4). It is true that the dogmas of the Council of Jerusalem were concerned, not with Christian faith, but with Christian practice. Neither were these dogmas enforced by

penalties. Nevertheless, the use of dogma in this case determines the later ecclesiastical use of the word. Henceforth, in Church History, dogmas are decrees of the Church, not in matters of practice, but in matters of faith 'proposed by the Church for the belief of the faithful' (cf. *A Catholic Dictionary*, by Addis and Arnold, p. 269).

As time went on these Church dogmas multiplied exceedingly and were enforced by a great variety of penalties which placed the souls, bodies, property and reputations of Christian men at the mercy of the Church authorities. Men denied these dogmas at their peril, for in certain periods of Church history these dogmas, besides having all the spiritual authority of the Church, had the secular power of the State behind them also. So that those who denied these dogmas had no chance either in this world or in the next.

In the period of the *Renaissance* a spirit arose in Western Europe which revolted against this intolerable ecclesiastical tyranny—a tyranny which in the light of the New Learning seemed in many cases to be as intellectually false as it was absurdly arrogant. In those days it was mainly the Church dogmas, authorizing papal claims and catholic cultus, which were attacked and discredited. At later stages, in the days of the *Aufklärung* and the French Revolution, the attack on dogmas became more radical and extensive. In the modern era of evolutionary science, historical research and Biblical criticism, the authority of dogma was replaced in influential Church circles by an authority of another order. The dogmatic authority of Catholicism had, at the Reformation, yielded to the dogmatic authority of Scripture in the most vigorous and progressive communities in Northern and Western Europe. But now the dogmatic authority of Scripture itself was compelled to yield in many instances to claims of Truth based on the results achieved by the new science, historical research and Biblical criticism. At the *Renaissance*, the dogmatic system of the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas had in large part been laid in ruins, but in the nineteenth century the not less commanding dogmatic system embodied in the *Institutes* of John Calvin was as badly breached. There were prophetic Christians who shed no tears over the ruins. Nevertheless, these attacks on the ecclesiastical dogmatic systems deprived many weaker brethren of their spiritual homes.

Two great World Wars ensued. Many began to feel that the loss of moral and spiritual ideals, especially in modern Europe and America, was due to deserting the Church's dogmatic system and attempting to substitute for it general Christian culture which rapidly degenerated into materialistic naturalism and immoral hedonism among large classes of the population. These

people were right in some measure, and in some measure they were also wrong :

> 'Hard upon hard makes a bad stone wall :
> Soft upon soft makes none at all.'

Somehow the pearl of great price had got lost in throwing away the oyster shells, or, to use a favourite metaphor of the period, 'the nurse had thrown out the babe with the bath water.'

Modern humanitarianism appealed to modern liberalism by affirming the conviction that those who kept the second of the Two Great Commandments, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,' were thereby keeping the First Commandment, 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and soul and mind and strength.' But these modern humanitarians failed to realize that the love of God is the only secure basis for the love of man and the greatest incentive to it. The poet's *dictum* :

> 'For forms of faith let blinded bigots fight :
> His can't be wrong whose life is in the right,'

was cited as justifying the replacing of religious faith by good conduct. What, however, the poet was affirming was that the true test of right faith is right conduct, a view which would seem to have the support of St. James.

When it began to be realized that Christian Faith is the root of which Christian character and conduct are the fruit, a reaction began to set in against the attempt to exclude Christian faith from its primary position in the Christian life. Such reaction was both needful and right. An attempt however is being made to equate this renewed emphasis on Christian faith with the restoration of the traditional dogmatic systems to their ancient position of authority in the Christian society. This policy we regard as wrong and detrimental.

Let it be granted that if we are to have Christian faith, we must have clear statements as to what that faith affirms and on what that faith rests. But this is a very different matter from restoring to authority the old dogmatic systems in their entirety. Such a policy would prove to be as foolish as the extreme liberal attempt to abolish dogma. What is needed to-day is not that dogma should be extirpated from the Christian religion, but that it should be re-formulated and presented in a new way. *Non nova, sed nove* was the sound modernist *dictum* of that champion of catholicity, Vincent of Lerins, in his *Commonitorium*.

The re-formulation of Christian dogma must be based upon Truth—religious Truth, historic Truth, scientific Truth. Vast accumulations of Truth in all these spheres have been made of recent years, and this new Truth has in some respects rendered the ancient good uncouth. Some of this ancient good the new Truth has rendered false; some it has rendered artificial and conven-

tional. The Christian faith which created the old dogmatic systems is, in its essentials, untouched. But many of the dogmatic formulations of that faith are so out of date as to make the Christian faith itself appear false and incredible to those to whom it is presented in its ancient form.

Re-presentation is plainly as much a necessity to-day as re-formulation. To present a dogmatic pistol at the head of a possible Christian convert and to say, 'Accept this dogma or remain outside the Christian Church,' is a futile mode of action; yet that is what some of our reactionary ecclesiastics are advocating.

The greatest modernist (after our Lord) in the New Testament is the author of the Fourth Gospel. He cites Jesus as saying to some who stood in doubt of His Gospel and its authority:

> 'If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God, or whether I speak from myself' (*Jn.* vii, 17).

What Jesus demands from his disciples is not assent to a dogmatic system but the readiness to make an experiment which, as Dean Inge has pointed out, justifies itself by an experience:

> 'The Christian life begins with an experiment and ends in an experience.'
>
> 'Come and see.'
>
> 'This do and thou shalt live.'
>
> 'If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it is from God.'

This presentation of Christian dogma as a working hypothesis is one which must appeal to the modern scientific mind, since it represents the scientific attitude towards all the great affirmations of scientific truth.

Many years ago I became a student in the department of Natural Science in a colonial university. The Professor of Natural Science, one of those ubiquitous Balliol men, said to me at the outset, 'All the work in our laboratory is based on the acceptance of evolution.' I said, 'Do you then regard the truth of evolution as demonstrated?' 'No,' he replied, 'that is not our way of looking at the matter. We regard evolution as the best working hypothesis for our research. We are always ready to exchange it for a better working hypothesis, should that present itself, or to modify it in the light of new *data*.'

That is, I believe, the right and effective way of presenting our great Christian dogmas to the modern world — not as *mere* hypotheses, but as the best *working* hypothesis for human acceptance and practice.

But notice, the will to accept the dogma comes first — the will to accept the dogma, not as demonstrated truth decreed for human acceptance by an ecclesiastical authority which claims to be divine and infallible, but acceptance as a working hypothesis to be put

into daily experimental practice, and a willingness to stand or fall by the experiment. First in order comes the good will, then comes the right practice, then the growing certitude of true faith. In this process of experiment dogma comes last, not first.

The essential Christian dogmas are few indeed, but they are all of supreme practical importance. Only such may be offered to our fellow-men for acceptance, of which it may be said in each case: 'This do and thou shalt live.' These essential dogmas are not static but dynamic. All of them are in continual need of progressive re-interpretation in the light of enlarging Christian experience illuminated by the Holy Spirit. This is the dogma that matters and this is the way in which it matters. The whole is summed up for us in Dr. Illingworth's golden saying:

> 'The Christian Religion refuses to be proved first and practised afterwards. Its practice and its proof go hand in hand.'

THE MINISTRY OF TEACHING: CLERGY, TEACHERS AND ORDINANDS

By the Rev. W. Richardson, M.A., Chaplain and Tutor of Ripon Hall, and Assistant Master at the Royal Grammar School, High Wycombe.

ALTHOUGH the question of religious education is very much in the public eye at the moment, there seems to be one aspect of it which has not received adequate emphasis, if indeed any acknowledgment at all. This is the complete inability of the Church itself under present conditions to teach the essentials of Christianity. There are two very definite reasons for this.

(1) The inadequacy of our Sunday Schools and the difficulties under which they labour. In the first place really competent teachers are extremely rare, and even moderately capable and instructed teachers are difficult to obtain and more difficult still to instruct and retain. Good Sunday School teaching is a labour of pure love which entails sacrifice of much free time, and toiling under many adverse conditions. In the second place the children themselves compare the Sunday Schools unfavourably with the State Day Schools because they find an absence of compulsory attendance and attention, and an inevitably lower standard of technical efficiency in teachers and administration.

(2) The lack of competent teachers among the clergy themselves to teach adequately either in sermons, addresses, classes or study circles.

The result has been a progressive deterioration of Christian

knowledge among all age-groups and especially among the children of the last few generations during precisely that period when secular general education has made such strides. Therewith has gone a loss of respect for the Church and religion, and an increasing tendency to secularism and mere Marxist materialism, through sheer ignorance of any real alternative and in the mistaken belief that the Church stood aloof in its own smooth and fussy little world and had nothing to offer.

There are two urgent needs: (1) Better, deeper and more universal instruction in the facts and fundamentals of Christianity.

(2) A new method of approach. The idea that Scripture or Biblical knowledge can be taught merely historically and without any underlying interpretation is an illusion. Even secular history cannot so be taught, and would probably be worthless if it could. To say that Scripture must be taught *doctrinally* raises ire, but it is surely patent that it must be taught *religiously*, *i.e.* with a conviction of an underlying spiritual reality, not *merely* with an eye to history, literature, archaeology and ethics. After all, that is its whole point. The religious meaning and atmosphere are inseparable from it, and to try to teach it without realizing this renders it unreal and mere academic knowledge, largely despised because in such a context it is trivial compared with other similar events in the world's history and with other knowledge taught. It is never rightly understood or appreciated and is in fact ineffective. Διάνοια οὐδὲν κινεῖ, 'thought initiates no activity'; the teacher, like his Master, must touch the emotions and will; κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενος, 'he moves as one that is loved,' to adapt Aristotle's phrase.

Perhaps two practical suggestions may be made to meet these difficulties: (1) The teaching of Scripture should be removed from the curriculum of Day Schools and instead Sunday Schools should be made compulsory by the State. It is perhaps worthy of note that this suggestion came to me from the Headmaster of a State Elementary School who certainly had no ecclesiastical axes to grind. Such a system would necessitate adequate staffing of Sunday Schools by teachers presumably either of different denominations in different schools or of mixed denominations in common supra-denominational schools. Presumably they would be day school teachers or teachers similarly trained, and it is noteworthy that the most efficient Sunday Schools are often run or largely staffed voluntarily by day school teachers. No doubt questions of pay, hours and demands on time would be raised, but some arrangement should be possible, and if compulsory part-time adult or adolescent education should become the rule after the war, as seems likely, such a scheme would chime well with it.

(2) There should be greater intercourse and fusion between the School-Teaching and Clerical Professions. The English Church

should regard two years spent in a school either immediately on ordination even or certainly soon after the diaconate as equivalent to and equally valuable with parochial experience, and no less an ecclesiastical charge than a cure of souls. The clerical teacher should at the same time be attached to a local church both for his own spiritual good and for the good of the school and his pupils, who will be helped thereby to associate him and his teaching of Scripture more easily with ordinary practical life and with worship, to the great increase of their feeling of its reality and relevance to things that matter *now*. Lay teachers in their turn should be encouraged to take part in church work both spiritual and administrative, in the same churches and in a spirit of greater equality and fellowship.

This would be rendered easier if the clergy should show themselves capable teachers and understanding exponents of Christianity, sincerely working for the union of all sects, above denominations, tolerant of others' opinions, in the interests of the Kingdom of God which transcends all, and recognizing the incompleteness of all Orders in a divided Church, as Professor Quick expresses it. Furthermore, the clergy should teach other subjects as well as religion, because this will earn them greater respect and usefulness in the school-life and make them more genuine members of the profession. It will also give them on their part a deeper understanding of school life and of their pupils, and they will also be able to impart Christianity less directly but perhaps more effectively in such teaching.

I would conclude these brief suggestions with two further observations. The first I have touched already, but I feel it is so important that it deserves labouring a little. It is the primary importance of making religion feel *real* in the school life. Daily school prayers carefully chosen to touch vital interests of boys and girls, *religious* teaching, which does not mean 'pious' teaching, the connecting up of 'school functions' with religion and worship, and the whole atmosphere of the school as it shows the disciplined fruits of the spirit, will help in this direction.

The second point again concerns teachers and clergy. It is suggested in the recent report on the Training of Ordinands that they should spend some time teaching and doing other work of a secular kind and should also pass a period in a teachers' training college. Whether anything like it was in the minds of the Commission or not, this seems to indicate that there might be much closer relations between training colleges for teachers and clergy, perhaps in some cases almost fusion, so that the close co-operation I have suggested above might become part of their training and the teacher be a pastor even if he remained a layman and the pastor a teacher even though ordained.

CHRISTIAN DISCOVERY

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DURING the past fifty years or so the majority of Englishmen have come to believe that the most important things to achieve are self-expression, the development of individuality, the ability to be freely oneself. We have been anxious not to bias people, even children, in matters of religious faith, or patriotic feeling, or even in standards of manners and behaviour, but to leave them free to find their own way in these things. This approach is a consequence of an attitude to life, the attitude of a society which in many other ways, too, has held to a doctrine of *laissez-faire*; has believed, though subconsciously perhaps, that progress would inevitably come; that man must needs choose the highest when he sees it. Such a society thinks of a detached scepticism as the safest course to take, at any rate for the time being, until some course of action which is guaranteed to be both profitable and safe should reveal itself.

But the trouble about scepticism is that by its very nature people cannot really *believe* in it, and it cannot therefore generate a creative energy. Scepticism and purposelessness go together; and it is from purposelessness that our society and we ourselves suffer so much. Our generation has spent a long time in just doing things, or arranging things, in a vague hope that a god will come out of the machine, and that in spite of forebodings all will yet be rosy. Such doing is in itself an attempt to escape from facing facts, from taking responsibility; for it is possible to be sentimental in action as well as in thought. We accuse the Victorians of being sentimental in their art and in their words; but we allow ourselves to be sentimental in action when we act without purpose, plan or vision, just for the sake of acting.

Hitler at least knows this: that the only way to sustained and purposeful action comes through belief, through a faith which can integrate personality on some level or another. Totalitarianism is only to be understood if we think of it as a road built to lead out of a morass of scepticism. It is itself an escape, far preferable to scepticism, because more practical, more in touch with the needs of men's spirits, but none the less an escape: sentimental, defective because there are whole regions of deep experience and feeling which are out of its ken, the very existence of which it will not face. Men can accept it only by mass-suggestion, not with a sincerity that is inward and permeating.

But it is quite certain that men cannot really believe in anything by mass-suggestion, just because someone else believes in it and tells them to. No one can persuade us into appreciating the beauty of mountains or sky or sea if we do not feel it for ourselves. It is because of some inward recognition and acknowledgement that we believe, when we see them, in courage and goodness, in humility and self-sacrifice, and in suffering so borne that it creates the person bearing it instead of destroying him. We cannot help having faith in these things; we know intuitively that they have value and truth and meaning.

But to scepticism the courage and goodness and self-sacrifice of men are, ultimately, interesting irrelevancies; since there are no such things as ultimate values, they have no more than a passing significance. Scepticism inevitably breeds purposelessness, because if we fail to involve ourselves deeply enough in living — and this is what scepticism really means — we have no far-off goal or ideal to which all our energies can be directed. Instead of integrating our powers in some great activity, we are content to express a self at disunity, and let our deeds be done by a superficial part of ourselves instead of by the whole. Totalitarianism is an advance upon this, more powerfully in touch with the springs of hope and energy: but it, too, is full of fear. For much of life it has no use: Totalitarianism is Old Slavery writ large.

Our generation must make a choice: if it goes on with its scepticism and *laissez-faire*, purposelessness will shadow us still. Totalitarianism might temporarily bring a new purpose and energy to life; but in Christianity alone is there any long hope, for that alone of the three is in deep touch with the nature of men and of the world. The truth of Christianity is proved, not by textual criticism or dogmatic subtleties, but by that truth to human nature which the deepest experience of man finds in it. Christianity is not a series of doctrines somehow captured and held at all costs; it is a series of discoveries made as a consequence of taking up a point of view.

The strength of Christianity lies in the way it approaches life; for the first of Christian virtues, the one on which all the others are built, is humility, and the primary Christian quest is not power or pleasure but an understanding of God and one's fellow-men. The Christian is in a good position for discovering life — for his humility makes him receptive, he is willing to be forgiven, to trust in God and to learn from Him while He unceasingly reveals Himself in many ways — through His Son, through the deeds and words of men of many sorts, both past and present, to the listening ear of the inward spirit. The message of Jesus does not give any neat plan or map to life; if that was what he had been attempt-

ing to do he would not have relied so much upon parables or personal example. He laid down very few rules for conduct, and those of the most general character : his teaching was largely given by the manner in which he lived and the example of dependence upon God which he set. In this way his teaching was concerned with the spirit in which things should be done rather than with goals to be attained. We are to discover what Christianity is as we try to follow him, being differently Christian according to our talents and individuality. The Christian life is to be a journey of discovery, with a God-given compass to guide, but with many tracks not sign-posted and only occasionally a far view.

Christ himself was an explorer of life, though he is not always seen as one. 'Blessed are the poor in spirit,' he said; 'blessed are the pure in heart.' But whence did he get such knowledge save from a profound and individual perception — a voyaging of the soul through strange seas of thought, alone? His secret sureness that God would provide guidance and victory; his trust in his own disciples; his faith that beyond death was Life — all these are revelations of the spirit of an explorer. For him Christian discovery was not an intellectual thing merely but one which involved the whole self. By love was God to be gotten and holden, by thought never. He had indeed a faith in God so deep that He could bear anything that could happen to him. I believe that during his life on earth Christ was fully human and subject to the limitations of knowledge common to his time : no doubt he thought of the world as flat, and there were certainly many problems for which he could not have offered any so-called 'explanations' of a scientific kind.

It is a fallacy to suppose that discoveries about life can be made from the outside, that explanations can strip the veil of mystery from the world and that remedies which are external can cure all human ills. More and more scientific inventions have *not* brought us deeper wisdom and happiness. Too much faith in what science and economics and social service can do are manifestations of our unwillingness to face the facts and to acknowledge our dependence upon God. 'Happiness,' said Pascal, 'is not in man, or outside him, but in God, and the wise man seeks his happiness where he knows it may be found.'

The Christian life is meant for spirits in growth, and only if we feed upon the advancing hours can we continue for long to live it. Beliefs are not stationary things : they grow, as all living things do, and with a growing experience of life they are modified. The conception of God which it would be right for a child of 10 to have would be inadequate for a child of 15; what might fit the experience of someone of 25 would not be enough for that of a person

of 50. A discovery once made never leaves its maker quite the same man that he was before making it. When Keats knew that death was only a few years off; when Simon Peter found out that Christ loved him; when any man comes really to face and accept the fact of suffering, the reward of the discovery is a growth in spirit. Discovery always involves facing facts. Does religion really solve all the questions that perplex us? That is not its function. We make a mistake if we look to it to relieve us of the difficulties of life. Power it will bring, but not satisfaction; courage, but not escape from danger; understanding, but not explanation.

Christianity, then, is a way of living. Acceptance of the love and forgiveness of God and of all the teachings of Jesus will not in themselves solve every problem, of intellect or of conduct. But what we can be sure of is that no experience through which we can pass will be out of the range of its insight and comprehension, nowhere we can go will be out of the reach of God's understanding:

> 'If I ascend up into heaven, thou are there; if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me.'

These words are metaphors about the adventuring spirit. We are always within God's presence, exploring God's own self. God is our home and he is also the territory we discover. He is the way, the truth and the life.

This rest upon God's infinite knowledge, and love, and willingness to forgive is freedom-bringing. It gives relaxation to the spirit and makes possible at a later stage activity which can be meaningful and creative instead of the indulgence of wilful desires and egotistic whims, deeds which may be full of sound and fury but which will signify nothing. In the best Christians we know there seems to be a great naturalness, so that their good actions just flower. 'Moments of deep pre-occupation with God bring a deep refreshment and simplification to the soul,' says von Hügel. It is often true that you can help people most of all simply by being yourself. But to be yourself is the hardest of tasks, for the growth into sincerity which it involves means a growth into simplicity, and that demands a rare degree of depth and maturity. Evil actions are, I sometimes think, actions whose doings are out of touch with any really deep or inner part of ourselves. In doing them the body has taken upon itself to act apart from the whole of the self. Vice and sin are thus subtle forms of self-betrayal, a failure to act from our spirits or from real self-knowledge. In babyhood it is only gradually that we learn that all our limbs really belong to us and are parts of our physical being. And it is only slowly—and sometimes not at all—that later on we come to

learn that responsibilities are like limbs stretching far away from our bodies. Yet our responsibilities are parts of us and must be filled with inner spirit if we are to remain whole.

The discovery of selfhood which Christianity can bring about is essentially the discovery of other people too: for we can express our own reality only in our relationships with others. The Christian life is a life of works, but also of friendships and sympathies. Life without love means madness—of some sort; and the hunger we have for these personal relationships by which Time is transcended is a divine hunger. Through loving others we can love God: that is a Christian perception and one of which the New Testament has much to say.

Ideally, the Church, as a society of people who come together week by week with the common purpose of worshipping God and meditating upon his word, should be the place in which many discoveries are made in the field of personal relationships. There are, of course, many discoveries about life and God which can be made by the individual in solitude: and much of our life is inevitably lived alone, however much in contact with other people we may be. There is truth in Matthew Arnold's famous lines,

> 'Yes! in the sea of life enisled,
> With echoing straits between us thrown,
> Dotting the shoreless watery wild
> We mortal millions live *alone*.'

But if in private thought and feeling some discoveries come, others are essentially the offspring of doing things in company with other people. The Church ought to be an institution in which we make many discoveries about Christianity and life through being able to meet other people just as human beings instead of, as we may tend to do in many other activities, as functionaries or rivals or on some other superficial level. Is the Church really doing all that it might to help here? The Church of the future may find that the small group is a better unit for much of its work than the relatively large congregation, though of course the latter would still have its place. Personal relationships mean much; and the individual is apt to find them difficult to establish when he meets his fellow Church-members only at services where scores or hundreds are present at the same time and where the worship is almost entirely corporate. In addition, and partly as a substitute, there is a place for the meeting together voluntarily, under the direct encouragement of the Church, of numbers of groups of men and women, ten or twelve in each. Each such group or cell of people would be bound together by a purpose or purposes—worship, some social cause or activity, the study of a particular problem or book. Each group would be something like a family, and a number at least of its

members might come to feel a special understanding of each other. Groups would dissolve and re-form in different combinations from time to time, and the services of the whole church might on individual Sundays have especially in remembrance the interests now of one, now of another.

This might not always work: but growth in the quality of personal relationships does matter. For upon that depends, among many other things, the very possibility of a continuance of democracy and a making of it more truly what it claims to be.

What, then, is the value of Christianity to-day? It is surely such a faith and discovery of life as it can bring that we urgently need, both as individuals and as a society. On the personal side it gives an insight into the permanent meaning of things amongst transcience and change: men may spring up and wither as the grass, but God endureth for ever and the discovery of him is an infinite adventure. On the social side men need the depth of understanding of their own real natures which Christianity gives, to be saved from coming to accept themselves as robots actuated by their instincts: and that is a very real danger to-day, and will be for as long as we are surrounded by machines and bombarded by propaganda. Christianity helps men to know that they are members of one great family.

The only alternative to Christian discovery is to remain afraid to discover at any rate some parts of life, and as a consequence to become cut off altogether from experience of them—as the sceptic tends to do who is afraid of mystery and denies its existence, or as the totalitarian tends to do who is afraid of men and women as human beings and must make ciphers of them. Christianity and wholeness are indeed closely related, for in God the whole universe dwells. Only by a perpetual voyage of discovery in this life and after it can we reach the consummation. 'Now I know in part, but then shall I know, even as also I am known.'

BOOK REVIEWS

FREE CHURCH MODERNISM

In view of certain reactionary movements in Protestant theology inspired chiefly by a few Continental writers, it is encouraging to find that not all Free Churchmen in this country have succumbed to them. There exists a Union of Modern Free Churchmen which has as its aim

> 'The presentation of the Christian Faith in the light of contemporary thought and experience, with an emphasis on the need for reality in Christian Worship, Teaching and Conduct.' [1]

[1] The Secretary of the Union is the Rev. A. Clifford Hall, M.A., 'Wayside,' Silver Lane, Purley.

The President of the Union, the Rev. H. Bulcock, M.A., B.D., has recently produced a *Modern Churchman's Manual,*[2] and although a note states that the writer alone is responsible for the statements in it, we may perhaps regard it as fairly representative. The *Manual,* though very compressed, does succeed in tackling most of the important problems and in setting out a clear attitude towards them.

The question of the means whereby knowledge is attained in the sphere of 'spiritual' things, *i.e.* in the realms of religion and ethics, is naturally the first issue to handle, because the attitude you adopt here affects your attitude throughout. If you believe that an infallible Book or an infallible Church actually contains or posseses that knowledge and can impart it to you, your problem is greatly simplified. But if you hold that such a belief is the product of a wish to find clear-cut definiteness and finality where such things are not to be had, owing to the very nature of the subject-matter, the problem becomes more difficult. Some in despair take the plunge into the gulf of relativism, which means that what is true to me may be false to you, and so solves the problem by saying there is no problem to solve. The dogmatists assert that between their position and an agnostic relativism no *tertium quid* exists. But the sensible position is to regard objective reality as existing, and truth to be man's grasp of it. This grasp, of course, may vary in quality and extent; it may be weak or strong, ample or trivial; thus the amount of reality grasped will vary. But to say that human grasp of reality is limited, is not the same as to assert the relativity of all truth. In so far as reality is grasped at all, even if only an insignificant portion of it is grasped, the man who grasps it has discovered truth which is objective. And it is worth insisting upon that the truths which are described as 'supernaturally revealed' were in point of fact 'discovered' by individuals — individuals who had exceptional powers of grasping reality, powers which are moral as well as intellectual.

> 'Religious knowledge is a matter of quest and discovery, experience, confirmation, trial, failure and success just as in the other sciences. . . . Knowledge gained by religious discovery is no less a gift from God than if a miracle book had dropped from the skies, for both the data and the power to appreciate the data are from God. . . .
>
> 'With this view of Revelation as Religious Discovery, we avoid all those problems which arose out of the old mechanical theory of revelation; we have no longer those Bible difficulties which used to be the stock-in-trade of old-time infidels.'

With regard to belief in God, the chief difficulty people seem to have nowadays (apart from moral ones) is that they cannot picture the reality of anything that is not material and accessible to the five senses. If the question is put to them whether they do not believe in the existence of their own 'selves' or minds, which do not appear to be discernible by the five senses, they will reply that the existence of their 'selves' appears to be bound up with the existence of a material body. Yet to explain the body-mind relationship will be beyond them. But if they can be induced to believe in the existence of their own minds or selves—and actually they are more certain of this than of anything else — it should not be difficult to believe in a 'ground' or foundation of the soul, on which it rests and with which it is always in contact, though not always consciously. 'He is not far from every one of us: for in Him we have life and motion and existence.' If religious teachers would insist less upon what George Tyrrell called 'the Outside God' there would be less practical atheism among the public. As we find it stated in the *Manual*:

> 'The Modernist approach to the idea of God is along the lines of the Divine Immanence, the conception of God as in some way dwelling in the

[2] *A Modern Churchman's Manual.* Published by the Union of Modern Free Churchmen, 92 Blake Road, N.11. 1941. price 6*d.*

universe and manifesting his nature in the highest which the evolution of life and mind has revealed.

'We can look upon God under two aspects, *transcendent* in his unity, *immanent* in his manifestation, revealing himself in the structure, forms, and changes of finite experience. There can be no adequate conception of God without realizing both aspects of Transcendence and Immanence; these must be consistent and complementary. Any idea of God's Transcendence which removes or isolates him from the world is an untrue idea.'

It is easily seen that a philosophy of Divine Immanence affords a good approach to the idea of Incarnation. Such a philosophy, however, will not be equivalent to the Pantheism for which God is equally everywhere; it must be a philosophy 'of *degrees and values*.'

'God is by no means equally distributed over the universe. There is no point in merely making a collection of things and calling it Reality or God. Some phenomena which appear must be more significant than others. The moral universe has hills and valleys; it is no flat plain. There must be a graded and developing system behind the universe—the manifestation of God through a growing process.'

Thus 'where character and personality have reached their highest expression in our familiar world we have an approximation to the character of God.' For as Professor Pringle-Pattison claimed, the Immanence of God, and the *reality of appearances, i.e.* of the individual manifestation, go together. The individual is real, and a real expression of the divine. Thus the character of God will be registered in a single individual, even though limited by his human circumstances.

'Thus, Jesus must be regarded as a truly human individual in order that his grace and truth shall manifest God. The formula of Incarnation is not the manifestation of God *despite a* genuine humanity but the manifestation of God *in actual virtue* of a genuine humanity. Thus in our reading of the Gospels it is no concern of ours to stress anything in the nature of physical abnormality in Jesus. . . . There is a popular emphasis upon the psychical and physically abnormal in the Gospel records which cuts at the heart of any real incarnation.'

Mr. Bulcock declares that the real issue between Traditionalists and Modernists is not that of the exalted place assigned to Jesus, or of the revelation of God in Him, or of a genuine Incarnation and Atonement. The difference between the two standpoints is a fundamental one of philosophical background, a radical difference in the conception of the nature of God. If God is set over against and in contrast to the world of familiar experience, in some remote corner of the universe, his revelation of himself will correspond; it will display itself in actions remote in quality, time and place from the present experience. Abnormality, miracle, and marvel will form the framework, and perhaps the content, of the revelation. But if, on the other hand, God is regarded not as remote but as immanent in his creation as well as transcendent to it, then he will reveal himself in the common experiences of men, and in one who is neither a demi-god nor a sorcerer but a man.

'With our immanental view of God Jesus can satisfy the Athanasian claim that he is true man and true God. Arianism claimed for Christ a *second type of divinity,* which Athanasius rightly condemned. Popular orthodoxy claims for Jesus a *second type of humanity,* which is really equally unorthodox.'

This strikes us as extremely neatly put; and of course the trouble with most traditionalists is their imperfect knowledge of the theology they profess to teach, of the tradition they claim to uphold, and of the results of the modern

critical studies of the Scriptures. Hence their theology is shallow, crude, uninstructed, irrational and not really edifying.

Mr. Bulcock goes on to criticize what he calls a false isolationist view of the Incarnation, a criticism justified in view of St. Paul's reference to Christ in one breath as God's Son and as 'the first-born among many brothers.'

> 'We cannot isolate the manifestation of the personality of God in Jesus from that same manifestation in other individuals showing a like spirit.'

With regard to the doctrine of the Trinity, Mr. Bulcock says that its historical rise is to be found in the double sense of God's Wholeness (Transcendence) and of his Indwelling (Immanence). When God's greatness and transcendence was stressed there was a danger of his becoming vague or lost in his greatness. It was needful to think also of God as coming into contact with the world.

> 'Therefore men conceived God as "emanating" himself in a secondary form; they personified or personalized an aspect of his being, and spoke of a Divine Wisdom or Power or Word of God (the Logos) as creating the world, or as entering into the souls of men as a Holy Spirit making them "friends of God and prophets."'

In Christianity, men seeking to express their sense of the greatness of Jesus, and also anxious to reconcile their monotheism with the Hellenistic reverence for Jesus as a deity, identified him with the divine Word.

> 'They followed the centuries-old Logos tradition by saying that he was "in the beginning with God" and in some sense "was God"; all things were created by him; he was the Light that lighteth every man. Paul speaks of him as "the Christ that dwelleth in me" (*i.e.* the Logos as a Holy Spirit), and the Fourth Evangelist speaks of him as coming again as a Paraclete or Holy Spirit. Sometimes, however, the Holy Spirit seems to have been regarded as apart from Christ.'

We have thus presented to us God under three aspects: in his transcendent greatness, in creation and history, as experienced within the soul. The Trinity becomes a formula to express the truth that the greatness of God compels us to think of him in more ways than one.

> 'It is a symbol of an organic universe, and in any organism there is unity and multiplicity, One and Many. The problem is not to see God in three aspects but to confine his aspects to three! He appears in a million forms. The popular use of the doctrine to suggest the deification of Jesus or some form of tritheism in unity is a perversion of the true idea of the Trinity as a symbol of the manifoldness of God.'

In St. Paul's writings, as Mr. Bulcock has noted, there is at times no very clear distinction between the risen, living Christ and the Spirit of Christ or the Holy Spirit. There seems no doubt that 'the Spirit' was much more central to St. Paul and to the Fourth Evangelist than tends to be the case to-day. Primitive Christianity was primarily the religion of the Spirit, the presence and power whereof was the characteristic feature of the experience of those early communities. We are convinced, with the late Canon J. M. Wilson, that to be effective and dynamic, as well as merely rational, a modernist theology must be primarily a theology of the Spirit, because this is the only kind of theology that can be in touch with present experience, and so form an intellectual framework for a religion of present experience, which is the only kind of religion that can be of any use to anyone to-day.

> 'The Church's association of the Holy Spirit with the physical phenomena of Pentecost can be misleading and unfortunate. In the early Church psychical gifts held a large place (miracles, gifts of healing, prophecy, speaking with tongues and the interpretation of tongues). Paul

did not despise these gifts nor regard them as necessarily evil (indeed he claims to have displayed them himself, in *II Cor.* xii, 12). But he knew, by experience, that reverence for these psychical gifts, and trust in them as the principal way of approach to God, was a profound delusion. "Yet show I unto you a more excellent way." The alternative way is the way of love.'

This is all quite true. It seems a mistake to be in any way afraid of the Spirit's psychical gifts. The Spirit is not only 'the Comforter' and 'the Guide into all truth.' He is also 'the Giver of Life'; that is to say, the stimulator of vitality and the augmenter of vital power. It seems a pity not to stress this, especially as it has to do with actual present experience.

Mr. Bulcock has something to say of the New Testament picture of Jesus, which he asserts, taken as a unity, just as it stands, 'is very perplexing to a thoughtful reader.'

'He is presented as a Prophet of Galilee with human features and an understandable message confirmable in human experience. He is the Teacher of a Way of Life. He redeems publicans and sinners by his confidence in human personality. . . .

'But in the same gospel pages he also appears with a nimbus of miracle and abnormality. He was born of the Virgin Mary in a miraculous way; he was ever performing miracles as "signs" of a celestial origin. . . . He is the Cosmic Word made flesh; he was not only emergent in the world in the fulness of time, he created it in the beginning. He was not only a supernatural agent of God—in some sense he was God. By his death and resurrection he effected a cosmic rite, whereby the power of the world's evil spirits was broken. . . .'

So long as the parts of the New Testament, the earliest and the latest alike, were viewed without any historical perspective, not as successive deposits of a series of stages of doctrinal development, but as complementary narratives all describing similar events from one and the same angle, the figure of Jesus was bound to be very perplexing, unless accepted merely as a mystery beyond analysis or criticism.

'But we believe that the complexities of the New Testament figure of Christ have a simple explanation in the fact that it is a composite figure. In the development of the idea of Christ even in New Testament pages it seems possible to distinguish several more or less distinct presentations. . . . Our New Testament picture of Christ has been effected by several layers of speculation, having their explanation in contemporary thought, especially Jewish apocalypse, Hellenistic religious cults and Alexandrian philosophy. They form a composite picture like a colour print, one impression superimposed upon another, although not too successfully, for their diversities of origin and nature cannot be perfectly reconciled.'

This seems to us to express the situation with admirable brevity and honesty. It is a wrong task of apologetic, says Mr. Bulcock, to attempt to justify the first century thought-forms as scientific or philosophic, still less to insist that they are essentials of Christian faith and discipleship.

'But it would be equally wrong to dismiss them as without meaning and value. They surely testify to certain facts of spiritual experience, and find their explanation and interpretation in these.'

Such a regress to origins in experience may afford a basis for a restatement of faith. In Mr. Bulcock's view the restatement

'will rest upon an immanental philosophy that the whole universe has a spiritual significance; that normality of law is indicative of God; that God works by ordered evolution which may have peak moments of expression but never a break of fundamental continuity.'

The restatement to be of any use to a particular generation will have to be in terms of the thought of that generation; we need not imagine that the terms in which *we* think are final—indeed, they are changing rapidly before our eyes. Meanwhile the approach indicated by Mr. Bulcock

> 'interprets Jesus by metaphysics reached independently, instead of basing its metaphysics of the Incarnation on the isolated fact of an abnormal Jesus. It attempts no statements of the relation of Jesus to the Father on lines other than those conceived for the whole race and God.'

It must always be remembered, and perhaps Mr. Bulcock does not stress this point sufficiently, that just as the traditional theology had a basis in experience, the case must be the same with a modern theology. Unless the experience is actual and real, the most up-to-date theology is of little value. There is no point in translating the old theology into new terms merely as an exercise. The strength and power of the Pauline and Johannine writings lies in the self-evident fact that the experience behind them, which produced them, was not only real and vivid, but powerful and dynamic. The lava coming out of the volcano was then in a molten state. The volcano is now quiescent and the lava hard and cold. It will not do just to carve the cold lava into new shapes with a theological chisel. If the lava were once more molten, it would be easy enough to run it into new moulds, provided its flow could be controlled. But when an elemental force moves it has a way of taking the bit into its teeth, so that not even the intellectuals can do anything with it.

Mr. Bulcock's *Manual* does not, as he would admit, contain anything very new, but it is a sincere and honest attempt to express old truths in terms that can be understood by this generation, and to cut a straight pathway through the theological labyrinth. Such attempts as Mr. Bulcock's are evidence of two things. First, that a religion is not dead so long as it strives to re-express its beliefs. Second, that it is high time that English Churchmen joined hands with their Free Church brethren in this endeavour.

J. C. Hardwick.

THE HISTORIC MISSION OF JESUS *

In his latest work Dr. Cadoux's aim appears to be to salvage as much as he can of the Liberal Protestant view of the Jesus of History, as against Schweitzer, Barth and the form-critics. Unlike these he does not overstate his case, and he successfully avoids extreme views and patent absurdities. But his standpoint and his caution lend his book a somewhat conservative air, in spite of an up-to-date acquaintance with the relevant literature. Dr. Cadoux realises that the Liberal Protestant Jesus was an artificial construction formed by the elimination of elements uncongenial to the enlightenment prevalent at the close of the last century and he endeavours to sketch the mission of Jesus in a fashion intended to include all the data. He allows the arbitrariness of rejecting one part of the teaching of Jesus because it seems unworthy of another.

Dr. Cadoux's book is undeniably and inevitably technical in character. The central part is a mosaic of Biblical citations and encrusted with footnotes referring to the modern literature. But should the book come into the hands of the general reader he might with profit read the introduction and the conclusion. These afford a lucid summary of the various phases and aspects of the eschatological problem in the Gospels.

It is often helpful to know a writer's Christological standpoint when he discusses Jesus, but Dr. Cadoux, though he devotes a few pages to this, is somewhat vague. His views are not traditional, and it may be surmised that he is content with a simple devotion that does not require dogmatic precision.

* *The Historic Mission of Jesus, a Constructive Re-examination of the Eschatological Teaching in the Synoptic Gospels*, by C. J. Cadoux. (Lutterworth Press. 1941. 21/-.)

The writer recognises the difficulty of his task, but disagrees with those who would abandon it as unfeasible. He holds that

> 'knowledge regarding the personal character and aim of Jesus himself is in large measure attainable through a critical examination of the Gospels and is absolutely fundamental to a right interpretation of the Christian message as a whole' (p. 1).

Of the school with which he is most in sympathy he writes (p. 3):

> 'This "liberal" account of Jesus was not so far astray from the truth as many modern theologians would have us believe — certainly not so far astray as are the versions which some of them are recommending us to substitute for it. It represented, at least, an honest and intelligent attempt to disentangle the essential and abiding realities from the less essential vehicle in which they were conveyed. But it erred through over-confidence in its pre-suppositions and over-simplification in its treatment of the material. It was accordingly destined to undergo a very severe shaking-up at the hands of those who, seeing the mistake of assuming the identity of the morally-acceptable with the historically-true, transferred the whole stress to that part of the Gospel-teaching which is least easily assimilated by the modern mind — the eschatology.'

Some account is given of Schweitzer's views, but none of the related but distinct position of the Catholic modernists. Form-criticism is treated as yielding precarious results and Barthianism as uninterested in purely historical questions.

> 'Whatever be the merits or demerits of the Barthian theology generally, one cannot but regard its attitude to the historical Jesus as erroneous and regrettable, while the use of Form-criticism in order to demonstrate the legendary character of the greater part of the Synoptic narrative seems wholly unjustified' (p. 8).

Neither has the writer much use for the fashionable 'realised eschatology' associated with the name of Professor Dodd, which may be held to explain too much by making the problem disappear.

A certain colouring of the record by ecclesiastical afterthought is admitted, but the synoptic Gospels are held to be substantially true. On the crucial passage, the so-called 'Little Apocalypse' in *Mark*. XIII and its derivatives in *Matthew* and *Luke*, Dr. Cadoux is inclined to hedge, and treats it as of doubtful authenticity. He thus avoids the robust attitude of those who hold it to be the key to the teaching of Jesus and of those who reject it as an interpolation by the evangelist from an already existing document.

To the New Testament critic perhaps the most interesting part of the book will be the attempt to divide Jesus' eschatological views into two stages. This distinction is naturally precarious and is based on the theory that Jesus passed from optimism to pessimism, that initial success turned into realisation of failure. In view of the difficulty of dating the various strata in the Synoptic Gospels the distinction must be based rather upon psychological than purely literary grounds.

Dr. Cadoux vigorously defends the right of history to be independent of theology, citing the successes of Liberal investigation in the fields both of the Old Testament and the New. Recent critics have not failed to point out the theological content of even the earliest gospel and its lack of purely biographical interest: they have insisted that the Synoptic Gospels must be interpreted in the light of their ecclesiastical background. To them the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith are inseparable, and they regard as both illegitimate and impossible the attempt to loosen the hyphen. As they point out, the interest in the Jesus of history is quite modern. The early Church was slightly interested in the teaching of Jesus. This is instanced in the Creeds, which

skip hastily from his birth to his passion. The interest was in the salvation which he had won.

Various ways are suggested (pp. 338ff.) in which it is possible to interpret the eschatological teaching of Jesus. The fundamentalist, Catholic or Protestant, still believes in the Second Advent, though the date is ever postponed. Or Jesus Christ, being divine, may be held to be inaccurately reported whenever any saying attributed to him appeared false. A variant of this is the opinion that Jesus deliberately accommodated himself to the current views of his time. This is not merely arbitrary, but ethically doubtful, since Jesus is held to have acquiesced in and even to have promoted error. The Liberal school minimised the eschatological element in Jesus' teaching. A fifth possibility is to treat apocalyptic imagery as childish or poetic and to attempt to get at what seem to be the permanent principles latent behind it. On the other hand the Apocalyptists may well be regarded as literal persons who meant what they said. Or, finally, it may be conceded that Jesus to some extent shared the limitations of his race and education and was mistaken as to the date and manner of the kingdom's coming.

Many modernists are inclined to follow the lead of the Fourth Evangelist and to substitute the notion of eternal life for that of the Kingdom of God. This is a conception much more congenial to the modern mind and quite unobjectionable in itself. But unless we hold that the Fourth Gospel is of equal historical value to the Synoptics it is doubtful if we are entitled to this way of escape. We still await a Christology which will adequately include and explain Jesus' eschatology. Meanwhile we must endure the apparent contradiction between the Fourth Gospel's claim that Jesus is the truth and the indications of error in the Synoptics. Dr. Cadoux has excluded the Fourth Gospel from the scope of his inquiry for legitimate reasons. At a time when so many publishers are employing their scanty paper on ephemeral pamphlets, the Lutterworth Press may be congratulated on the present solid production.

P. R. Smythe.

THE FOUNDATION OF PETERBOROUGH CATHEDRAL, 1541

The Northamptonshire Record Society is to be congratulated on the issue of *The Foundation of Peterborough Cathedral,* edited by Mr. W. T. Mellows, Chapter Clerk and Treasurer of the Cathedral.*

Four hundred years have elapsed since the great Benedictine monastery of Peterborough was surrendered to King Henry VIII and was reconstituted as a cathedral in 1541.

The documents in this volume comprise those relating to the surrender of the monastery, the foundation and endowment of the cathedral and its administration during the first century of its existence, and deal with the Tudor clergy as administrators of the estates of the Church. As the editor says, 'they do not appear as very attractive characters according to our modern ideas, but this may present a partial and possibly unfair picture.'

In chapter II is given a very full account of the foundation of the See of Peterborough, sealed on June 30, 1541, with the seal of the Court of Augmentations, and the letters patent founding the See and cathedral, the writ for which was sealed at Pontefract in the presence of the king, who arrived there on August 4 for a visit of ten or twelve days.

The statutes of the cathedral record that the king, with the advice of the Lords and Commons, had resolved to make an end of the monasteries because of the many and great irregularities therein, and to convert them to better purposes, and that where ignorance and superstition held sway, the pure worship of God should flourish. The letters patent recited that 'nothing

* *The Foundation of Peterborough Cathedral*, edited by W. T. Mellows (Northamptonshire Record Society, 1941; price £1 1*s.* 6*d.* to Fellows).

more than true religion and the true worship of God should be restored and reformed to the primitive rule of genuine purity.' For this purpose the king's commission stated that in the new cathedral there should be a dean and six prebendaries, eight petty canons, eight singing men, eight choristers, a schoolmaster for a grammar school and usher for the same, twenty children at the grammar school and six poor singing men to have their finding there and to pray for the prosperous estate of the realm.

The new foundation was thus placed on a collegiate basis, and the bishop, dean and prebendaries were nominated by the king. John Chambers, the former abbot, was appointed the first bishop with an income of £333; Francis Abree, the former prior of St. Andrew, Northampton, became the first dean with a stipend of £100.

The names of the first prebendaries and petty canons with their former pensions and new salaries are given, the latter in all cases higher than the former.

The third chapter deals with the functions to be fulfilled by the dignitaries and officers of the cathedral, specifying the duties to be discharged by the dean and chapter, and short biographies of the Tudor deans.

The next chapter gives an account of the officers of the cathedral, college and grammar school. One of the duties of the precentor was to keep the cathedral register of baptisms, marriages and burials, which, however, was not commenced until the year 1615, when, during the deanship of George Meriton, the first cathedral font was constructed, only to be 'pul'd downe, and ye lead taken out of it by Cromwell's Souldyers' in 1643. At the Restoration in 1660 it was replaced and survived for some two hundred years, when it was again turned out for a reconstructed garden ornament with a pagan design, during the italianization of the cathedral in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

At the Grammar School the dean and chapter were ordered to maintain from their funds, twenty poor boys with a natural disposition and gift for learning, to be kept at school for four or five years, from the age of nine to fifteen; any boy noteworthy for great stupidity, dullness or a natural disinclination for study to be expelled, 'lest like a drone he consumed the honey of the bees.' The headmaster was to be learned in Latin and Greek, the usher well educated in Latin and able to teach the boys the first rudiments of grammar. Other boys might attend the school for the purpose of learning grammar.

Of the twenty free scholars, the dean nominated four king's scholars and four choristers as scholars; each of the six canons nominated two scholars. The six bedesmen were to be maintained out of the revenues of the church; their duty was to be present in church at the time of divine service, to wait upon the priests and to assist the sextons. The amount set apart for them was £10 annually.

Chapter V deals with the administration of the Cathedral College, in which we are shown how the first registrar, a notary public, John Mounstevinge, made garnerings for his own benefit, such as securing long leases of cathedral property and a sale of the patent of the registrarship. Bishop Clavering in 1732, when perusing a list of Mounstevinge's transactions, added a note to one of them 'he was a cunning sharper.' Of his being such the reader will find many instances in this book. At a later date Edmund Mounstevinge, the registrar's son, applied the dubious profits acquired by his father to the detriment of the bishopric and cathedral of Peterborough by bestowing his whole estate in pious and charitable uses; £1000 to found two fellowships in St. John's College, Cambridge, also buildings and the endowment of almshouses and other good causes, by his will in 1635.

After this very complete, valuable and most readable introduction by Mr. Mellows, which occupies some 83 pages, the actual Tudor documents are

given, commencing with a Coppye of the Kyng's Commission for ye new errecte Mynster of Peterburghe, dated July 20th, 1541, with the letter patent in Latin, of which an admirable translation is given for the benefit of non-classical readers, followed by the annual value of all the lordships, manors and properties belonging to the See, the estates retained by the Crown, the Cathedral Statutes, with useful indices of places, persons and subjects.

Since the book was issued an extremely valuable find has been recorded, that is the original charter of Henry VIII for the foundation of Peterborough Cathedral, which, after being lost for a century, was discovered by Miss Joan Wake, Secretary of the Northamptonshire Record Society, in the course of a salvage drive for waste paper in the bishop's registry.

The editor is to be complimented on the successful completion of this learned yet interesting and readable account of the early history of Peterborough Cathedral, and we shall look forward to the issue of the first volume yet to come, by the Northamptonshire Record Society, which is doing invaluable work towards the history of that county.

The volume is well printed and enriched with good illustrations of the west front of the Cathedral, the Singing Men's Chambers, the Precentor's House and the six Prebendal Houses.

J. W. WALKER.

IDEALS AND ILLUSIONS *

Ideals and Illusions by Professor Stebbing is concerned with the failure of national life which has shown itself during the past twenty-five years. As a community we have failed, but in the end the character of a community depends on the characters of those who compose it. Her diagnosis of our failure is as profound as it is simple — it is that we have been unwilling to make definite to ourselves what we believe to be worth seeking. We cannot be too coherent and too definite. Hence, the important question for each to answer is, 'What is worth having in such and such specifiable circumstances?' It is this precision, commonly overlooked in the exhortations of moralists, which alone can give their otherwise airy nothings a local habitation and a name.

Prof. Stebbing is careful to make clear that she uses the word 'ideal' in the sense of something worth having; it does not mean 'imaginary' or 'non-actual', or 'impracticable', as the word 'utopian' does. Spiritual excellencies are to be found in this world, and the plea is repeated that we shall cease to talk about material and spiritual values in abstraction from definite situations.

Prof. Stebbing is on firm ground both in definition and in warning when she says:

> 'Happiness is not an end to be chosen *instead* of Truth, Beauty and Goodness; it is a characteristic of experiences of knowing something to be true, contemplating something beautiful, fulfilling one's duty. We must think in adjectives, not in capitalized abstract nouns.'

Along this way Prof. Stebbing approaches the problem of building a better world. At once two questions arise, *viz.* In what ways does the world need to be made better? How is this better world to be achieved? She notes the gradual deterioration in recent years of the democratic ideal founded on the moral principle that *all men alike ought to be free and happy,* and contrasts the indignation of nineteenth century European civilization at such offences as the unjust imprisonment of Dreyfus and the murder of Bulgarian Christians by the Turks as being committed against the community itself. 'Remember', said Gladstone to the electors of Midlothian, 'that the sanctity of life in the hill villages of Afghanistan among the winter snows is as inviolable in the eyes of Almighty God as can be your own.' The history of the twentieth century would have been different, if his words had been remembered and applied in

* *Ideals and Illusions,* by Professor L. Susan Stebbing. (Watts & Co. pp. 206. 8/6. 1941.)

a genuine collective security. Did we not care enough to be indignant, or were we too passivist to have any conscience, or were we simply lacking in intelligence?

The really terrifying sign of our times is the deterioration in moral standards and moral sensitiveness, writes Prof. Stebbing; people have in parts surrendered the Christian code of action and have wholly surrendered the religious faith on which it is based, and they do not feel the need to put anything in its place. Convention without understanding of its basis is bound to collapse, and therefore our primary need is reflection on our standards of value. Unfortunately Prof. Stebbing does not at this point proceed to any discussion of this problem; instead she has many commonplace but true things to say about the lack of thinking and feeling for ourselves as shown in passive film-gazing, mass-created opinions, and newspaper astrology, concluding with the statements that democracy is a vision of good living and that the better world will not come of itself, born of vague hopes and Sunday aspirations. With all this no sane, let alone Christian, person will disagree, and even the most fundamentalist of preachers lives in hope that Sunday aspirations will be translated into week-day thought and activity. The spiritual values of civilization are late in appearing, and they are very fragile and very easily destroyed; that is why the authoritarian ideal is so much easier to attain than the democratic ideal; men all too readily revert to a lower level. Hence,

> 'to lose the war will mean that democracy is overthrown, but to win the war does not mean that democracy is saved,' for 'democracy as an ideal is a form of society, an association of free men in which the free development of each is the condition of the free development of all.'

The questions concerning an appropriate economic order and a political machinery to implement the democratic ideal are subsidiary to the question of what essentially is the democratic ideal. Prof. Stebbing's definition, 'all men alike ought to be free and happy,' implies an equality only as individuals who are associated with other individuals in the State, and a recognition of this kind of equality would put an end to much foolish argument which bases itself on the denial that all men are equal. Here there is no room for selfishness, since this ideal, rightly understood, is concerned with the welfare of every member of the community, and our political and economic machinery should keep this end in view, being efficient for the purposes of free men rather than for those of a master-slave relationship.

Prof. Stebbing has scant patience with Canon Peter Green's argument that the words 'right' and 'wrong' would have no meaning apart from a conscious life after death for the individual, and his statement that 'I should try to do right even though "right" has no meaning for me' is meaningless. The larger question is whether my life would have significance even if I did not continue to live after death, and this in its turn raises a minor question, *viz.*, what is the rational justification of morality? Prof. Stebbing answers that morality is not to be deduced from anything else, even a system of the universe; it is a *datum* of which account must be taken by any philosophical theory. She writes:

> 'It is an illusion to find the value of our lives here and now in a life to come; it is an illusion to suppose that nothing is worth while for me unless I live for ever; it is an illusion to suppose that there is no uncompensated loss, no sacrifice that is without requital, no grief that is unassuaged. But it is also no illusion, but uncontested fact that here and now we know that hatred, cruelty, intolerance, and indifference to human misery are evil; that love, kindliness, tolerance, forgiveness and truth are good, so unquestionably good that we do not need God or heaven to assure us of their worth.'

We are grateful for the astringent quality of this book, no less than for the modesty which occasionally peeps out from its pages. The traditionalist will hate it as much as the muddleheaded, the modernist will say that philosophically it does not go far enough.

T. WIGLEY.

CONVERSION OR CATASTROPHE*

'He that wrestles with us strengthens our nerves and sharpens our will. Our antagonist is our helper.' Lord Elton puts this quotation on the first page of his book, *Saint George or the Dragon*. It strikes the keynote of what he has to say. His subject is national morale, which is national morals in wartime. Morale is of supreme importance, because 'the total warfare of our time is a struggle not between armies, fleets and air forces merely, but between nations themselves, their every quality and their every resource.' To-day we are fighting for our national existence, as we have not fought since Napoleon. How are we standing the strain?

In times of crisis there are always some who call the nation to repentance. Lord Elton makes very clear the faults which caused us to allow Germany to make a second world war only twenty years after we had defeated her in the first. The chief of them is materialism. In the years between the two world wars money was more desired, more honoured and more powerful than at any other time in our national history. But materialism is soft, for the materialist believes that there is nothing for which it is worth while to sacrifice the good things of life. We were soft. We preferred butter to guns. We boasted that our standard of living was the highest in Europe. We loved our peace and ease, and therefore we shut our eyes to threats of war from Germany, since to take them seriously would have cost us money and trouble. Even our virtues had grown soft. 'The characteristic virtue of our age was kindness; and the perversion of kindness is softness.'

We can find few causes for satisfaction as we regard the record of what we did and thought in the years between the two world wars. What then of our morale during the war, especially since Dunkirk and to-day? War makes supreme demands on 'the most fundamental and familiar of all the virtues . . . loyalty, courage, endurance, discipline.

> 'During the peace we greatly undervalued these virtues. But Dunkirk, the blitz, and many other trials and reverses since have proved that our people can show the highest examples of these virtues. The Russians are defending themselves against the German invaders with the greatest courage, partly because they have been taught for twenty years that the welfare of Russia is of infinitely more importance than their own. Our people have not had this schooling in the duty of selfsacrifice. But we have nevertheless shown a toughness which has amazed the world and surprised ourselves.'

Our morale is as high to-day, or higher, than at any time since the war began, giving us solid reasons for confidence in our ultimate victory. What of the future when the war is won? Lord Elton is chiefly concerned to describe the sort of people he wants us to become, for his subject is national morale. But he makes some valuable suggestions for changes in our educational system, our democratic institutions and our economic life. The reforms are very thorough, as one would expect from a writer on national morale; but the nation is in a chastened mood, and ready for change. The changes he proposes are those which far-sighted and generous-hearted people would welcome. In a foreword he says that he has two prejudices. 'I believe that change, however sweeping, should have its roots in the past, and for another I am a Christian.' He is faithful to these two principles throughout his book.

* *Saint George or the Dragon,* by Lord Elton. (Collins. 1942. 6/-.)

His chief desire is to see a revival of religion in this country. People must worship something, and if they do not worship God they will worship money (ourselves) or the state (the Germans) or humanity (the Russians). The weakness of Lord Elton's book is that his conceptions of the Christian faith are in certain cases ill-informed. He is right to point out that in the soft pre-war days a wishy-washy Christianity was preached which seemed to have forgotten the meaning of the Cross, which is the sign of sacrifice. Before the Nazis declared war on Christianity, German Christians talked a lot about the heroic courage with which Christ faced his enemies. This was also something which seemed to have been forgotten by English Christians. The fact of sin too was passed over much too easily. But Lord Elton's treatment of the problem is not helpful. He assumes that St. Paul's doctrine of original sin is a correct interpretation of *Genesis* 3, which it is not. This is an example of how largely as a nation we have ceased to study the Bible, how ignorant we are of the truths which modern study has discovered. Like Lord Elton we desire to see a religious revival in this country; we need to become again a nation guided by sound Christian principles, in order that our share in the work of reconstruction after the war may be worthy, and Christian faith is the only power which can keep men true to their principles in the confusions and temptations of life. But if Christian faith is to be influential and enduring; it must be based upon sound learning and wide experience. Here is a great opportunity for the Modern Churchmen's Union, and for all Liberal Christians.

J. K. NETTLEFOLD.

CYRIL BARDSLEY: EVANGELIST*

The son and gradson of clergymen, Cyril Bardsley was trained for the ministry at Wycliffe Hall and became a curate at his father's church. He then became Vicar of St. Anne's, Nottingham for two years before he moved at the invitation of his friend the Bishop of Liverpool to St. Helens. From 1910—22 he worked at Salisbury Square as Honorary Secretary of the C.M.S. As vicar he had done much to interest people in Overseas Missions, but he now had much greater opportunity of devoting himself to the work he loved. His tolerance, his gift for friendship, his infectious laughter did much to smooth over natural difficulties and to promote enthusiasm for the cause of the C.M.S., and by personal letters and by his tour through Canada, India, and China, he gave direct encouragement to the missionaries.

It is perhaps unfortunate that Dr. Bardsley resigned his secretaryship in 1922 when the C.M.S. was threatened with a split between the 'Conservatives,' on the one hand, who clung to the old traditions of the C.M.S. and the Modernists and the Anglo-Catholics on the other hand. Finding himself unable to harmonise the conflicting groups he probably resigned to give the C.M.S. a chance to recover under new leadership. Grateful tribute, however, is paid to his work by his colleagues at Salisbury Square and the missionaries themselves.

After a brief nine months as the Secretary of the new Missionary Council of the National Church Assembly he was consecrated Bishop of Peterborough in 1922, and when this large diocese was divided in 1927 he became the Bishop of the new diocese of Leicester.

Bishop Bardsley was not a 'learned theologian'; his education had suffered through ill-health and an unfortunate accident in the school gymnasium resulting in concussion of the brain. He never took any part in Bishops' councils and was often obliged to withdraw from his work for necessary recuperations. He was conscious of his limitations and humble as a result of them.

* *Cyril Bardsley: Evangelist*, by Joan Bayldon. (S.P.C.K. 1942. 9/-.)

His chief work for the Church undoubtedly lay in the sphere of evangelism. Here his natural gift of tolerance and fellowship and hearty good humour found full scope. Much of his energies were absorbed by the routine work of organisation, preaching and the raising of large funds, but his enthusiasm and heart were in the evangelisation of the diocese. To quote from his address to the Diocesan Conference in November 1934.

> 'My own convictions are known to you all. I can truly adapt some words of St. Paul and say "Of the stock of Evangelicals, of the tribe of Evangelicals, an Evangelical of the Evangelicals"' (p. 162).

It was he who originated the Men's Year, the diocesan team to awaken the parishes, the conventions at Swanwich, The Solemn Assemblies, the mass meetings for councillors and the 1939 campaign in Leicester. His aim was to revitalise parish life and make both the clergy and laity increasingly conscious of their responsibility to live and teach the Christian life.

The results of such work are very difficult to assess. Bishop Bardsley was himself disappointed in the results of his 'campaign to spread the Gospel and bring souls to Christ.' Although undoubtedly his enthusiasm and sincerity must have been an inspiration to the diocese, and although evangelists must always be an important part of the Church's work, perhaps his methods were not the best for an age which is inclined to be cynical in its approach to Christianity and which demands a closer interrelation between religion and those social and political problems which now weigh so heavily on men's minds.

No review of his life would be adequate which does not stress the saintliness of the Bishop's character. 'Such a life is a wonderful witness to the Grace of God.'

ERIC W. BREWIN.

A RESPONSE TO TAMBARAM*

Revelation and Reunion is an important book on reunion from the Anglican point of view, important not so much for any new facts or opinions, as for the attitude of sympathy and reasonableness.

The chapters on revelation show how little any of us have learnt direct from God as individuals compared with all we have learnt in fellowship with others. This thought emphasises the importance of the Church, not just as a man-made organisation, but as the sphere in which we live and receive our spiritual nourishment.

From this point the argument naturally turns to the need for a reunited Church, and from that to the things necessary for reunion.

It is hard for an Anglican reviewer to assess the effectiveness of this book, which is intended mainly to commend the strictly Anglican point of view to non-Anglicans. But the impression one has is that the logical argument for the Church is well sustained, but that when the author comes to the particularly Anglican points, especially the necessity for bishops, and the absolute necessity for an episcopally ordained minister at the Eucharist, there are little gaps in the logic, which are perhaps scarcely noticeable to an Anglican who is accustomed to these things by habit.

The author admits that bishops have not at all times been monarchical autocrats, and he prefers the constitutional episcopate which is found in some of the Anglican Churches overseas. But if one admits such variety, how is the word 'bishop' to be defined? and what answer is to be given if Presbyterians assert that their presbyters are bishops? The mere asking of these questions suggests that episcopacy, however desirable, cannot be as fundamental as the Church itself.

* *Revelation and Reunion, a Response to Tambaram,* by G. W. Broomfield. (S.P.C.K. 1942. Paper, 4/-; cloth, 7/6.)

We agree with the author that the Eucharist is an act of the whole body of the faithful. His conclusion, that the minister at the Eurcharist should therefore be one recognised by the *whole* Church as authorised to act as its representative, is no doubt ideally true, just as it is ideally true that every participant at the Eucharist should be holy, but neither requirement is fulfilled anywhere to-day. The temporary expedient suggested for the reunited Church of South India, that existing ministers should be recognised without episcopal ordination, should not be condemned as it is by the author. It is not ideal, but a result of our past failures, and on a par with the present fact that even an Anglican or Roman priest is not authorised by the *whole* Church to celebrate the Eucharist outside his own denomination.

L. E. Browne.

THE SKERRY OF SHRIEKS*

Mr. Morley's book *The Call of the Spirit,* is not a book at all. It is a collection of a number of scattered and scattering observations on diverse themes with little or no connection with each other. The result of reading it is a confusion of mind which is largely the result of incoherence in the author. In these days it is not enough to proclaim a triumphant faith in transcendent forces without giving a reason for the faith that is in one; exclamation marks can never take the place of arguments in any book which we may assume is an appeal to the mind of its reader. It is not enough to write,

> 'On with the fray! We have now come too far in our course for prayer and supplication to have the slightest effect upon the outcome of the clash of arms . . . How all this could have been avoided if we had confided in the Arm and Shield of God!'

The author, like many other pacifists, has not grasped the fact that unless the Spirit is able to find a body by which to express itself, it is as if it were not. Certain obligations arise from the possession of a body, self-maintenance is of prime importance, which in its turn involves the maintenance of an environment favourable to the survival of a spirit-expressing body. If all men everywhere were ready to confide 'in the Arm and Shield of God,' whatever they may mean, there would doubtless be disarmament all round. The problem of self and environmental maintenance, however, looms large when the unarmed or disarmed are threatened with destruction by the well armed who embody a totaly different spirit. The opinion of a Pole, a Czech, a Slav, a Norwegian, Dutchman, Belgian, or Frenchman, on this vague philosophizing of Mr. Morley would be as valuable as it would be pungent; he would agree with one sentence in this book, 'You cannot appease people who will not be appeased.' After a vigorous condemnation of the pre-war government's policy in Ethiopia and in Spain, it is with some amazement that we read that, in the 'eye for an eye' passage,

> 'Christ shows a sublime disregard of all material and transient values. With him these things do not matter; They are not real and are of no account.'

One seems to remember another saying of Jesus that your heavenly Father knoweth what things ye have need of. We are face to face to-day not with 'a *dead* materialism,' as Mr. Morley claims, but with a materialistic spirit which is very much alive, and which will remain alive for a longer time than any Christian will care to contemplate, if in the name of Christ his followers go on pretending their body has no survival value in the realm of spirit, and is not worth defending against aggression by any extension of body such as weapons provide. Mr. Morley is consumed with certain periods. He hates diplomats and politicians, 'They are vampires, thriving

* *The Call of the Spirit,* by William Morley. (C. W. Daniel. pp. 173. 1941. 7/6.)

upon the life-blood of their fellow-men. Parasites *in excelsis.*' He has apparently never heard of Lord Lothian. He hates Conservatism

> 'under its banner are ranged all the worshippers of Mammon, all financial manipulators, the selfish and the inconsiderate.'

He hates *Punch,* which 'recognizes only the existence of a certain class. And what a class! one essentially parasitic.' He hates all medical research which uses animals in its investigations,

> 'It is a violation of every moral law; an offence in the sight of God, which will demand in due time its own retribution.'

Has he never heard of M. & B. 693 and the help of the mouse in that discovery? of Retan's monkeys and respiratory paralysis? of the help of fowls, guinea-pigs, and mice, in making possible our present knowledge of nutrition? After this tale, it is a small thing to be told that Mr. Morley hates zoos and circuses, or that 'the activities of the Church are too often expended in amiable futilities, and peter out in the shallows of purposelessness and indifference.' Even the chapters on 'the meek' does not restore our equanimity, for there is a place and time for anger when in this chapter we read,

> 'The priests in league with our rulers again beseech the people to serve God and Mammon.'

If this is the call of the Spirit, we prefer to be deaf to such a voice. Did not Pythagoras declare, 'Silence is better than unmeaning words?'

T. WIGLEY.

THE LIBERATION OF AN IMPRISONED SOUL

Dr. Marett's *A Jerseyman at Oxford* has been followed by another Oxford autobiography, *The Confession of an Octogenarian* * by L. P. Jacks, editor of the *Hibbert Journal,* and for some years Principal of Manchester College, Oxford.

Both authors can claim to be Oxford men: both have lived the greater part of their life in Oxford, yet the former knows himself to be an insider and the latter feels himself to be an outsider. The reasons for this are easily understandable by those who know Oxford. Dr. Marett passed from his school to Balliol, and thence to a Fellowship at Exeter College, becoming in due course Rector. Dr. Jacks was already a graduate of London, a Unitarian minister who had exercised an influential ministry in the great cities of Liverpool and Birmingham before he came to Oxford. He then came, not to occupy a University post, but the headship of a Nonconformist theological college. He found Oxford dons friendly: the University conferred on him the honorary degree of Master of Arts—a very real distinction. Nevertheless, Dr. Jacks feels himself to be not an Oxford man—and he is right. To be an Oxford man demands not only that one should enter Oxford early, but that one should possess a certain social and cultural background, and these qualifications Dr. Jacks, with admirable frankness, makes no claim to have possessed. He belonged to the shop-keeping class in a provincial English town where he was born in the year 1860. Both his father and his mother were no ordinary people and both secured, but in very different ways, the love and reverence of their son.

Our contemporary pessimists, who weep for the social and economic conditions of modern England, would do well to compare the Nottingham of to-day with the Nottingham of the 1860's described in this autobiography. The hardships and vicissitudes of his early life bred in young Jacks a sense, not of pessimism, but of apprehension — life's potentialities for disaster — which the success and prosperity of the years that followed have never entirely eliminated. This, although it is not usually recognized, we believe to be

* *The Confession of an Octogenarian,* by L. P. Jacks. (Allen and Unwin. 1942. 15/-.)

one of the fundamental differences between Victorian youth and the youth of to-day. The youth of to-day complains continually of frustration if things do not turn out for him in accordance with his desires. The Victorian youth counted himself fortunate if, surrounded as he was with imminent disasters of every kind, he managed to escape them—though not without loss and pain and hard endeavour.

Originally a member of the Church of England, Jacks, while yet a lad, was converted to Unitarianism. Sam Collinson, great-hearted, large-minded, whose presence as a lodger in the Jacks' household brought him into close contact with the lad, effected the conversion which even the influence of Jacks' kind and able schoolmaster, George Herbert, was not able to counteract.

After a hard struggle, inspired by the example of the heroes of Smiles' *Self-help,* who rose early, worked late, and ate the bread of carefulness, Jacks became an Undergraduate of London University, 'that Mother of Orphans' of which he writes with deep gratitude.

> 'London University which, by opening its gates to "external students," has provided a way of escape for thousands of imprisoned souls, mine one of them' (p. 64).

Here he was attracted to the study of philosophy; an interest which he retained for the rest of his life, although he failed, notwithstanding all his philosophical reading, to become a formal philosopher and develop a system of his own. Some may judge his mind was too discursive and lacked the logical faculty, but others may judge that his close contact with reality and his realization of its manifold complexity and its absorbing problems made him sceptical of any philosophical system which could claim to have solved the mystery of the Universe. Kant, Bergson, Josiah Royce, and above all Spinoza, taught him most; but he read his philosophers 'between the lines,' and although he received inspiration and illumination from them all, yet they provided him with no final solution. He did not come out by the same door wherein he went. He went on through door after door, and realized that there were yet many more doors ahead.

The next stage in the life of our autobiographer was passed in preparation for the ministry of the Unitarian Church as a student of Manchester College, then situated in London. Here he came under the influence of the great Martineau, and the hardly less great Estlin Carpenter, who became his most generous and loyal friend, and in the atmosphere of whose Christian home he realized how saintliness can be united to scholarship, and fearless research to devotional wonder. Owing to Estlin Carpenter's influence, Jacks began his ministerial career at Bedford Chapel as assistant minister to that prophetic personality, Stopford Brooke, who is gratefully remembered by many as the author of one of the best of our English religious biographies, that of Robertson of Brighton, and as an illuminating guide to the literary and historical sources of Shakespeare's plays. Compelled by conscientious scruples, Stopford Brooke resigned his royal chaplaincy and sacrificed his ecclesiastical prospects to become the minister of Bedford Chapel. Jacks learned much from him and had the good fortune to become his son-in-law.

When the *Hibbert Journal* was founded in 1902, Jacks became its editor. Under his editorship the *Hibbert Journal* far exceeded the expectation of its founders and secured a world-wide circulation. The *Hibbert Journal* owed its success not only to the fact that as a review of contemporary religion, theology and philosophy it met a 'felt want,' but also to the cross-bench mind of its editor and his determination to meet the demands of a reading public similarly constituted. As editor he was not concerned in the *Hibbert Journal* to present his readers with his own convictions and merely publish articles which reflected those convictions. He desired that his journal should be a forum of

opinion, and demanded that what he published should arrest attention and be lucid in exposition and popular in style. If each article contradicted its fellow, so much the better.

The editorship brought him into contact with a great number of influential personalities, particularly in the world of religion and philosophy. Invitations to lecture in Great Britain and the United States were numerous and enlarged his reputation and experience. As a lecturer he succeeded better than as a preacher, for, although deeply religious, he really possessed no definitely theological or ecclesiastical interest and attachments. Matthew Arnold's *Literature and Dogma* provided him with as much as he was able to assimilate in the Biblical and dogmatic spheres. Some years ago we heard him say 'I have just been re-reading *Literature and Dogma* and I find it as good as ever'; and his autobiography indicates that he has not changed his mind since then. The fundamental article of his religious faith is his belief in the guidance of God—a guidance which he believes has been granted to him at all the turning-points of his life and will not cease for him when this earthly life terminates. Although he was President of the Society for Psychical Research, it is not on the results secured by that research that he rests his faith in future existence, but on the more sure foundation of his own spiritual experience.

As an author he has been voluminous, although he only started late in life. Probably he will be best remembered as a religious biographer: his lives of Stopford Brooke and Charles Hargrove are of outstanding value. Of his other works we prefer *Legends of Smokeover, The Lost Radiance of the Christian Religion* and *Elemental Religion,* but probably *Mad Shepherds* is most characteristic of him, for, although born in a town, he is essentially a rural man and loves the life and work, the social intercourse and sights and smells of the countryside.

His autobiography raises many issues, but we have only space to touch on three.

(1) His New Testament studies have led him to the conclusion that Immortality is its central and supreme theme. For Jesus Christ, we believe, the supreme interest was the Kingdom of God: 'Thy kingdom come on earth as it is in heaven.' For St. Paul, we believe, the supreme interest was Salvation from Sin through faith in Jesus Christ and by the gift of the Spirit. For the writer of the Fourth Gospel, the supreme interest is Eternal Life realized in the knowledge of God which comes to men through Him who is the Way, the Truth and the Life. We think that Dr. Jacks' conclusion is too restricted and better describes Plato's supreme interest.

(2) Dr. Jacks is the best-known Unitarian in this country. But what is his real relationship to Unitarianism and what view does he hold of its prospects? Many years ago we learnt from that distinguished scholar W. E. Addis (author, with T. Arnold, of the *Catholic Dictionary*) that there are two kinds of Unitarians. The one type affirms as its ideal 'Doctrine and Worship both alike free.' Its members may be orthodox, judged by traditional orthodox standards, but they would claim that their religious convictions and their expression of them develop with enlarging experience. In many cases their new views subsume their old ones: in other cases they contradict them. This troubles them not at all. As Christians they enjoy to the full the great Christian gift of freedom in the Spirit. This they have found to be the great advantage of Unitarianism, in which the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man are increasingly realized under the guidance of the Spirit. The other type of Unitarianism is dominantly dogmatic. It is primarily concerned to affirm the Unity of the Godhead, and to deny the Deity of Jesus Christ and the rightfulness of worshipping him.

Dr. Jacks is a Unitarian of the first type. Had he to choose between affirming that Jesus Christ is God or that Jesus Christ is man he would prefer

the former. Of course both affirmations used in isolation are unorthodox. The God-Man is the only orthodox way of defining the Person of Jesus Christ. Yet Dr. Jacks, if required to choose between the label Unitarian or Trinitarian, would claim the former — but clearly he regards both these labels as out of date. When in 1928 Unitarianism became an organized denomination, and so seemed to Dr. Jacks to be 'foreign to the genius of the movement, and likely to destroy its effectiveness as contributory to "completing the work of the Reformation,"' he withdrew his name, as did other notable Unitarians, from the official list of Unitarian ministers.

(3) English Churchmen naturally turn to the account that Dr. Jacks gives of the controversy aroused by Unitarians preaching in Liverpool Cathedral. He is of the opinion that the issue having been raised by Lord Hugh Cecil, the verdict of the bishops was inevitable. It was certainly deplorable that the protest was made, especially as it was popularly understood that Liverpool Cathedral was to be in an unique sense the spiritual home of the people of Liverpool and that in its free pulpit any great spiritual and moral teacher might deliver his message. Sympathizing with this ideal, many wealthy Unitarians had given generously to the Building Fund of the Cathedral. It ought to be added that the sermons delivered by Dr. Jacks and the Rev. Lawrence Redfern proclaimed a noble spiritual message without taint of heresy.

Many English Churchmen who believe that it is possible to secure a free pulpit without any sacrifice of our Church's essential orthodoxy feel compelled to recognize that Lord Hugh Cecil's protest was as deplorable as was the mismanagement which permitted the affair to conclude with a decision which evaded the true issue. Hence what might have been a triumph for Christian freedom in the Church of England served only to display episcopal lack of statesmanship.

The Confession of an Octogenarian is a sincere and searching attempt to present the efforts of an 'imprisoned soul' to secure moral, intellectual and spiritual freedom and transmit it to others, and that with more success than the modest author of the Confession would be prepared to admit.

H.D.A.M.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman*

Sir,

MAURICE ARTHUR CANNEY.

Your 'In Memoriam' notice of M. A. Canney ought to be amplified with a reference to his most detailed and ambitious publication, namely *An Encyclopaedia of Religions* (1921). This was an endeavour to present in a volume of moderate size, information about most of the ancient and modern religions, ethnic and historical. Containing a good deal of material not found in the great Encyclopaedias and not easily accessible, it bore testimony to the extent of his reading, to the catholicity of his interests, and to what he himself called 'the ABC habit' which he had acquired when writing articles.

Didsbury College, Manchester. C. J. Wright.

Sir,

THE VATICAN AND THE WAR

The article entitled 'The Vatican and the War' in the June number of the *Modern Churchman* is distinctly untimely. It is essential, particularly at this time, for all Christians to work together for our fundamental principles. It would be very easy for a Roman Catholic to write a criticism of the Church of England, but we would agree that it would be deplorable at this time.

There are certain facts which, if the author had included, would give a more balanced view. About two years before the war an encyclical letter was 'smuggled' into Germany and read from all Roman Catholic pulpits one Sunday. It was the famous '*Mit Brennende Sorge*' condemning National Socialism, even before Britain did. The writer of 'The Vatican and the War' has also forgotten that when Hitler visited Rome, the Pope ordered the Vatican Library to be closed in his face. The Pope also stated that 'a cross which is alien to the cross of Christ has been raised over Rome.' This was a criticism of Mussolini, who had ordered it.

The encyclicals of German Bishops, *e.g.* Cardinal Faulhaber, Bishop Von Galen of Munster and Bishop Von Preysing of Berlin, have also condemned the Nazis even during the war, when they risked great penalties. These facts seem to be far from supporting National Socialism.

C. of E. Chaplain, Chaplains' Office,
R.A.F. Station, Kirkham, Lancs.
July 1st, 1942.

E. J. Strover (S/Ldr. C.F.).

Sir,

We should be only too pleased if we could see all Christians working together against Nazism and Fascism. It would be the height of madness to repel support from any quarter. Unfortunately we happen to be at war with two countries, one of which is entirely Roman Catholic and the other half so. Most of the leaders of Nazism are Roman Catholics, by education at any rate. Von Papen is still Chamberlain to the Pope. Roman Catholics are fond of insisting on the wonderful hold they have on their people. Is it lack of will or lack of power which prevents them from restraining their spiritual subjects in Germany and Italy? There was no lack of vigour when it was a question of dealing with Tyrrell and Loisy.

It is very difficult indeed to get an unbiassed account of religion in Germany under Hitler. There is a well-documented study of the relation between the Nazi Government and the Churches, Protestant and Catholic, called 'Religion in the Reich,' by Mr. Michael Power, a Roman Catholic. He is candid about the compromising policy of the Catholic Hierarchy. Cardinal Innitzer, he tells us, declared when Austria was seized: 'Both priests and faithful will stand unconditionally behind the great German State and its Führer.'

I did not write with any intention of criticizing Pope Pius XII. To his own Master he standeth or falleth. I see his point of view; to a certain extent I sympathize with it. At the time of the Spanish Civil War English opinion was predominantly on the side of the anti-clerical, not to say anti-Christian, Republican Government. That attitude was bitterly resented throughout the Catholic world, especially in France; this was very evident in 1938.

As Bishop Butler said, 'Things are what they are, and their consequences are what they will be. Why should we wish to be deceived?' Mr. Bernard Shaw owes much of his reputation to his habit of blurting out unpleasant truths; only, being Irish, his arid common sense is regarded as amusing. In the *Saturday Evening Post* the other day he wrote that 'Mr. De Valera is asking Mr. Churchill to imperil his forty million people for the sake of the mere paper neutrality of four million hostile Irishmen.' Let us hope he exaggerates.

When I spoke of the opportunism of the Church, I was not referring only to the Church of Rome.

G. Milner.

Sir,

WHAT ARE NECESSARY DOGMAS?

A national Church must necessarily contain considerable varieties of belief. There must also be some minimum of dogma. What is this minimum? The report entitled *Doctrine in the Church of England* gives some guidance

on this matter, although it was outside the province of the Commission (pp. 2, 3) to define exactly what the minimum was. Nevertheless they have in some cases gone ouside their terms of reference and 'indicated a clear line beyond which any doctrine or interpretation would seem to us not permissible' (p. 3). I write now to express the opinion that in one case when they have done this they have gone wrong.

The point I wish to raise is the Resurrection (pp. 83-88), by which of course I mean the historical Resurrection, not the doctrine of the future life. Though somewhat disguised, it is fairly clear there are two sections on the Commission, one of which believes (more or less) in the literal truth of the Gospel account, and the other does not. The other believes the story of the empty tomb to be 'symbolic,' and bases belief in the Resurrection on the appearances of Jesus to his followers after his death.

What I wish to point out is that the common-sense layman has no use for these subtleties. If it is allowable to regard the Gospel story as unreliable, 'symbolic,' or mythical, it is foolish to regard the Resurrection as a necessary dogma. By all means let those who believe in an 'appearance' Resurrection continue to do so, but it is too subtle to be the groundwork of a general belief. Also it ceases to be reasonable. It is reasonable to believe in the Resurrection on the authority of an infallible Church, but we do not accept the infallible Church (p. 36). It is reasonable to accept the Resurrection if the evidence of the gospel story is adequate, but 'it is impossible in the present state of our knowledge to make the same evidential use of the narratives of the miracles of the Gospels which appeared possible in the past' (p. 51). It is not reasonable to believe in the Resurrection on account of the apostolic *kerygma* (p. 84). All that can reasonably be got out of that is that probably something remarkable happened but we do not know what. It is not wise to insist on a belief when the reasonable grounds have disappeared. In short my contention is that the remarks of the commission on miracles (pp. 50-52) are admirable, but the Resurrection is one of the miracles.

These remarks are obviously negative. The positive question—what is the necessary minimum—I cannot answer in the space at my disposal.

H. S. Shelton.

Sir,

The difficulty raised by Mr. H. S. Shelton is a real one, but it is, I think, inescapable in the present situation. It appears to boil down to this: modern criticism and knowledge have raised certain difficulties about accepting the statements in the New Testament as literal statements of facts; the authority of the traditional Christian dogmas is therefore not so absolute as it was once regarded. What then is the Church to do?

It cannot say explicitly 'Everything is in the melting-pot, and we do not know where we stand,' for most of its practising members still hold firmly to the traditional beliefs. It is not in a position (*pace* Mr. Shelton) to say exactly what happened, or what must be believed about everything. This difficulty may lead to utterances which to 'the common-sense layman' appear to be 'subtleties,' but that difficulty is inherent in the situation.

Is it reasonable to demand new dogmatic definitions of minimum beliefs (especially about matters of historical fact) when the matter is still *sub judice*? We are in a transitional period of religious thought and any attempt whether by Commissions or common-sense laymen to crystallise an official dogmatic residuum would be premature.

The Commission therefore wisely limited itself to the recording of what is believed among various Christians, and if they assert that something must have happened to account for the belief in the triumph of Christ over death

they are only saying what Mr. Shelton himself recognises as necessary. After all, the belief in the Resurrection ('however explained,' Report p. 84) *is* an essential part of the Christian faith.

T. J. Wood.

249 Grand Buildings,
Trafalgar Square, London, W.C.2.
5*th August*, 1942.

POPULATION PLANNING.*

Sir,

The passages in your Editorial for May, against which Sir Francis Fremantle protests seem to err if anything on the side of under-statement. The pressure of population has been in all ages an underlying cause of war. The struggle for existence goes back to the first beginnings of organic life.

That over-population is the cause, not merely a cause, of the present war can be proved from the writings of the man who began the war, Adolf Hitler. Happily our Adversary has written a Book; it is called *Mein Kampf;* it is the Bible of modern Germany. Published in 1933 when prudence might have suggested a certain amount of caution, it is perfectly out-spoken on Germany's need for more territory, more *lebensraum.* 'The National Socialist Movement must attempt to remove the disproportion between our population and our area' (p. 254). Could anything be franker?

The Kaiser, says Hitler, thought to provide for Germany's surplus population in areas outside Europe. 'The amazing increase of population of Germany before the war (of 1914) brought the question of providing the essential nourishment into a more and more prominent place in all political and economic thought and action' (p. 106).

Hitler, unlike the Kaiser, will not be satisfied with territory overseas. He wants, Germany wants, more land in Europe. 'Thou shalt give it me now, or else I will take it by force.' And when he says 'land,' he means soil tenanted by serfs or without human encumbrances. In the occupied territory one can see the system in working order. Reduction of population on a drastic scale has already begun. Where the population is recalcitrant, the firing squad takes the place of the Concentration Camp. 'Keep still, damn you,' as Dr. Johnson heard the fishmonger say to the eel he was skinning alive.

What are the Allies to do about it? There are only two possible courses. First we must win the war and take over the policy of the vanquished. Exterminate the exterminators. We know that Hitler means to reduce our population to, say 18 millions; let us reduce Germany's in the same proportion to, say 40 millions. 30 would be safer, but let us be generous. As to the methods to be pursued, I should prefer not to detail them in the *Modern Churchman;* some old-fashioned Modernists might think them sub-Christian.

We come to the second method, that recommended by our Editor. Rationalise the population of the world; redistribute it on rational lines and without reference to an effete state system. There are open spaces in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere awaiting the plough. That is what *Homo Sapiens* would do, if he deserved his name. *Homo Insipiens* just now prefers to crowd together in great cities which with the coming of the *Blitz* are turning into rabbit-warrens.

Nature does not tolerate over-population; famine, pestilence, war, these are the checks she supplies. On a finite earth there is not room for infinite people. During the last century the population of the earth has more than doubled. Since the eighteenth century the White Race has increased four-fold.

* *Current Trend of Population in Great Britain,'* Cmd. 6358, 1942: price 2*d.*

What is needed is not more people, but better people. Reckless multiplication of the unfit and systematic sterilisation of the higher types go together. Heavy taxation leads to deliberate restriction of families among the tax-paying minority. Modern war means the survival of the unfittest, those who can't pass the medical tests; it is horribly dysgenic, not merely cruel to the individual but bad for the race. Consider the losses in the Royal Air Force and other Air Forces; we are throwing away the cream of our manhood and keeping the dregs. Far better an honest famine or a good old mediaeval pestilence; they killed off the weaklings.

GAMALIEL MILNER.

Werrington Vicarage,
Launceston.

SIR,

In your June number you printed a letter from me on the fallacy of 'fertility beyond a level of subsistence' and added your inferences as to my views. May I respectfully correct them?

(*a*) The hereditary quality of children in a small family is probably the same as that in a large.

(*b*) The hereditary quality of first-born children is probably up to the average of the younger children.

(*c*) Total hereditary quality in a generation is in proportion to total quantity.

(*d*) Science cannot in effect apply the principles of the stud-farm to mankind. She can only advise against the breeding from dysgenic parents while emphasising the value to the State, as to the individual, of large families on a simple sufficiency of means in order to supply, in quality as in quantity, the world's varied needs in peace and war.

Meanwhile the proportion of Old Age Pensioners will be doubled in the next 30 years, unless we do something about it.

FRANCIS FREMANTLE.

SIR, LIBERAL CHURCHMEN NOT MODERN CHURCHMEN.

I was glad, as a member of the Union, to read again an article in the June number of the *Modern Churchman* by our distinguished ex-President, Dean Inge, on 'Christian Liberty.' In introducing his subject, he alludes to the name of both the Union and its journal. I am, I believe, a faithful member of the Union and a diligent reader of our journal, but I have always inwardly quarrelled with the name. As the Dean says, there is no meaning in 'Modern,' whereas the word 'Liberal' has a real and dignified significance and is full of suggestiveness.

Would it be possible for the Council to take up the matter and endeavour to change the name? I believe most members would welcome it.

Charles Rectory (St. Petrox), Barnstaple.
June 22nd, 1942.

WALTER N. JOYCE.

[At the time that the designation 'modern' was selected for our society there was already in existence a society of Liberal Churchmen so designated because they were Liberal in politics, the Liberal Party being at that time at the height of its power.

Although not a few of the members of our Union were Liberal in politics, it was felt to be desirable that we should not be identified with, nor be liable to be mistaken for, any political party or as having anything to do with party-politics.

The reasons which led to the selection of the term 'modern' are set forth by Prof. Percy Gardner (at that time President of the Union) in an

article entitled 'Modernism and Modernity' in the first number of the *Modern Churchman,* April, 1911.

Whilst unable, for publicity reasons, to alter the title of our magazine, we should offer no objection to the Modern Churchmen's Union substituting to-day the term 'Liberal' for 'Modern,' since in the public mind the term Liberal is no longer identified with adhesion to a political party.—ED., *M.C.*]

DOCTORS AND PARSONS.

SIR,

As an ordinary lay-woman who has done some work as a hospital librarian, may I offer a few remarks in response to Mr. Molesworth's letter, even though I missed the issue of the *Modern Churchman* containing the article Doctors and Parsons. The hospital where I have been working deals exclusively with surgical cases. Very few of the patients die, yet nearly all have to face life handicapped by some physical disability. In the course of my work I have been quite shocked to hear the clergy assure patients that all would be well in the near future, when it was obvious that it could not be. I did not know (as Mr. Molesworth says) that the doctors expect the clergy to take up this attitude. Yet how can this shallow and rather brittle 'cheerfulness' be associated with the Gospel? Surely any enlightened doctor would wish his patient to have hope imparted to him—but it must be *real* hope, and how can that be given except by the patient being made aware that his suffering need not be the futile frustration that it seems—that God can make it an instrument of Redemption—that it can become creative instead of destructive. Surely that is the true comfort of the Gospel. To see that comfort degraded into nothing more than a dose of soothing syrup with a poisonous base of falsehood seems very like a betrayal. When the true hope is implanted in a patient's mind it cannot fail to have beneficent effects upon the body—the cessation of anxiety—the relief of nervous tension and restorative powers.

I do not know anything about preparing a patient for death, but it seems to me that whether it be death or life, only the Gospel truth will do. That no one may trespass upon the right of a priest to take that truth to the needy. The words in which it is couched may vary from one age to another, but the essence is always the same.

GRACE FOX.

Birmingham.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND CHURCH SCHOOLS.

SIR,

You may have seen a letter in the *Oxford Times* of 1st May from Mr. Robertson Scott, editor of *The Countryman* (and member of the County Council Education Committee). In it he indicates his agreement with the position taken on the subject of religious instruction in schools, by the Bishop of Liverpool, and by Dr. Norwood in your columns, and, in fact, by most liberal churchmen.

It seems fatal to make a long-term policy of a separate syllabus which must recede more and more into a minor category. Mr. Scott quotes from *The School Child and Juvenile Worker.*

> 'The local education authorities . . . must safeguard the unity and peace of the schools by avoiding teaching of a divisive character.'

There is no reason to think they will safeguard these objects at the cost of effective Christian instruction. If the Churches were unable to agree on sufficient common ground for effective Christian teaching, it would be a severe condemnation of their essential Christianity and its validity as a sound and reasonable faith for the community as a whole. As a short-term policy pending a wider and more far-sighted one aiming at effective instruction in

all schools, the maintenance of our existing church schools seems necessary in view of prevailing indifference; but it is not so stated by the protagonists of the movement, but apparently as a permanent programme, coupled with the construction of new schools, on the same separatist basis. This policy seems to have no future.

I personally find that far more of the clergy than say so openly think in this way; and a good many support the thrust for new schools not because they think it wise or feasible, but for other readily comprehended reasons. As one, a Canon, observed in my hearing:

'I don't believe it can be a success, but I'm not going to be seen not trying for it.'

D. G. DAVIES.

The Rectory, Bletchington, Oxford.
5th May 1942.

SIR,

COUNTRY PARSONS AND THEIR PROBLEMS.

May I be allowed to express my entire agreement with your comments on the letter of Mr. Rolf Gardiner. The letter itself, I am afraid, recalled to my mind the story, probably apocryphal, of the town-bred parson who suggested to his country flock that they should milk their cows only once on Sundays, so as to find more time for Church attendance.

Newton St. Cyres Vicarage, Exeter. L. E. ELLIOT-BINNS.

SIR,

A GROWING MOVEMENT.

I believe you will be interested to know something about the second Long Vacation Divinity Course under the Manchester Reader in Religious Education which has recently been held at New College, Oxford. The course consisted of twenty-four one-hour lectures and was attended by some seventy members, forty others having been prevented from attending owing to lack of accommodation. One lecture was by Professor R. H. Lightfoot, one by Rev. T. J. Wood, and two by Rev. R. G. Griffith. Each of these lectures was a really valuable appendix to the course, and every student with whom I spoke said how grateful they had been to hear them.

The setting which New College gave to an important week should be grasped at once. The Manchester Reader, Mr. R. B. Henderson, an old scholar of the College, drew inspiration from that setting. At the outset our lecturer confessed to us that he had had no time to prepare his lectures adequately. Urgent War Office duties had made this inevitable, but I believe that it became as clear to every listener as to me that forty years of studied devotion to his subject was the true preparation.

To deliver twenty lectures in a single week, on the literary and historical background of the Bible, and that with merely the pretence of notes, unused, leaves me in vain search for words. What must be said is difficult. When a man so long and so deeply in earnest speaks his mind, he must take from us a few young imaginings; but not one of these hours passed without some great accomplishment of the Spirit being given in spirit and in truth.

It was not possible for me to talk with all who spent that week in listening — it was defined within two minutes as not a Conference — but those with whom I did speak will confirm the matter, if not the manner, of what I have written.

If this experience can be repeated year by year, Manchester College will be giving, through its Reader, continuing riches.

M. S. GOTCH.

The Bentley School,
Calne, Wilts.
September 2nd, 1942.